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The use of GNSS in the railways for passenger information services and selective 
door opening is already commonplace but the advancement of this increasingly 
popular navigation technique into safety of life rail applications has been hindered by 
the unknown level of measurement error caused by the local rail environment, 
especially that due to multipath. 
Current state of the art receiver technologies are discussed along with the additional 
advantages of signal differencing using local base stations. Limiting factors for 
hardware in a kinematic environment are also discussed and specific examples to the 
rail environment highlighted. 
Safety critical analysis techniques such as FMEA, HAZOP and FTA are reviewed to 
illustrate the evaluation of safety integrity values and the possibility of system risk, 
leading to the formation of a structured safety case. 
Three main data sets from electrified, rural and urban rail environments have been 
collected using dual frequency geodetic receivers in order to enable analysis of 
multipath effects in normal railway operations.  The code and phase data have been 
combined to compute fluctuations in multipath errors and these have been used to 
characterise this effect in both space and time.  Where phase positioning is possible 
comparisons with standard code-based positions have been made to assess the overall 
quality of the type of GNSS positioning expected to be operationally-viable on the 
railways.  Experiments have also been undertaken to evaluate the possible effects of 
electromagnetic radiation from overhead cables used to power the trains.   
 
Finally, the ways in which the results of these experiments can be used to help build a 
safety case for the use of GNSS on the railways are discussed.  Overall it is concluded 
that it is unlikely that multipath errors or electromagnetic interference will be the 
limiting factors in utilising GNSS for safety-critical railway applications. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Background 
 
The current UK rail network is owned by several private companies following the 
breakup of British Rail in the 1993 railways act. 
Because of this fragmented system, standardisation of the rail infrastructure has meant 
improvements and alterations to tried and tested methods are time consuming and 
costly. Despite this, there are constant changes to the rail network operational 
systems, the most major current change being the unification of all European rail 
systems through the implementation of the European Rail Traffic Management 
System (ERTMS) designed to allow trains from all EU countries to travel across 
country borders without issue. 
The current methods used to locate trains relies upon track circuits which leads to a 
large redundancy in track occupation as safety ‗buffer‘ zones have to be left between 
trains to avoid collisions. The ERTMS system has three levels, the most sophisticated 
of which (level 3) uses track mounted beacons (called Balises) to tell the train its 
location. These beacons together with the required under-carriage reader are costly 
and a very large number would be required in order to have continuous positioning 
accuracy along a line, so an alternate method of train location is required. 
 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) offer the opportunity to position a user 
anywhere in the world to a very high accuracy. In this thesis the US Department of 
Defence (DoD) run Global Positioning System (GPS) will be concentrated on as it is 
the only viable option for reliable global positioning due to it currently being the only 
complete system. The methods used and results obtained in this work are however 
highly applicable to the other GNSS systems as they operate in the same frequency 
band with similar signal structure. 
By using GPS as a location tool, physical additions to both train and track can be 
avoided, thus saving cost and inconvenience as line side equipment is difficult to 
maintain and is often subject to vandalism and harsh conditions. The current ‗fixed 
block‘ train positioning system requiring large amounts of redundant track can be Introduction 
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switched to the ideal ‗moving block‘ system where train separations are merely based 
on breaking distances, increasing track density and thus revenue. 
There are however very stringent guidelines for any new technology in the railways, 
stating that it can only be applied if the same pre-existing level of safety is 
maintained, or improved upon.  
There are levels of Required Navigation Performance (RNP) which define the 
accuracy (position compared to true value), integrity (ability of the system to inform 
the user of an error), continuity (the probability of maintaining navigational guidance) 
and availability (percentage of time the system is within limits of required 
performance) of a system so that when in design, the minimum system specification is 
known.  
 
RNP‘s were originally introduced when the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) Air Navigation Commission requested that the All Weather Operations Panel 
(AWOP) examine the possibility of extending the RNP concept, which was originally 
intended for en-route operations, to include approach, landing and departure 
operations (Filip, Polivka, & Suchanek, 2006). 
The use of RNP‘s have subsequently been adopted in the railways so that safety 
critical analysis of positioning systems can be carried out without confusion as to the 
levels being tested for. 
Alcouffe and Barbu (Barbu & Alcouffe, 1999) defined values, but these were 
designed to be altered depending on the application and so finalised RNP‘s for the UK 
railways are as yet undefined and only recommendations exist. 
This is where GPS is an unknown as the accuracy and integrity of GPS positioning in 
the rail environment have not yet been fully tested and so has yet to be determined as 
a viable solution.  
There have been numerous European projects, such as the Low Cost satellite based 
train location system for signalling and train Protection for Low-density traffic 
railway lines (LOCOLOC/LOCOPROL) (Lancien, 2005) that stated multipath (direct 
and reflected signals entering the receiver causing an error)  as an unknown level of 
error, the Advanced Position Locator system (APOLO) (Barbu & Alcouffe, 1999) and 
the Galileo Demonstrator for Railway Operation System (GADEROS) (Ulrech, 2002). 
Both of which meant to define and test prototype equipment for a satellite based train 
positioning system, but did so without investigating the levels of multipath or signal Introduction 
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error caused by the lineside infrastructure and so multipath was an undefined errors 
source that needed to be quantified for the rail environment. 
1.2  Objectives and Scope 
 
The public applications of GPS in the rail environment to date have been for non 
safety critical or very low safety level systems allowing their operational integrity to 
be lower than that of a ‗safety of life‘ system.  
The objective of this research is to try and determine the level of GPS signal error in 
the rail environment so that a safety case can be produced for its use as a positioning 
system. 
Through a range of experiments, the possibility of electro-magnetic (EM) interference 
from overhead power lines is investigated as well as degradation of GPS signals due 
to multipath in rural and densely urban rail environments from line side infrastructure 
and surrounding buildings. 
Multipath is investigated using the L1/L2 code multipath observable and its effect on 
the final position solution is qualitatively assessed.  
From this investigation, the results and conclusions are designed to help in the 
forming of a safety case for the use of GNSS as a positioning device in the UK rail 
network. 
1.3  Research Limitations 
 
This research considers the GPS constellation only, additional systems such as 
GLONASS and the future GALILEO will help to improve the accuracy and integrity 
of the final solution, but it is not within the scope of this research to evaluate these 
GNSS systems. 
The UK rail safety culture and methods of analysis are used as a tool for evaluation of 
the systems discussed; it is not the aim of this research to alter pre-existing methods 
for rail system safety level determination. 
The integrity of the GPS constellation is not part of this research, though this would of 
course be a contributing factor to any final system‘s safety qualification it was not 
possible to cover over the course of this research project. 
It is not the purpose of this research to produce a full safety case, merely to investigate 




1.4  Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter 1:  Describes the background and limitations of the research carried out as 
well as the contributions to the area of GNSS research. 
 
Chapter 2:  Background of key research sections, specifically GNSS signals and 
their interaction with given environments. The advantages of real time kinematic 
(RTK) networking and the underlying principles are discussed as a useful system for 
high accuracy real time positioning. 
The safety culture in the UK rail network is described, leading to an explanation of 
current uses of GPS in the railways and the error sources encountered due specifically 
to the rail environment. 
 
Chapter 3:  Risk and Safety analysis in the railways is detailed, Hazard analysis 
and system safety failure modes are discussed together with other current safety 
integrity level determination techniques. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
the rail safety culture are also outlined. 
 
Chapter 4:  The departmental RTK software suite is presented and its modular 
format is discussed. The research focused library and alternate algorithm design 
which allows full user customisation is outlined and demonstrated with results 
validation. 
 
Chapter 5:  Three data collection exercises are designed and recorded so that 
different rail environments can be investigated for GPS signal interference. The first 
uses a private train line in the Severn Valley to provide a test data set, helping to 
prepare for larger data sets later in the project.  
The second experiment is to detect any possible electromagnetic interference (EMI) 
due to overhead power lines on the electrified east cost main line.  
The third exercise makes use of GPS data from a full location package consisting of a 
dual frequency GPS receiver, accelerometer, gyroscope and tachometer mounted on Introduction 
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an electric suburban train travelling through the urban Birmingham New street area, 
though only the GPS data will be used in this research. 
 
Chapter 6:  Data from the three experiments is processed and the results are 
presented. Geometric comparison is shown to be non ideal and code multipath 
observable techniques are used to determine the effects of the local environment on 
GPS signals. 
Data snooping methods are devised to locate signal breaks so that possible EM effects 
can be isolated and recorded. 
 
Chapter 7:  Summation of the research carried out, leading to conclusions and 
possible future work. Limiting factors of the experimental results and possible 
improvements are also discussed. 
 
1.5  Research Contributions 
 
  Understanding of rail safety analysis techniques to help understand the limitations 
of GPS in a safety of life application so that further concept development can take 
place. 
  Analysis of GPS data in the rail environment providing insight into the various 
error sources present and their expected levels. 
  Electromagnetic interference from overhead cables is shown not to be an error 
source for GPs signals. 
  A research toolkit has been developed by the department with contributions from 
this work for easy network based RTK evaluation. 
   Background of Research 
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2  Background of Research 
2.1  Introduction 
 
To understand the issues surrounding the application of GPS in the rail environment, 
the underlying principles and systems must be fully understood before any further 
research can be understood. 
Section 2.2 explains the basics of the GPS system and goes on to detail the GPS 
signal in space (SIS) and the multiple signals that are modulated onto the main carrier 
frequencies. Section 2.3 provides the reasoning for and method used in RTK 
processing of GPS data. Section 2.4 discusses the Safety culture used in the UK 
railways and how this effects the changes and improvements made on a daily 
operational basis. Section 2.5 gives a brief overview of current applications of GNSS 
in the railways, specifically that of passenger information services and selective door 
opening. Section 2.6 outlines the possible error sources for GPS in the rail 
environment and focuses on that of possible EM interactions and the common error of 
multipath and its effects. 
 
2.2  GPS signals, processing and atmospheric effects 
 
2.2.1  Signal structures 
GPS satellites all transmit on the same two carrier frequencies called L1 (1575.42 
MHz) and L2 (1227.60 MHz), both of which are multiples (154 and 120 respectively) 
of an internally generated fundamental frequency of 10.23 MHz. 
The signals are right hand circularly polarized (RHCP) in order to take advantage of 
the Faraday rotation effect and reduce ionospheric interference. 
Modulated onto these carrier frequencies using binary phase shift keying (BPSK) are 
the individually assigned satellite pseudorandom noise (PRN) sequences. By using a 
spread spectrum of roughly 2MHz, code division multiple access (CDMA) allows the 
receiver to distinguish between multiple satellite signals and by using the PRN 
sequence it can identify which specific satellite it is receiving. Background of Research 
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This PRN sequence makes up the coarse acquisition (C/A) code, which together with 
the precision (encrypted) (P(Y)) code and navigation message is modulated onto the 
L1 signal.  
The C/A code has a wavelength of 300m and consists of a sequence of 1023 chips 
transmitted at a rate of 1.023Mcps. The P code consists of a very long (roughly 10
14 
chips) PRN code transmitted at a chip rate of 10.23Mcps and wavelength of 30m, 
allowing for comparatively high precision range measurements to be taken.  
Since 1994 the P code has been called the Y code due to the encryption designed to 
limit its availability to authorised users only. 
The Navigation message is 37500 chips long and contains the full constellation health, 
clock parameters and satellite ephemeris allowing the receiver to calculate precise 
satellite positions. It is transmitted at 50cps and it takes 12.5 minutes to receive the 
full message before it is repeated. 
 
2.2.2  GPS receiver design 
GPS receivers generally consist of an RF front end that feeds into a digital signal 
processing section which extracts the navigation data for use in the final data 
processing module (Ray, 2000) 
 
Receivers use right hand circularly polarized antennae to match the GPS signal for 
maximum gain. These antennae can be actively amplified to reduce overall noise, 
non-target frequencies and the signal reduction due to coaxial cable attenuation. 
The front end also has a frequency synthesizer driven by local oscillators which 
provide clock frequencies used to sample the GPS signal for analogue to digital 
conversion. These clock frequencies are then passed on to the digital signal processing 
section of the receiver. 
Throughout the RF processing, automatic gain control keeps the signal level at the 
required level whilst minimising the amount of noise introduced to the system. 
 
The digital signal processing uses multiple parallel channels to dynamically track 
individual satellites based on their PRN number. 
Each channel has a code and carrier tracking loop that work together with internally 
generated versions of the received signals which are modulated in-phase and Background of Research 
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quadrature-phase with the input signal. These combined signals are then correlated 
with early, late and prompt versions of internally generated code. 
The early and late correlation values (traditionally 1 chip apart, though recently 
narrow spacing of 0.1chips have become popular for multipath mitigation) tend to be 
used for code tracking and the prompt correlation values for carrier tracking. 
The prompt signal strips the C/A code from the input signal and outputs a continuous 
wave with phase transition caused only by the modulated navigation data. This feeds 
the carrier loop which outputs a continuous wave with the same frequency as the 
carrier input. This is then used to strip the carrier from the input signal in order to 
leave the C/A code, which then enters the code tracking loop (Wu & Zhang, 2005). 
The discriminator algorithm gives a calculated number on the code phase error, with 
the discriminator output signal, ε, calculated by: 
 
                (2.1) 
 
Where yE and yL are the early and late code correlation powers respectively. 
 
If the value of ε is equal to 1, the prompt code is aligned with the input C/A code.  
If ε > 1 the codes should be shifted to the right and if ε < 1, to the left. 
Once the code lock has been achieved, the carrier phase lock loop attempts to match 
the locally generated carrier phase to the incoming signal. Generally, receivers use a 
Costas loop as the effect of a 180° shift due to data bit transitions is ignored.  
The in-phase and quadrature-phase prompt correlation values are used to compute the 
carrier phase offset between the local and input signals. 
In carrier tracking, the integer number of carrier cycles are determined so that range 
measurements can be calculated and high accuracy position calculations can occur. 
If the signal is interrupted in some way, this can cause a ‗cycle slip‘ where the 
tracking process must begin again as an unknown integer number of cycles may have 
been unaccounted for, causing an ‗integer ambiguity‘. 
 
2.2.3  Ionospheric effect 
The ionosphere is located 50 to1000 km above the surface of the earth and is known 
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The effects are due to electrons in the atmosphere interacting with the L1 and L2 
signals, delaying the pseudoranges and advancing the phase. The severity of the effect 
is linked to the frequency of the signal passing through as well as the total electron 
content (TEC) of the signal path and so satellites observed at a low elevation angle to 
the horizon will have their signals affected to a greater extent due to their ionospheric 
path lengths being greater. 
Unfortunately, the TEC can vary significantly as shown in figure 2.1 depending on the 
local time, magnetic latitude and how close to the solar maximum it is as sunspots and 
solar activity can affect the electron density in the atmospheric plasma considerably. 
The TEC can also fluctuate rapidly and with limited predictability so removing the 

















By utilising the frequency dependence of the ionospheric effect, the range delay error 
on L1 or L2 can be removed through a simple linear combination of the L1 and L2 
frequencies, for L1: 
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Where   dion, L1 is the range delay on L1 due to the ionosphere 
f1, f2 are the frequencies of L1 and L2 
    P1, P2 are L1 and L2 range measurements 
 
If only single frequency GPS data is available, 8 coefficients have been included in 
the navigation message so that at least a 50% reduction in ionospheric error can be 
achieved (Klobuchar, 1987). 
2.2.4  Tropospheric effect 
The troposphere ranges from the earths surface to an average of 11km with it thinning 
to 8km at the poles and thickening to 16km at the equator, the troposphere contains 
roughly 80% of the atmospheric mass and is made up of water vapour and gases. This 
vertical range of the troposphere is where the ‗wet‘ part of the model is contained. 
The stratosphere stretches from the top of the troposphere, above the tropopause layer 
to about 50km in height. The ‗dry‘ component of the tropospheric model stretches 
from ground level to roughly 40km and despite it occupying the stratosphere as well 
as the troposphere, most of its effect is from the lower region inside the tropospheric 
layer. Because the tropospheric effect on GPS signals is non dispersive, the dual 
frequency mitigation approach used for the ionosphere cannot be used as the effects 
are frequency independent. 
The amount of path delay in the zenith direction due to the troposphere is in the range 
of 2m, increasing with zenith angle to several meters, so there needs to be a 
tropospheric model included when attempting precision position computations. 
The wet component of the tropospheric delay accounts for up to 10% of the total, with 
the dry component causing the remaining 90% error. 
The modified Saastamoinen tropospheric model (Saastamoinen, 1972) for calculating 
trop path delay requires variables such as the temperature, local atmospheric pressure, 
partial pressure of water vapour and height of the receiver location. The zenith angle 
to the satellite in question is also required and a mapping function is used to relate the 
combined wet and dry zenith delay to the received signal path delay. 
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Where  z is the zenith angle of the satellite 
  P is the atmospheric pressure in millibars   
T is the temperature of the receiver in Kelvin 
  e is the partial pressure of water vapour in millibars 
B and δR are correction terms dependent on receiver height and z and can be 
found on page 53 of Xu (Xu, 2003) 
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Where Rh is relative humidity in % 
 
For simplicity standardised values for pressure, temperature and humidity can be 
calculated from the following equations: 
 
225 . 5
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Where P0 is standard pressure ≈ 1013.25 millibars 
  T0 is standard temperature ≈ 18° Celsius 
  Rh0 is standard relative humidity ≈ 50% 
  H0 is reference height ≈ 0m 
 
There are alternative models such as the modified Hopfield model (Hopfield, 1963), 
Niell model (Niell, 1996) and Yionoulis model (Yionoulis, 1970), some of which 
separate the wet and dry components of the total zenith tropospheric delay, but all 
produce similar results. 
 
 Background of Research 
31 
 
2.3  Real Time Kinematic Relative positioning 
 
2.3.1  Point positioning 
For train signalling and control a positioning system needs to be able to produce real 
time positions within specified accuracy and integrity levels. 
Using GPS, point positioning can be carried out using pseudorange C/A 
measurements to four or more satellites in order to provide a preliminary position 
solution using least squares (Kaplan, 2005).  
 
u u j u j u j j ct x z y y x x       
2 2 2 ) ( ) ( ) (      (2.8) 
 
Where ρj is a pseudorange to satellite j 
  xj, yj and zj are the x, y and z coordinates of satellite j 
  xu, yx and zu are the x, y and z coordinates of the user 
  c is the speed of light 
  tu is the user clock offset 
 
From this equation, the user position is assumed to be a combination of an 
approximate user position and user clock offset u u u u t z y x ' , ' , ' , '  and incremental 
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This allows us to write  
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By performing an expansion about the approximate position and clock offset, a first 
order partial derivative Taylor series can be evaluated and substituted into equation 
2.8 to produce 2.11: 


































'        (2.11) 
Where  j '   is an approximate pseudorange to satellite j 
j    is the incremental change to the approximate pseudorange to satellite j 
   
2 2 2 ) ' ( ) ' ( ) ' ( ' u j u j u j j z z y y x x r         
 
By simplifying equation 2.10 with directional cosines axj, ayj and azj ,it can be shown 
 
u u zj u yj u xj j t c z a y a x a              (2.12) 
 
Which can be put in matrix form due to the need for 4 satellites as there are 4 
unknowns. This can then be rearranged to form 
 
Δx = H
-1Δρ    (2.13) 
 



















































































Equation 2.12 can be iterated until the position converges to a best estimate. This is 
ideal when there are 4 satellites, but if there are more than 4, equation 2.13 cannot 





















































Where n is the number of satellites being observed (n≥4). 
To overcome this, ordinary least squares is used to overcome a system with more 
equations than unknowns.  Background of Research 
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From 2.13 we require a value of Δx so that HΔx is close to Δρ. By forming a residual 
vector r, so that r = HΔx – Δρ and solving for the minimum value of its square 
(RSE(Δx)), provided H
TH is non-singular, Δx can be solved for as follows: 
Given that: 
RSE(Δx) = (HΔx - Δρ)
2    (2.14) 
And: 
(HΔx - Δρ)
2 = (HΔx - Δρ)








2    (2.16) 
 
By differentiating RSE, its gradient is calculated as: 
 
        ∇RSE = 2H
THΔx – 2H
TΔρ      (2.17) 
 
As long as H
TH is non-singular (all the columns of H are independent) we solve for 





TΔρ      (2.18) 
 




sometimes known as the least squares solution matrix. 
For now we will assume that Δρ and Δx contain errors in the linear forms: 
 
Δρ = ρT - ρL + dρ      (2.19) 
 
Δx = xT - xL + dx      (2.20) 
 
Where ρT and xT are the error free vector of pseudorange values and error free 
position and time values respectively 
ρL and xL are the vector of pseudorange values and position and time values 
respectively calculated at the linearization point. 
dρ and dx are the net errors in the pseudorange values and position and time 
estimates respectively. Background of Research 
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T]dρ = Kdρ    (2.21) 
 
Where the matrix K is defined in [] brackets. 
 
Equation 2.21 gives the relationship between the errors in pseudorange values and the 
errors in position and time. The covariance of dx is obtained by: 
 
cov(dx) = E(dx dx
T)    (2.22) 
 
Where E represents the expectation operator. 
 
Substituting this into 2.21 and assuming a fixed geometry we get: 
 














-1    (2.23) 
 
The assumption that the components of dρ are identically distributed, independent and 
have a variance equal to the square of the satellite user equivalent range error 
(UERE),  σ
2




UERE    (2.24) 
 
Where Inxn is the n×n identity matrix. 
 






UERE    (2.25) 
 
The vector dx has four components, representing the errors in the vector  
xT = (xu, yu, zu, ctb).  
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The covariance of dx is a 4x4 matrix: 
 
 
 cov(dx) =             (2.26) 
 
 
From 2.26, dilution of precision (DOP) values can be calculated as a ratio of the 
components of cov(dx) and σUERE.  
Geometric DOP (GDOP) which represents the effect of the standard deviation of the 
measurement errors on the solution is defined by: 
 
 
GDOP =           (2.27) 
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GDOP =  ?11 + ?22 + ?33 + ?44    (2.29) 
 
Other values for position, time, horizontal and vertical dilution of precision can also 
be calculated using these components to give a measure of the final solutions 
accuracy. 
 
If certain pseudoranges are known to be more degraded than others, or a system 
requires that certain signals have their effect on the final solution downgraded and 
others upgraded, a weight matrix W can be used in 2.18 as shown: 
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This can, as an example, be used in a position solution where there are limited 
satellites and so every available satellite must be used but if one of these satellites has 
a low elevation angle, its signal will be more prone to errors and so the effect of this 
pseudorange on the position solution can be reduced using a weight matrix.  
 
By introducing tropospheric and ionospheric models, pseudorange measurements can 
be improved, leading to a better position fix, but there are also other corrections, such 
as the inclusion of a residual satellite clock error, rotation of the earth and movement 
of the satellites during signal propagation known as the light time equation (Blewitt, 
1997) which are essential if the solution is to be within kilometres of the true position. 
When these error sources are included in the position solution, point positioning can 
occur with a general accuracy of 10m in the horizontal.  
The signal received can be broken into the various error sources as shown in equation 
2.31. 
s T I d d dt dt c P s r s r          ) (       (2.31) 
 
Where   P is the measured code range 
    ρ is the actual geometric range between satellite and receiver 
    δρ is the orbital error 
    c is the speed of light 
    dts is the satellite clock error 
    dtr is the receiver clock error 
dr is the receiver hardware delay 
ds is the satellite hardware delay 
    I is the ionospheric delay error 
    T  is the tropospheric delay error 
    s is the receiver noise and local signal errors 
   
If the L1 and L2 signals are used for phase measurements and L1 for pseudorange, 
provided the integer number of wavelengths have been resolved, precise point 
positioning can be carried out with a single static receiver to achieve centimetre level 
position accuracy. Background of Research 
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The problem with this setup is, for a receiver to be able to minimise the tropospheric 
and ionospheric errors it has to occupy a known point for a considerable amount of 
time which is not possible when trying to locate a kinematic receiver. 
 
2.3.2  Relative positioning 
By considering the fact that tropospheric and ionospheric errors are spatially 
correlated and that orbit and satellite clock errors cancel when dealing with multiple 
receivers, relative positioning can be used to facilitate high accuracy kinematic 
positioning. 
Using a reference receiver that permanently occupies a known point, the local signal 
corrections can be calculated. This is possible as the receiver knows its position to a 
high accuracy and thus knows the true geometric distance to the satellite in question 
(usually the highest elevation satellite in view to both receivers. 
Provided the second moving (rover) receiver stays within a localised area, the effect 

















By single differencing, orbital errors are reduced as they are very similar for both 
receivers, depending on the baseline length and satellite clock errors are removed 
from the pseudorange equation as they are the same. 
 
  S 
Ionosphere 
R1  R2  Troposphere 
d 
Figure 2.2 - Diagram of single differenced receivers Background of Research 
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From equation 2.31 single differencing using receivers 1 and 2 gives equation 2.32 
and 2.33 for phase and code measurements respectively. 
 




Where   Φ12
?  is the single differenced phase for receivers 1 and 2 
P 12
?  is the single differenced pseudorange for receivers 1 and 2 
?12 is the single differenced true geometric range for receivers 1 and 2 
???12 is the combined receiver clock offset 
?12 is the combined receiver carrier phase hardware delay 
    ?12 is the combined receiver code hardware delay 
𝜆?12 ?0  is the between receiver non initial (t0) zero phase in meters 
?12
?  is the carrier phase ambiguity 
I12 is the combined ionospheric error 
T12 is the combined tropospheric error 
    S12 is the combined receiver noise 
 
By observing two satellites simultaneously (double differencing – see figure 2.3) the 
receiver clock errors can be removed. Local environmental noise such as multipath 
cannot be eliminated as this is due to local reflectors and so is not linked to both 
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From equation 2.32 and 2.33, the addition of another satellite and receiver leads to 







?? are the double differenced pseudorange and phase for 
receivers 1 and 2 to satellites a and b 

















Even though the satellite clock offsets are removed as a possible error source in both 
single and double differencing, they must still be considered when calculating the 
positions of the satellites themselves. 
The advantages of using these methods are such that if the two receivers are close 
enough, all the error sources can be eliminated provided there is no multipath or cycle 
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Figure 2.3 - Diagram of double differenced receivers Background of Research 
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epoch mode in real time where all the eliminated error sources can degrade the final 
position solution.  
These techniques also introduce their own problems, whereby the system noise is 
effectively doubled due to the measurement combinations and the constraint that the 
two or more receivers used in a baseline must be able to view the same two satellites. 
The addition of a real time system would also require a permanently operating radio 
link to be in place between rover and base station, something which in itself can fail, 
reducing the system to a single receiver point positioning solution with the 
accompanying reduced accuracy and integrity. 
2.4  UK Rail safety culture 
 
Due to privatisation of the railways, the UK government reviewed railway safety 
regulations and determined that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the 
Health and Safety Commission (HSC) should regulate the entire rail network. In 2006 
this responsibility was transferred to the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) where it 
remains. 
The laws that govern most rail safety practices are general safety laws that apply to all 
employers and employees in the UK, for instance; the health and safety at work act 
1974 has produced the management of health and safety at work regulations 1992 and 
the construction (design and management) regulations 1994.  
These are both non rail-specific regulations that place the responsibility of safety on 
the employer to keep their staff, passengers and anyone they interact with as safe as 
reasonable practicable. 
The construction regulations also require those involved to keep records and share 
information with all those concerned in order to control risk. 
The 1974 act also created the railways (safety critical work) regulations 1994 which 
ensures employers make sure their workers are properly trained in safe practice and 
the railways (safety case) regulations 1994 which states that train and station 
operators and railway infrastructure controllers must have a railway safety case before 
they begin work and that during the work it is followed. 
 
From an engineering standpoint a defensive status has always been taken in respect to 
failures and possible risk. By designing all systems in a manner that facilitates a lower Background of Research 
41 
 
level of risk in the event of failure, safety can be achieved even when the system does 
not operate as intended. The simplest example of this would be the automatic vacuum 
brake design in trains. Rather than the driver applying pressure to the braking surface 
with brake pads attached directly to brake pistons, the brake piston actually holds the 
brake pads away from the braking surface, then when the driver wishes to reduce 
speed, he simply allows the brake pads to apply pressure on the breaking surface by 
reducing the amount the pistons hold the pads away. In the event of the braking 
system failing, the brakes are automatically applied. This may cause a disruption to 
service, but is far safer than a train with no brakes at all. Unfortunately this system 
was only bought into service after 88 people were killed in the 1889 runaway carriage 
incident in Armagh. Previously a more conventional system of braking was used due 
to its simplicity and lower costing. Every alteration to the modern railways reflects 
this type of defensive engineering, including the way track junctions are set out and 
controlled, even though this can sometimes increase redundancy and reduce profits. 
After incidents such as the Hatfield rail crash on 17 October 2000 which exposed the 
shortcomings of the national railway infrastructure company Railtrack to ensure the 
sound condition of its assets, high risk industries have been trying to reduce the use of 
incident data for improving their safety principles and have moved towards the 
development of a ‗positive safety culture‘ to manage risk before it occurs. 
The HSE define a safety culture as (ACSNI, 1993): 
 
“The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of and organisation‟s health and safety 
management. Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by 
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of 
safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventative measures.” 
 
As well as promoting a positive safety culture, the ORR advises rail operators in good 
practice and has continued the ‗blue book‘ of recommendations originally collated by 
the HSE. The blue book is designed to be a set of guidance notes and not specifically 
requirements for the rail industry as a whole.  Background of Research 
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The latest incarnation has been renamed ‗Railway safety principles and guidance‘ and 
consists of two main parts, the first of which determines the top level principles 





















For some rail industry sections this provides enough guidance for them to then create 
their own standards but for others, part two of the guidance literature consists of seven 
separate publications focusing on specific aspects of railway construction and their 







Figure 2.4 - Complete structure of safety principles (Office of Rail Regulation, 2005) Background of Research 
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2.5  Applications of GNSS in the rail environment 
 
There are many applications of GNSS in the rail industry with varying requirements 
on position accuracy and integrity.  
Some systems are already making use of GPS signals for location purposes such as 
for passenger information services (PIS), freight management and automatic selective 
door opening. 
PIS requires relatively low accuracy positioning ~100m as this simply informs 
passengers of times of arrival and general journey progress by using the train‘s current 
position to calculate an estimated travel time to the next station. This is a non ‗safety 
of life‘ application that can fail without increasing risk and reducing safety, merely 
causing annoyance to passengers. If the PIS gives incorrect information however, this 
can cause issues with liability for costs incurred if a passenger were to alight at the 
incorrect station due to an incorrect PIS announcement. This is a clear distinction 
between total failure of a system and that of it operating incorrectly without 
knowingly doing so, as is the difference between reliability and integrity of a system. 
 
Freight management systems use GPS locators combined with GSM communications 
to inform the user where a certain container or package is at any point in time. This 
can be especially important when dealing with valuable or hazardous goods that need 
to be closely monitored. Certain companies that offer this service also allow the user 
to be notified when the package in transportation comes within a pre-defined radius of 
its destination so the recipient can prepare accordingly, which is ideal if the package is 
large and requires a workforce to be prepared for its management. This type of system 
needs to have a higher level of integrity and reliability as its failure will cause the user 
to lose track of the package and render the entire system useless. 
The failure would imply a financial loss to the company involved, but this is still 
considered a safety independent system as there is no danger to people‘s health in the 
event of the system failing. 
 
Selective door opening (SDO) on Southeastern class 375 trains (Southeastern, 2005) 
was converted to use the on-board GPS units originally intended for PIS, for 
automatic opening of selected doors when entering a station without a full length Background of Research 
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platform. Extending a platform is extremely costly and causes inconvenience for 
passengers as stations are closed.   
The system works by encircling each station in a virtual zone that when entered, tells 
the main on-board computer which station the train is in and what the length of the 
platform is, thus which doors should be opened. The driver then stops the train in the 
correct position using traditional navigation techniques which then triggers the 












By using GPS to determine when the train is in the correct position, the safety of 
passengers is now in question as if the incorrect doors opened, the passengers could 
be exposed to extreme danger such as falling onto an electrified rail.  
 
The initial problems involved with this system luckily only caused the doors to not 
open at all and after several updates to the software, the system performed as intended 
without incident. One of the main boundaries overcome was utilising hardware that 
was originally safety independent with no integrity values and adapting it for use in a 
system that could potentially cause risk to passengers. SDO by GPS is now used 
throughout the Southeastern fleet and has proved that if the hardware and software is 
robust enough, risk can be reduced to a level acceptable for daily use in the public 
domain.  
The issues that arose during the development of the SDO system could have caused 
risk to passengers, but the possibility of a fatality was very low as, had the doors 
opened onto an electrified rail, the passengers would have a high chance of realising 
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Figure 2.5– SDO virtual station zone Background of Research 
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safety critical application of GNSS in the UK railways and has provided automation 
using pre existing hardware. Despite this, multipath has still been flagged as being of 
an unknown error size that so far has simply been absorbed by the general error 
budget of the positioning system. 
 
The next step in the use of GNSS in the UK railways is for train positioning and 
signalling which requires a much higher level of safety integrity and must be able to 
operate over the entire of the UK network. SDO only needs to operate in the vicinity 
of a train station, a controlled environment that tends to have a clearer view of the sky 
compared to when a train is travelling through deep cuttings and dense foliage 
between stations. The Alaskan Railroad Corporations Collision Avoidance System 
(ARRC-CAS) (Mokkapati & Pascoe, 2005) uses GNSS positioning to provide track 
authority limits and to enforce speed restrictions on the Fairbanks-Seward line in 
southern Alaska. They designed a system from the ground up, including the 
communications backbone and Automatic Train Protection (ATP) fail-safety 
architectures so that the existing Centralised Traffic Control (CTC) system could be 
optimised by automating many of the operator functions. 
 
For GPS to replace the current track circuit based location system, the existing system 
must first be fully understood. 
The UK system of train location does not use any on-board systems; the only train 
bourn part of navigation on a train is the driver who obeys the signals. The train is 
located using electronically isolated sections of track that carry a 10 volt DC signal. 
When the train is on a particular length of track (called a section) the axles act as an 
electrical contact between the rails, closing the circuit loop. This is then shown in the 
main control room as an ‗occupied section of track so the controller knows where 























The problems occur when issues such as leaf fall cause an organic paste to be formed 
with the oil and water which causes conduction problems, leading to malfunction of 
the system. 
 
Line side infrastructure like electrical cables and connections are also prone to 
vandalism and require constant maintenance and monitoring. These problems can 
become dangerous if not dealt with efficiently but it is more common for delays to 
occur than accidents. 
Using track circuits is termed as being a ‗fixed block‘ location technology as it uses 
fixed lengths of track place a train in a certain section. This reduces the possible train 
density of the line massively as there are usually two or more sections behind a train 
that are kept clear as a safety ‗buffer‘ so that other following trains do not collide with 
it (see figure 2.6). This has to be done as the controller doesn‘t know where inside the 
occupied section of track the train actually is, it could be at either end or in the 
middle. By leaving a buffer the controller can make sure there is no chance of two 
trains on the same line colliding. Two sections are used to allow the amber light 
system to be used. When entering a section of track, the train causes it to become 
occupied, the section of track following the train will have a red signal at its entrance 
and the section before that will have an amber signal at its entrance. This helps the 
train driver to know that a red signal is ahead and he can make speed adjustments 
accordingly. If he passes a red signal, this is known as a ‗signal passed at danger‘ or 
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Figure 2.6 – Track sections and buffer zones for moving train Background of Research 
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SPAD. This is seen as a safety violation and in each occurrence a full investigation is 
carried out as to why the driver could not stop before the signal. 
Track sections can be tens of kilometres long and so knowing the actual position of a 
train can be very difficult which is why a location beacon system was brought about 
as part of the European rail traffic management system (ERTMS) and the European 
train control system (ETCS) which aims to standardise the methods of train location 
and signalling across Europe so that freight can pass through country borders without 
having to change trains. This would also remove the need for high speed trains to 
have multiple systems on-board which is costly and needlessly complex. 
ETCS has 3 levels of operation that move from fixed block to moving block 
technology (see figure 2.8). 
 
Level 1 is much the same as traditional track circuit location, but the use of beacons is 
employed. The beacons used are called ‗Balises‘ and are placed in the centre of the 
track at known positions (as in Figure 2.7). When a train passes over, the 
electromagnetic induction powers the beacon enough to transmit a small signal with 
details on position and information on the track ahead (such as recommended speeds 









By combining this information with the track circuit positioning, the train is 
controlled by visual light signals at the line side as with traditional train control. 
ETCS levels 2 and 3 rely heavily on the use of specific radio communications based 






Figure 2.7– Photo and design image of a Balise Background of Research 
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•  Exchange information between the main control centre and the train driver.  
•  Allow the drivers to speak with the traffic management centres.  
•  Transmit the maximum permitted speed from the control centre to the train 
driver. 
 
By having a permanently operating communications channel between a train and the 
main control centre, the need for line side signalling is removed along with the 
possibility of its malfunction due to lack of maintenance or vandalism.  
The issue of communication breakdown does however mean that GSM-R must have 
full coverage over the entire rail network as well as supporting full redundancy code 
and bit-checking in the signal protocol so that any distortion can be removed and 
possible jamming/spoofing can be avoided. 
 
ETCS level 2 still uses track circuits for track occupancy detection, together with 
balise locators but the train operations are controlled through GSM-R, removing the 
lineside signals completely. This is already a reduction in the amount of lineside 
infrastructure required, but still uses a fixed block movement system with reduced 
freight capacity. 
Level 3 removed the fixed block mode of track circuit detection, instead using train 
based odometry and balise locators. This information is then sent to the main control 
centre where the movement authority is determined and then transmitted back to the 
train via GSM-R. 
This top level of operation provides moving block capability which can massively 
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Figure 2.8– ETCS level 1, 2 and 3 (UNIFE, 2007) Background of Research 
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The main problem with ETCS is the need for all trains to be fitted with balise readers 
which is very costly and takes the train being fitted out of service for an extended 
period of time. The cost of laying balises along the track is also considerable, coupled 
with the fact that the maximum accuracy achievable when using balise locators is 
limited by the distancing between each beacon as train odometry is notoriously poor 
at roughly 10% of the total distance travelled. For a reliable system to be in place, a 
level of redundancy also has to be included, which would require a fully working 
positioning system to be in operation even if one of the on track balises has 
malfunctioned, requiring double the number to be in place.  
 
For these reasons, GNSS is being investigated as a viable alternative or addition to the 
use of balises, in a ‗virtual balise‘ format (IERR, 2002). Because so much investment 
has already been made in the balise method of operation, rather than start again with 
an independent positioning system based on GNSS that would provide continuous 
location information, the use of a virtual balise has been chosen. The idea is that when 
the train passes a position on the track that would normally have had a physical balise 
mounted on the track; the on-board system would know this and produce a virtual 
readout using purely on-board location systems. Several projects have already used 
this approach when testing the possible use of GNSS in the railways, such as the 
European Space Agency (ESA) sponsored Railway User Navigation Equipment 
(RUNE) project where European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
(EGNOS) signals were also used in an on board positioning system on the Torino-
Chivasso line in 2005.  
The Kayser-Threde GmbH sponsored INTEGRAIL (kayser-threde, 2004) project also 
focused on the use of EGNOS to produce a fully integrated ERTMS compliant 
railway traffic management and control system for Europe. 
2.6  Error sources due to rail environment 
 
The UK line side formations vary massively between urban and rural environments 
with deep cuttings and urban canyons, trees and foliage. GNSS signal obscuration and 
interference by physical surroundings as well at the train itself is of great concern. 
Rail specific interference from overhead cables and electrical engine noise is also 
possible.  Background of Research 
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These error sources are as yet unknown and so are of interest and are of great 
importance as large scale spatially correlated errors such as ionospheric and 
tropospheric errors can be largely removed by using network solutions. Other 
interference such as clock variations and receiver noise can be modelled to a certain 
extent, leaving the local non spatially correlated environment as the last significant 
source of error as differential processing is not effective. 
Due to the physical surroundings in the rail environment, there are many objects that 
can effect GNSS signals. Without knowing the exact geometric makeup of the 
surroundings and satellites it is very hard to determine the possible effects of this 
interference (Bradbury, 2007). 
As shown by A.Parkins (Parkins, 2006) the availability of satellites whilst in a rail 
cutting is dependent on the side wall elevation angle but independent of the cutting 
azimuth which amplifies the complexity and individuality of each train lines signal 
interference. This is a concern when analysing the feasibility of GNSS as a location 
tool for safety critical systems as possible position errors and the reduced integrity of 
any position calculated could allow for a catastrophic occurrence to happen. 
This is why further investigation into the possible position errors and signal 
interference in the rail environment is needed, as without an initial understanding of 







































As well as being completely blocked by physical barriers, signals can be received 
directly, diffracted, reflected only, attenuated as well as be subject to multipath just as 
shown for common rail environments in figures 2.9 and 2.10. 
 
2.6.1  Multipath 
Multipath is the phenomenon where a reflected signal is received along with a direct 
signal from the same satellite. This is then received by the receiver as a composite 
signal. Multipath is particularly difficult to detect as for short periods it is not zero 
mean and so a bias can still be left, even after time averaging of the signals, especially 
when considering a close reflecting surface. 
Figure 2.11 shows a simplistic multipath diagram for a single reflection causing a 
















Figure 2.10 – Trains in deep cutting 
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Figure 2.11 - – Geometry of a simple multipath occurrence Background of Research 
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The extra distance ?? travelled by the reflected signal is ??       +??       , thus: 
 
 
From 2.36, if considering phase measurements converting to cycles and then radians 




Where   λ is the signal wavelength 
 
The receiver sees a combined composite of the direct and reflected signal which 
Braasch (Braasch, 1996) describes using phasor diagrams to give the total carrier 





Where    ʱ is the attenuation factor or multiple-to-direct signal ratio 
    R(ηc) is the correlation function for the PRN at time lag ηc 
    δ is the relative path delay 
     
From 2.38 by assuming a worse case whereby ʱ is equal to 1 and that ηc and δ are 
considered small, it can be calculated that the maximum possible phase tracking error 
is π/2 radians. This is shown in figure 2.12. On the L1 frequency, a π/2 phase error 













  (2.37) 
𝜃? = tan−1  
𝗼𝑅(𝜏? − ?)sin𝜃
𝑅(𝜏?) + 𝗼𝑅(𝜏? − ?)cos𝜃
   (2.38) 
(2.36)  ?? = 2? cos? 
 
Figure 2.12 -  – multipath phase tracking shift against phase tracking error Background of Research 
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The actual value of ʱ varies depending on the reflecting material, frequency of the 
incident signal and its angle of incidence, θi (Kavak, Xu, & Vogel, June 1996).  
With GPS signals being circularly polarized, the reflection coefficients for the 
perpendicular and parallel components are different. 
 
For the perpendicular component, ?⊥, provided the incident and reflecting mediums 
are both lossless nonmagnetic dielectrics the attenuation factor can described for 
phase and pseudorange measurements by: 
 
 
                  (2.39) 
 
 
Where ε1 and ε2 are the relative permittivity of the incident and reflecting media 
respectively. 
 
For the parallel component, ?∥,for lossless nonmagnetic dielectrics: 
 
 
                  (2.40) 
 
 
The assumption of dielectric properties is valid as most surfaces in an outdoor 
environment such as wood, concrete and glass are dielectric in nature and metal 
objects usually have a coating of silicon oxide or aluminium oxide for 
weatherproofing. 
Research has been carried out to experimentally verify values for reflectance 
coefficients of various smooth surfaces such as concrete and leafy hills (Weiss & 
Axelrad, 2007) and relative permittivity for grass and asphalt (Kavak, Vogel, & Xu, 
1998) in the GPS frequency band. Smooth surfaces produce specular reflections 
which are coherent and can to a certain extent be modelled, whereas rough surfaces 
produce incoherent diffusely scattered reflections which are difficult to model. 
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Composite multipath signals also cause the code tracking delay lock loop (DLL) to 
correlate in a constructive (reflected signal in phase with direct signal) or destructive 
(reflected and direct signal out of phase) manner as shown in figure 2.13.  
The receiver uses an internally generated replica of the signal to sample the rising and 
falling edges of the peak of correlation so that the exact time of signal arrival can be 
deduced.  
Multipath alters the form of the peak which affects the time of arrival calculation and 
causes the pseudorange measurements to appear shorter for destructive interference 












There are generally four main methods of reducing multipath in GNSS; antenna 
location, software, hardware a combination of the last two. 
Receiver design can reduce the effect of interference by decreasing the correlator 
early-late spacing and increasing the precorrelator bandwidth a certain amount 
(Braasch, 1996). If the precorrelator bandwidth is too narrow, the correlation function 
peak becomes rounded and so any advantage of using a narrow correlator spacing is 
lost. Conversely, if the bandwidth is too great, the receiver is far more susceptible to 
electromagnetic interference and any satellite signal anomalies will produce larger 
pseudorange errors than that of a narrower bandwidth (Phelts & Enge, 2000).  
The multipath delay and resulting tracking errors for the C/A code and P code for a 

















The difference between a narrow and wide correlator spacing can be clearly seen, 
with the resulting tracking error for the narrow correlator reducing to a fraction of the 
wide correlator. 
NovAtel communications (Fenton, Townsend, & Diedrendonck, 1995) designed a 
prototype correlator that uses multiple early and late samplings so that the effect of 
multipath on the correlation function gradients could be assessed. This system was 
reported to provide a reduction in multipath similar to that of a choke ring antenna. 
This was then improved upon in the NovAtel Pulse Aperture Correlator (PAC) by 
implementing the same technique in a receiver with higher bandwidth (Jones, Fenton, 
& Smith, 2004). 
 
NovAtel have more recently reported on their ‗vision‘ correlator (Fenton & Jones, 
2005) that uses the PRN code chip transition shape as a multipath mitigation 
reference. By looking at the RF properties of a chip transition from 1 to 0 or the 
reverse, the effects of multipath can be easily distinguished compared to the 
traditional summation correlator design seen in figure 2.13. 
By initialising the vision correlator with high elevation satellites with relatively low 
multipath, the basic transition curve can be stored and then compared against all 
incoming signals so that the effects of multipath can be determined.  
 
 







The effects of different correlation techniques can be seen in figure 2.15. This figure 
shows the original wide correlator (WC) spacing results together with the now 
commonplace narrow correlator (NC) results. The NovAtel PAC and latest Vision 
correlator techniques are also shown, with the results proving that range errors can be 
limited to within 5m provided state of the art correlator designs are implemented in 
the receiver. 
Some signal tracking loops can also remove multipath if it varies at a higher 
frequency than the loop bandwidth. High frequency multipath is more common for a 
kinematic receiver, especially if the reflecting surfaces are far away. In the rail 
environment, this would most likely come from the along-track direction and be due 
to overhead infrastructure or lineside infrastructure after a turn due to the across track 
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Figure 2.15– comparison of multipath processing techniques 
 
 
Same additional path length 




From figure 2.16 we can see two theoretical situations that can produce the same level 
of multipath. Despite the building being a further distance away than that of the trains 
own roof, the additional path length equates to the same.  
The only way to distinguish between the resultant multipath is by looking at the 
frequency with which they vary as local reflectors produce lower frequency multipath 
and far away reflectors produce higher frequency multipath variation. This is due to 
the changing satellite geometry‘s effect on the reflected signals additional path length. 
Per Enge (Enge, 1999) describes how the high frequency motion of an aircrafts skin 
produces ‗white noise‘ multipath that can be removed by carrier smoothing but 
ground reflections produce low frequency multipath variation which leads to 
measurement errors. 
Due to receiver design limiting the remaining code multipath to additional path 
lengths below 10m, the situations in figure 2.16 are of interest in the rail environment 
as they were the most likely sources of shorter additional path lengths. 
 
Provided a reflecting surface is not a perfect conductor, single reflections of a signal 
can cause a switch from right hand circularly polarized (RHCP) to left hand 
elliptically polarized (LHEP) if the angle of incidence, θi, is less than the Brewster 
angle, θB, defined below: 
                  (2.41) 
 
 
If the angle of incidence is greater than the Brewster angle, the reflected signal is still 
elliptically polarised, but with the same polarisation as the incident signal. When the 
incident angle is equal to the Brewster angle, the reflected wave becomes linearly 
polarized perpendicular to the plane of the reflecting surface. 
 
Most GPS antennas have been designed specifically to attenuate LHEP signals so 
single reflections (which also have the highest gain of any reflected signals) are 
removed. This feature does not completely remove the errors due to multipath as 
multiple reflections can have both RHEP and LHEP configurations but it does reduce 
the number of first order reflections that have the highest attenuation gain, thus 
reducing the level of correlation skew. The use of choke-ring antennas also reduces 
𝜃? = tan−1  
?1
?2
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the effects of multipath from below the horizon, but not from above, and due to their 
size, train mounting would prove problematic due to height and rooftop space 
restrictions. 
 
Another method of reducing multipath is by limiting the minimum elevation angle for 
a satellite to be accepted and used. This reduces the use of signals with ground 
reflections as well as those from buildings and trees where interaction is more 
common, as well as more likely to produce short additional path lengths. 
The problem with removing these satellites entirely is that availability is then reduced 
and so a weighting system is more appropriate in order to guarantee a maximum 
number of satellites used in the position calculation (Collins & Langley, 1999). This is 
on top of the reduced attenuation for low elevation satellites employed by most 
geodetic antennas. 
Signal to noise ratios (SNR) can also be used as a weighting parameter as the 
attenuation of a reflected signal increases noise, allowing a user to determine if a 
signal is direct or attenuated in some way previous to reception. This is more common 
when dealing with phase observations. 
One such approximation for the undifferenced phase variance ζ
2 in mm
2 as a function 




Where   i indicates which L signal (L1 or L2)  
    Ci is the carrier loop noise bandwidth in mm
2 
 
Equation 2.42 was built upon by Brunner (Brunner, Hartinger, & Troyer, 1999) by 




Where   C/N0template is derived from interference free elevation versus C/N0 




2 = ?𝑖.10−(?/?0???????? )/10  (2.42) 




Equation 2.42 then becomes 2.44. 
 
 
This SIGMA-Δ model proved to be successful at improving 2.42 in reducing 
multipath, but can only really be applied to stationary sites and in this instance, phase 
measurements only.  
 
Other models, such as that proposed by Lau (Lau & Cross, 2005) have also been 
successful in improving and in this case, correcting phase multipath but have not been 
successfully applied in a highly dynamic environment due to its reliance on the 
sinusoidal characteristic of phase multipath. The applications of SNR weighting to 
code measurements is not as common. 
 
Comparisons of elevation angle versus SNR multipath modelling have been made 
(Wang & Satirapod, 2000) with conclusions favouring the SNR approach as a more 
accurate system of multipath modelling. 
Problems arose when trying to determine the SNR values used by each receiver 
manufacturer and the less than ideal format of SNR simply being given as a value 
between 0 and 9. 
 
Code multipath error can be calculated as an observable if dual frequency phase data 
is available (Cross, Lecture Notes for Positioning 1 (GEOMG004) and Positioning 2 
(GEOMGS05); Code Multipath Observable - UNAVCO, 2007), by breaking the 







Where   P1 is the code measurement on L1 frequency 
    L1 is the phase measurement on the L1 frequency 
    L2 is the phase measurement on the L2 frequency 
?Δ
2 = ?𝑖.10−(?/?0???????? −𝗼.Δ)/10  (2.44) 
?1 = ? + 𝐼1 + ? + ??1 
?1 = ? + ?1 − 𝐼1 + ? + ??1 
?2 = ? + ?2 − 𝐼2 + ? + ??2 
(2.45) 
(2.46) 
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    D is the true range 
    I1,2 are the ionospheric effects on the L1 and L2 signals respectively 
    B1,2 are the integer ambiguities on the L1 and L2 signals respectively 
    t is the tropospheric effect on the signal 
    MP1 is the multipath effect on the P1 code measurement 
ML1,L2 are the multipath effects on the L1 and L2 phase measurements 
respectively 
 
By forming the L1 code/phase combination and assuming phase multipath is 
negligible, equations 2.45 and 2.46 become: 
 
 
From 2.47 and 2.48: 
 
 





















Which gives us the L1 code multipath observable MP1: 
??1 − ?1 = ?1 − ?1 − 2𝐼1  (2.48) 
?1 − ?2 = 𝐼2 − 𝐼1 + ?1 − ?2  (2.49) 









(?1 − ?2) +
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(𝗼 − 1)
(?2 − ?1)  (2.51) 
??1 − ?1 = ?1 − ?1 −
2
(𝗼 − 1)
(?1 − ?2) −
2
(𝗼 − 1)
(?2 − ?1)  (2.52) 
??1 −  ?1 −
2
(𝗼 − 1)
(?2 − ?1)  = ?1 − ?1 −
2
(𝗼 − 1)





The corresponding L2 observable can also be calculated as: 
 
 
Where the Constant term is an offset due to the remaining integer ambiguity.  
This offset can be reduced by time averaging, provided a long enough time period is 
observed to allow for low frequency multipath variation as the changes in MP1 and 
MP2 for static receivers are sinusoidal as the satellites move through the sky, thus 
altering the reflected signal path lengths. Moving antennas are more likely to have a 
white noise characteristic to multipath due to the reflecting surfaces being altered. 
This white noise multipath is also expected to have a normal distribution due to each 
reading being independent from another and there being a lower probability of large 
value multipath. 
For an accurate multipath measurement to take place, averaging is used as it is 
assumed the level of multipath (both destructive and constructive interference) will 
have zero mean over time.  
The MP1,2 observables are normally used as a data quality check as any large changes 
in its value over time will indicate either a cycle slip or multipath. As an observable, 
cycle slips must first be removed if the results are to be a true indication of possible 
multipath. 
 
2.6.2  EM interference 
Interference with GPS signals can come from many sources and can be intentional or 
unintentional. 
Intentional interference is not common unless dealing with a military situation or 
possible terrorism and is known as intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) 
(Radsky, Baum, & Wik, 2004). 
The most basic form of intentional interference is by using high-power 
electromagnetics (HPEM) to introduce enough signal noise to make signal tracking 
and acquisition impossible. Due to GPS signals being relatively weak, high power is 
not necessarily needed for basic jamming of a receiver. HPEM can also disable the 
receiver itself by radiating the electronic components, causing them to malfunction. 
??1 = ?1 − 4.0915?1 + 3.0915?2 + ????????  (2.54) 
??2 = ?2 − 5.0915?1 + 4.0915?2 + ????????  (2.55) Background of Research 
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Intentional spoofing is an act whereby a deliberately corrupt or incorrect signal 
mimics a correct GPS signal and is transmitted so that receivers in transmission range 
try to use the incorrect information. In 2002 an article describing how to build a short 
range L1 C/A jammer was published in Phrack magazine (issue 60). For US military 
applications, the anti-spoofing W code was modulated onto the P code for this 
specific reason, however spoofing has supposedly been attempted by forces in 
Afghanistan during the recent conflicts with little success according to the US 
military, despite the use of RF guided smart bombs being used to destroy the jamming 
beacons.  
Because civil users don‘t have access to the W code, they are left vulnerable to 
spoofing from hackers and terrorists, something the Federal Aviation Aadministration 
(FAA) are aware of. 
 
The L1 and L2 frequency bands have been earmarked for GPS and thus unauthorised 
for civilian users to transmit on, but unintentional jamming can still occur; one well 
known case was that of a malfunctioning TV preamplifier (Goodman, 2003) that 
caused the Moss landing incident in April of 2001 where sailors in Moss Landing 
harbour, California were left in a situation where GPS seemed to disappear.  
Any unintended interference occurs either due to a radio system using a closely 
neighbouring frequency, where if enough power is used, saturation can occur and thus 
impede the functioning of a GPS receiver, or by radio systems operating outside the 
band but with in-band emissions from harmonics or frequency conversion products. 
Other spurious interference sources can be as diverse as engine ignition systems, TV 
and computer monitors, electric motors, fluorescent lights, ac-dc converters, 
alternators, generators and switching power supplies. 
The increase in UWB devices such as medical equipment, communications, 
construction, ground radars and WiFi networking systems also may have an effect as 
despite their individual power being limited to -75.3 dBm/MHz in the protected 
GNSS band, the collective effect of multiple devices could significantly increase the 
noise floor and cause receiver tracking errors (ANASTASIA project, 2006). 
Interference that is more specific to the rail environment would come from localised 
emitters such as GSMR radio beacons, diesel engine electrics, passengers personal 
electronic items and overhead electrified cables.  















There have been investigations into the effect of national grid electrified cables on 
GPS signals with conclusions showing no detectable interference during normal 
operation (Lee & Ge, 2006). The effect of the physical pylon supporting structure 
themselves (figure 2.17) and their possible scattering effect on GNSS signals has not 
been fully investigated due to the complexity of their structure. 
Although the EM interference effects from the electric cables themselves seems to be 
below a detectable level, the wide band electronic noise caused by corona formed on 
conductor surfaces is of concern as the interference fields from conductor corona has 
been detected up to frequencies of 1GHz (Olsen, 1994). 
 
M. Silva ( (Silva J. M., 2001)) shows that for a line voltage of 500 kV at 50Hz, the 
effective incident noise power density (Nincident) on a receiver placed underneath a 
transmission line is -115.3 dB-Hz μW/m
2.   
 
Given that the incident power density of a carrier signal from a directional transmitter 
is: 
Cincident = [Pt(dBw)+Gt(dBi)-10log10(4πd2)+60] dB μW/m2   (2.56) 
 
Where   Pt is the transmitter power 
    Gt is the antenna gain relative to an isotropic antenna 
    d is the distance between satellite and receiver in meters 
 
 
Figure 2.17– National grid pylons (© Andrew Dunn 2004) Background of Research 
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From 2.56, Cincident is calculated as being -70 dB μW/m
2, giving a C/N0 value of 45.3 
dB-Hz which is close to the minimum specified by some receiver manufacturers. 
In practical tests however, the EM noise due to corona, even in worst condition foul 
weather where noise is 15-25 dB higher did not seem to degrade the receiver 
operation when using the NMEA amplitude measurement unit (AMU) output. 
Hardware that is at different voltages and physically close can produce sparks known 
as gap discharge if the potential difference is high enough (see figure 2.18). These 
discharges become more frequent in dry weather to produce wideband EM noise 
similar to that of corona. Experimental results have found that the effects of gap 













Nationwide DGPS services broadcast in the UK by Trinity House in the 291 to 309.5 
kHz frequency range are also liable to interference from corona noise, gap discharge 
and nearby electronic RF noise sources (Silva & Olsen, 2002). This reduces the 
availability of the DGPS network and can thus degrade a receiver‘s position and 
integrity performance if it is reliant upon these available signals. 
 
The levels of safe operation as defined by RNP‘s, although not being a common 
specification for a discrete component of the system, need to be feasible given the 
number of possible error sources outlined in this chapter.  
When a safety assessment is carried out on a system, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA - as 
mentioned in 3.6.2) would propagate any errors at a component level through to the 
 
Figure 2.18 - – Pylon detail common to cause gap discharge  Background of Research 
65 
 
final system level, causing a failure of the system‘s ability to function within the 
defined levels. Further safety analysis techniques are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
3  Risk and safety principles 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The dictionary defines safety as: 
 
‘A state in which or a place where you are safe and not in danger or at risk’ 
 
Safety of life systems are becoming increasingly more technical and complicated in 
their construction, requiring a safety evaluation method that can compile such 
intricacies to provide an overall statement for a system based upon its components. 
The safety case documents a system helping to prove it is of an acceptable safety 
standard based upon supporting evidence about its components, ranging from 
scientific outcomes from rigorous testing or engineering knowledge about similar 
systems and educated statements based upon this. The safety case is meant to tell a 
story for a system, detailing tests undertaken, the results and subsequent alterations 
applied to mitigate intolerable levels of error, culminating in a clear declaration of the 
system‘s ability to perform its task at the required level of safety. 
3.2  The safety case 
 
3.2.1  Overview 
The main aim of a safety case is to tell a story about a certain system, culminating in 
an overall confidence statement on the systems safety level. This should include: 
 
  Goals/Claims for a system. 
  Evidence for claims made. 
  Arguments linking evidence to the goals (claims). 
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The goals/claims are explicit requirements the final system has to satisfy in order for a 
successful safety claim to be made. They are based upon well defined criteria that are 
validated for the given environment and application, providing adequate safety level 
compliance. 
Evidence is given by hazard logs, risk modelling and reduction methods, quality and 
safety reports, FMEA, etc and presented by methods such as ETA and FTA to give a 
complete picture of the system safety level. 
 
Evidence is considered if it is not part of the original claims on the system, i.e. if 
additional evidence is to be used for a safety case, it cannot simply be as a result of 
the original system design parameters. Arguments must accompany all evidence, 
along with any assumptions and technical judgements that are made by the personnel 
involved. 
Each section has different viewpoints within a project and each of these must be 
included, some of which are: 
 
  Safety specialists 
  Internal and external regulators 
  Operators and managers 
  Senior staff that decide equipment is safe to enter the public domain 
  Lawyers 
There is as such, no rigidly defined structure for a general safety case, making it 
difficult to know exactly what should be included, however the Railtrack yellow book 
has a section on the required content of a railway safety case (Railtrack, 2000) and it 
states that there should be: 
 
  Executive summary 
  Introduction 
  Definition of system 
  Quality management report 
  Safety management report 
  Technical safety report 
  Related safety cases 
  Conclusion Risk and Safety Principles 
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The safety case can be written for an entire system or a single component, it must 
prove that the safety level is achievable consistently based upon statistical evidence 
and expert opinion. 
 
3.2.2  Project implementation of a safety case 
Engineering safety management projects require an interaction between various 
parties such as project coordinators and engineers and an independent safety authority 
and safety assessor and ultimately, the customer.  
For a safety case to be approved and a project to be released into the public domain, 
there are certain steps to endorse the safety case and review the risks involved, 
together with the running hazard log. Figure 3.1 shows how the safety case fits into 
























Prepare preliminary safety plan 
 
 








































Perform safety assessment 
 
 
Issue safety assessment report 
Figure 3.1 - Diagram showing project safety implementation links (Railtrack, 2000) Risk and Safety Principles 
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3.3  Risk definition and categories 
Risk is the prime concern when constructing a safety case and it consists of two 
components, frequency and severity, in the relationship: 
 
Risk = Frequency × Severity 
 
This allows a more quantitative method of approach towards risk as the frequency of a 
systems failure can be measured statistically through analysis of data taken over a 
known timeframe. Severity can be quantified in various ways, from financial outlay 
for the correction of failures or the consequences of an accident where machinery or 
systems have become damaged or delayed or by the level of injury or number of 
fatalities that have occurred due to the error. 
Safety cases have apportioned set levels of risk based upon the severity and frequency 
categories of an incident occurrence. There are six defined quantitative levels of 
frequency and four levels of hazard severity: 
 
Severity level 





Fatalities and/or multiple severe 




Single fatality and/or severe 
injury and/or significant 
damage to the environment 
Loss of a major system 
Marginal 
Minor injury and/or significant 
threat to the environment 
Severe system damage 
Insignificant  Possible minor injury  Minor system damage 
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Category  Description 
Frequent 
Likely to occur frequently. Hazard will be 
continually experienced. 
Probable 
Will occur several times. Hazard can be 
expected to occur often. 
Occasional 
Likely to occur several times. Hazard can be 
expected to occur several times 
Remote 
Likely to occur sometime in the system life 
cycle. Hazard can be reasonably expected to 
occur. 
Improbable 
Unlikely to occur but possible. It can be 
assumed that the hazard may exceptionally 
occur 
Incredible 
Extremely unlikely to occur. It can be 
assumed the hazard will not occur. 
Table 3.2 – Frequency category breakdown 
 
Using Tables 3.1 and 3.2; risk evaluation takes place by formulating a frequency-
consequence matrix to determine the acceptance level of the hazard defined by the 
qualitative risk categories: 
 
Risk category  Actions to be applied against each category 
Intolerable  Shall be eliminated. 
Undesirable 
Shall only be accepted when risk reduction is 
impracticable and with the agreement of the 
authority. 
Tolerable 
Acceptable with adequate control and with the 
agreement of the authority. 
Negligible 
Acceptable with/without the agreement of the 
authority. 
Table 3.3 - Qualitative risk categories 








Frequent  Undesirable  Intolerable  Intolerable  Intolerable 
Probable  Tolerable  Undesirable  Intolerable  Intolerable 
Occasional  Tolerable  Undesirable  Undesirable  Intolerable 
Remote  Negligible  Tolerable  Undesirable  Undesirable 
Improbable  Negligible  Negligible  Tolerable  Tolerable 
Incredible  Negligible  Negligible  Negligible  Negligible 
  Insignificant  Marginal  Critical  Catastrophic 
  Severity Level of Hazard Consequence 
Table 3.4 - Frequency-Consequence matrix 
 
Risk acceptance is based upon a number of principles defining when alterations to 
mitigate risk should be carried out. 
3.4  Risk determination methods 
 
In order to determine if a new system or paradigm should be implemented in the 
railways, several methods of analysis are used. These normally relate the current level 
of risk to the future level created after the change has been implemented. 
Three of these analysis methods are detailed below, along with the countries in which 
they are normally practiced. 
 
  Globalement Au Moins Aussi Bon (GAMAB as practiced in France) 
 
The main formulation being ―All new systems must offer a level of risk 
globally at least as good as the one offered by any equivalent existing system‖. 
This implies that progress must be made by the requirement ―at least‖ and by 
using ―globally‖ it does not single out a particular risk. The supplier is free to 
distribute allocation between the different risks within a system and applies the 
relevant approach, be it qualitative or quantitative. 
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  Minimum Endogenous Mortality (MEM as practiced in Germany)  
 
This accounts for death rates in the society caused by technological facts such 
as entertainment and sports, DIY, work machines and transport. It does not 
include deaths by illness and disease or congenital malformation. 
The risk is referred to as ―Endogenous Mortality‖ is denoted by the letter R. In 
well developed countries R is lowest between the ages of 5 and 15 and is 
denoted by Rm (as it is the minimum value) and typically has the value 2x10
-4 
fatalities/(person × year). The impact of a new system upon the Rm value is the 
measure of the risk introduced by the system. 
 
  As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP as practiced in the UK)  
 
This is primarily analysis of a hazardous situations improvement being 




































Risk cannot be justified 
except in extraordinary 
circumstances 
Tolerable only if risk reduction 
is impracticable or if cost is 
grossly disproportionate to the 
improvement gained 
Tolerable if cost of reduction 
would exceed improvement 
gained 
Necessary to maintain 
assurance that risk remains at 
this level Risk and Safety Principles 
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3.5  Safety integrity levels 
 
Safety integrity relates to the probability of a safety related system or component 
achieving its required safety function. The higher the safety integrity, the lower the 
probability of failure to perform the required safety functions like providing an 
accurate position. 
Safety integrity is comprised of two components: 
 
1.  Systematic failure integrity. 
2.  Random failure integrity. 
 
For the required safety level to be achieved, both types of failure mode must be 
considered when defining a SIL. 
There are four discrete levels for specifying the safety integrity of a safety related 
system/component, SIL 4 the highest and SIL 1 the lowest, with SIL 0 being non 
safety dependent. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the qualitative and quantitative levels defined for use in 
safety critical systems. 
 
Safety Integrity Level  Descriptive words 
4  Very high 
Vital 
Fail safe 
3  High  High integrity 
2  Medium 
Semi vital 
Medium integrity 
1  Low  Low integrity 
0  Not specified  Non vital  Non safety 





































-5  99.9% to 99.99% 
Table 3.6 - SIL quantitative level definition 
The probability of a failure on demand is for a system that is not necessarily running 
all the time and so it determines how often the system will fail when you attempt to 
access it, thus it does not have any units. 
If a SIL is defined for a system, it should address both the quantitative failures 
associated with random failures and the qualitative safety management systematic 
failures.  
The required level of safety integrity for a given application is based on the results of 
hazard analysis and risk assessment carried out by qualified analysts. 
In the UK railway safety case it is advised that RNP‘s are used as a guide for the 
assessment of a systems Accuracy, Integrity, Availability and Continuity as shown in table 
3.7 from the APOLO project (Barbu & Alcouffe, 1999). 
 
Class  Accuracy  Integrity  Availability  Continuity  Time to 
Alarm  Coverage 
A  ~ 1 m  high  > 0.99  high  < 1 s  Europe 
B  ~1m-10m  high  > 0.99  high  < 5 s  Europe 
C  < 10 cm  high  > 0.99  high  < 5 s  Europe 
Table 3.7 - Principal requirements for railway safety related application as defined in APOLO project 
 
The Class system in 3.7 refers to the applications of the technology, defined as being: 
Class A –   Most demanding, automatic system including shunting and parallel 
track determination 
 
Class B –   Mainly refers to speed checking and line authority for drivers. 
 
Class C –   Shunting exercises and depot manoeuvres. 
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The high integrity and continuity generally refer to a value of 10
-9 per operation, where the 
operation duration obviously plays a factor. 
3.6  Hazard analysis and determination methods 
 
Hazards and their possible outcomes have to be identified in many different ways as 
simply brainstorming for possible system insecurities and failure modes may not 
identify all the possibilities. Different methods have been designed to cope with a 
wide range of system architectures, from system level through to individual 
components so that the component level failures can be tracked through the system to 
assess their full impact. 
When beginning a project, a hazard log is started so that the details of all hazards and 
potential accidents/failures that are identified during safety analysis can be recorded. 
All documentation linked to the safety of a system is logged and stored in the hazard 
log. 
 
Some of the safety analysis methods used to identify hazards for hazard logs and 
safety cases are: 
 
  Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP) uses a set of guide words to identify 
possible hazards, this continues throughout the project lifecycle to ensure all 
risks are identified and rectified, with the results being stored in the hazard 
log. 
  Fault tree analysis (FTA) uses a system level fault at the top of the tree to 
identify the combinations of events that can cause it. 
  Event tree analysis (ETA) identifies the consequences of an initiating event in 
a complex system in a logical and simple way. 
  Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) reviews the full system at 
component level, identifying failures and their consequences. By identifying 
these faults early on, design modifications at a later stage can be avoided. 
  Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) adds the criticality 
measurement to the consequences of the failures in FMEA. Risk and Safety Principles 
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Criticality analysis is a procedure where each potential failure is ranked 
according to the combined influence of severity and probability of occurrence. 
It is the American system for risk analysis. 
  Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) are discrete quantitative values for defining a 
systems or a components integrity level. There are 5 levels from 0 to 4, with 0 
being a safety independent level and 4 being the highest achievable level. 
 
3.6.1  HAZOP process 
Key features of HAZOP examination include the following.  
 
  The examination is a creative process. The examination proceeds by 
systematically using a series of guide words to identify potential deviations 
from the design intent and employing these deviations as ―triggering 
devices‖ to stimulate team members to envisage how the deviation might 
occur and what might be the consequences. 
  The examination is carried out under the guidance of a trained and 
experienced study leader, who has to ensure comprehensive coverage of 
the system under study, using logical, analytical thinking. The study leader 
is preferably assisted by a recorder who records identified hazards and/or 
operational disturbances for further evaluation and resolution. 
  The examination relies on specialists from various disciplines with 
appropriate skills and experience who display intuition and good 
judgement. 
  The examination should be carried out in a climate of positive thinking and 
frank discussion. When a problem is identified, it is recorded for 
subsequent assessment and resolution.  
  Solutions to identified problems are not a primary objective of the HAZOP 
examination, but if made they are recorded for consideration by those 
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The HAZOP process consists of four main sections as detailed below: 
 
1.  Definition 
  Define scope and objectives 
  Define responsibility 
  Select team 
 
2.  Preparation 
  Plan the study 
  Collect data 
  Agree style of recording 
  Estimate the time 
  Arrange a schedule 
 
3.  Examination 
  Divide system into parts 
  Select a part and define design intent 
  Identify deviation by using guide words on each element 
  Identify consequences and causes 
  Identify whether a significant problem exists 
  Identify protection, detection, and indicating mechanisms 
  Identify possible remedial/mitigating measures (optional) 
  Agree actions 
  Repeat for each element and then each part of the system 
 
4.  Documentation and follow-up 
  Record the examination 
  Sign off the documentation 
  Produce the report of the study 
  Follow up that actions are implemented 
  Re-study any parts of system if necessary 
  Produce final output report 




























Throughout the HAZOP process and the life of the system in question a hazard log 
must be kept for permanent reference purposes. 
The Railtrack ‗yellow book‘ outlines the hazard log structure as follows:  
 
Introduction:  This section describes the purpose of the hazard log and indicates the 
environment and safety requirements to which the system safety 
characteristics relate. 
It will include: 
 
 
Figure 3.3 - The HAZOP process chain Risk and Safety Principles 
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  The aim, purpose and structure of the hazard log in sufficient 
detail to enable understanding by all project personnel. 
  A unique identifier of the system to which the hazard log 
relates and a reference to a description and the scope of the 
system. 
  A reference to the safety plan (in early stages of the project this 
will have to be omitted). 
  A reference to the system safety requirements specification or, 
if this has yet to be written, the safety analysis documentation. 
  The process for managing the hazard log, such as who may 
modify it and the approval process for each new entry. 
 
Journal:  The journal should describe all amendments to the hazard log in order 
to provide a historical record of its complication and provide 
traceability. 
It should record, for each amendment: 
 
  The date of the amendment (not necessary if a diary format 
used). 
  A unique entry number. 
  The person making the amendment. 
  A description of the amendment and the rationale for it. 
  The sections in the hazard log that were changed. 
 
Directory:  The directory, sometimes known as the safety record log, should give 
an up-to-date reference to every safety document produced and used by 
the project.  
The documents referred to should include (but not be limited to) the 
following, where they exist: 
 
  Safety plan. 
  Safety requirements specification. 
  Safety standards. 
  Safety documents. Risk and Safety Principles 
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  Incident/accident reports. 
  Analyses, assessment and audited reports. 
  Safety case. 
  Correspondence with the relevant safety authorities. 
 
For each document the directory should include the following: 
 
  A unique reference. 
  The document title. 
  The current version number and issue date. 
  The physical location of the master. 
 
Hazard data:  This section should record every identified hazard. 
For each hazard, the information listed below should be recorded, as 
soon as it becomes available. Data collected during hazard analysis and 
risk assessment should be transcribed to the hazard log when the 
reports have been endorsed. 
 
  A unique reference. 
  A brief description of the hazard which should include the 
system functions or components affected and their states that 
represent the hazard. 
  The causes identified for the hazard. 
  A reference to the full description and analysis of the hazard. 
  Assumptions on which the analysis is based and limitations of 
the analysis. 
  The severity for the related accident, the likelihood of the 
hazard occurring and the likelihood of an accident occurring 
with the hazard as a contributing factor. 
  The predicted risk associated with the hazard. 
  Target likelihood for its occurrence. 
  The status of the hazard; Typically one of the following: 
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–  Open (action to close the hazard has not been agreed). 
–  Cancelled (the event has been determined not to be a 
hazard or to be wholly contained within another 
hazard). 
–  Resolved (action to close the hazard has been agreed but 
not completed). 
–  Closed (action to close the hazard has been completed). 
 
  If the hazard is not closed or cancelled then the name of a 
person or company who is responsible for progressing it 
towards closure. 
  A description of, or a reference to, the action to be taken to 
remove the hazard or reduce the risk from the system to an 
acceptable level.  
  This should include: 
 
–  A statement as to whether the hazard has been avoided 
or requires further action (with a justification if no 
further action is to be taken). 
–  Details of the risk reduction action to be taken. 
–  A discussion of the alternative means of risk reduction 
and justification for actions considered but not taken. 
–  A comment on the need for accident sequence re-
evaluation following risk reduction actions. 
–  A reference to any design documentation that would 
change as a result of the action. 
–  A reference to all Safety Requirements associated with 
this hazard. 
 
Incident data:  This section should be used to record all incidents that have occurred 
during the life of the system or equipment. It should identify the 
sequence of events linking each accident and the hazards that caused it.  
For each incident the following should be provided: 
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  A unique reference. 
  A brief description of the incident. 
  A reference to a report describing an investigation of the 
incident. 
  A description of any action taken to prevent recurrence or 
justification of the decision not to take any. 
 
Accident data: This section should be used to record every identified possible 
accident. It should identify possible sequences of events linking 
identified accident with the hazards that may cause it.  
For each accident the following should be provided: 
 
  A unique reference. 
  A brief description of the potential accident. 
  A reference to a report giving a full description and analysis of 
the accident sequence. 
  A categorisation of the accident severity and the highest 
tolerable probability of the accident (the accident probability 
target). 
  A list of the hazards and associated accident sequences that 
could cause the accident. 
 
3.6.2  Fault tree analysis 
The International Standard (BSI, 1990) describes fault tree analysis, and gives 
guidance on its application, as follows: 
 
  Defining basic principles. 
  Providing the steps necessary to perform an analysis. 
  Identifying appropriate assumptions, events and failure modes. 
  Providing identification rules and symbols. 
 
The fault tree itself is an organized graphical representation of the conditions or other 
factors causing or contributing to the occurrence of a defined undesirable event, Risk and Safety Principles 
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referred to as the ―top event‖. The representation is in a form which can be 
understood, analyzed and, as necessary, rearranged to facilitate the identification of: 
 
  Factors affecting the reliability and performance characteristics of the system, 
for example component fault modes, operator mistakes, environmental 
conditions, software faults; 
  Conflicting requirements or specifications which may affect reliable 
performance; 
  Common events affecting more than one functional component, which could 
cancel the benefits of specific redundancies. 
 
Fault tree analysis is basically a deductive (top-down) method of analysis aimed at 
pinpointing the cause or combinations of causes that can lead to the defined top event. 


















From this evaluation technique, Figure 3.5 was created by A. Filip et al (Filip, Polivka, & 
Suchanek, 2006) for the Derivation of GNSS Signal In Space (SIS) integrity and 
continuity risk requirements for the Class C operations mentioned in 3.5. 
 


















3.6.3  Event tree analysis 
By identifying an initiating event, all potential accident scenarios and outcomes in a 
complex system can be identified in a logical and numerical manner. 
By tracing the effects of an incident through a system its weaknesses and design flaws 
can be identified and corrected and the resulting outcomes statistically documented. 
Although there are no standards for the graphical layout of the final tree, the main 
steps for event tree analysis are logically as follows: 
 
1.  Identify the unwanted initiating event or accident. 
2.  Identify the integral system modules that are designed to prevent further 
consequences. 
3.  Design an event tree to graphically show these preventative measures. 
4.  Outline the resulting consequences. 
5.  Establish probabilities for the initiating event and the resulting event tree 
branches. 
6.  Calculate the frequency of the outcomes defined. 
7.  Record all calculated data on the tree diagram. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 - Derivation of GNSS SIS integrity and continuity risk requirements for Class C operations. Risk and Safety Principles 
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Event tree analysis can only be used on a single initiating event, requiring the 
possibility of multiple trees for one system, especially if there are variable conditions 
for the initiating event to occur. 

















3.6.4  Failure mode and effects analysis and failure mode, effects and 
criticality analysis 
 
FMEA is an inductive method of performing a qualitative system reliability or safety 
analysis from a low to a high level. A thorough understanding of the system under 
analysis is essential prior to undertaking FMEA.  
Functional diagrams and other system drawings are normally necessary for this 
understanding. Reliability block diagrams, fault trees, event trees etc. are then usually 
derived from these in order to carry out the analysis. In many instances the block 






Figure 3.6 - Event tree analysis for fire alarm system Risk and Safety Principles 
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The core details required for FMEA to be carried out are: 
 
1.  The name of the item in the system being analysed. 
2.  Function performed by the item. 
3.  Identification number of the item. 
4.  Failure modes of the item. 
5.  Failure causes. 
6.  Failure effects on the system. 
7.  Failure detection methods. 
8.  Compensating provisions. 
9.  Severity of effects. 
 
Other information required for a particular system and project needs to be defined by 
the analyst assigned. 
Some of the detailed applications and benefits of FMEA are listed below: 
 
  To avoid costly modifications by the early identification of design 
deficiencies. 
  Identify failures which, when they occur alone or in combination, have 
unacceptable or significant effects, and to determine the failure modes which 
may seriously affect the expected or required operation. 
  To determine the need for the following: 
—  Redundancy. 
—  Design improvement. 
—  More generous stress allowances. 
—  Screening of items. 
—  Design of features that ensure that the system fails in a preferred 
failure mode, e.g. ‗fail-safe‘ outcomes of failures. 
—  Selection of alternative materials, parts, devices, and components. 
 
FMEA can be difficult and tedious for the case of complex systems that have multiple 
functions involving different sets of system components. This is because of the 
quantity of detailed system information that needs to be considered. This difficulty Risk and Safety Principles 
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can be increased by the existence of a number of possible operating modes, as well as 
by consideration of the repair and maintenance policies.  
 
In FMEA, it‘s not sufficient to consider only random and independent failures. Some 
‗common-cause‘ (or ‗common mode‘) failures (CCF) can occur, that cause system 
performance degradation or failure through simultaneous failures in several system 
components, due to a single source such as design or human error.  
A CCF is the result of an event that, because of dependencies, a coincidence of failure 
states in two or more components (excluding secondary failures caused by the effects 
of a primary failure).  
Table 3.8 is an example of an FMEA worksheet. 
 
 
Table 3.8 - FMEA worksheet example 
 
FMECA is a logical extension of FMEA bringing together the failures and the 
criticality of the outcome. As with risk, criticality is evaluated by a subjective measure 
of the severity of the effect and an estimate of the probability or expected frequency 
of its occurrence.  
Using the failure effects identified in the FMEA, each effect is allocated an 
appropriate severity class as defined by the risk matrix. The results of FMECA are 
recorded in a worksheet similar to the FMEA sheet, but with the additional columns, 
as per table 3.9: 
 




Table 3.9 - FMECA worksheet example 
 
Modernisation of  safety case presentation techniques has seen programs such as 
Adelards (Adelard, 2006) ASCE graphical hypertext safety case system offering new 
methods of presenting substantial amount of information (something that is common 
for the rail domain) in an easily navigated manner. 
By using an overall structural network map to present a complete system breakdown, 
each module in the network can represent an individual component.  
From these components, the program provides links for strategies, goals, assumptions 
and solutions to potential faults. All links have associated context and narrative 
embedded hypertexts so that the user or assessor has access to all the projects details. 
The idea behind such graphical interface programs is that system producers can pass 
on a full goal structured notation to an assessing body in a style that is easy to 
navigate and understand rather than passing on all the raw data and expect the 
assessors to fully understand the system under scrutiny as a whole. 
 
3.6.5  Use of Risk and Safety principals for GNSS in the Rail domain 
 
Full risk analysis is not an easy thing to do for GPS as for the system itself, producing 
the SIS is massively complex and so it falls at organisations such as the CAA and the 
FAA to try and determine any failure modes, effects or hazards from failures in the 
network of ground stations and satellites that make up the GPS constellation 
operations. These failures would then need to be sent to users in a real time fashion so Risk and Safety Principles 
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that anyone relying on GPS as a means of navigation is fully aware of any errors. The 
satellites do transmit a health status along with the navigation message, but this is not 
updated in real time and simply states if a satellite should be used or not. 
Future signals, like the addition of an integrity signal as proposed for Galileo should 
allow users to determine with confidence if a satellite should be used or not in real 
time, hopefully with a defined ‗time to alarm‘ limit as defined by the operators of the 
system. 
 
Receiver design is also very complex and at the time of writing this thesis, no 
company has undergone a full FMEA or FMECA of its receiver, making the uptake of 
GPS as a positioning technology by the UK railways difficult due to the unknown 
failures that could occur within the ‗black box‘ receiver. 
The receiver failures that could occur may cause a complete loss of function or an 
incorrect position. When considering the size of possible position errors, provided the 
navigation system uses additional sensors, such as INS, large instantaneous jumps in 
position or miss-matching with an additional GPS receiver should provide a level of 
risk management. 
When considering the RNP‘s accuracy for normal line authority is in the region of 
1m-10m with a time to alarm of 5s, if the train is travelling at roughly 55mph, it will 
cover 122m of track in this time and so the overall error budget allowed for a known 
position along the track comes to roughly 132m (122+10), a position error that a 
correctly functioning GPS receiver is able to function within provided a minimal 
amount of multipath mitigation is used. But as this amount includes the time to alarm, 
when a position error reaches this level, the system must be able to declare as such. 
Any internal integrity monitoring provided by the receiver may fail at this point and 
thus the possibility of a hazard is realised. In order to avoid this happening, system 
redundancy and error mitigation techniques such as additional sensors and backup 
navigation equipment would likely need to be employed, but as the current off the 
shelf systems do not provide any quantitative analysis of their failure, further 
investigation of any receiver used would be required. 
This thesis attempts to investigate the error introduced to GPS signals by multipath 
and EM radiation from the rail environment so that further work (if required) can be 
carried out in a more focused manner and any failure mitigation steps can be defined 
as part of the HAZOP process.RTK Software 
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4  Real Time Kinematic Network software suite 
4.1  Introduction 
The UCL department of civil, environmental and geomatic engineering has designed 
and written a fully functioning GNSS research library in the C++ programming 
language. The contributions to the library from this work were modules for RINEX 
file reading and Saastamoinen modelling, the remaining modules were created by 
other members of the development team. The library is primarily designed to function 
as a network based solution for high accuracy kinematic position solutions. Through 
integrating state of the art algorithms to solve for ionospheric and tropospheric 
disturbance as well as antenna offsets, geoid models and integer ambiguity validation 
techniques precision positions can be calculated. The addition of receiver autonomous 
integrity monitoring (RAIM) also allows the user to easily manipulate and test the 
latest integrity algorithms in a familiar experimental environment.  
4.2  Modular construction breakdown 
 
The RTK library has been designed from the outset to be modular in design, so that 
the user can apply whatever models are available by simply selecting them from a list, 
or they can create their own and add to the library for others to use. This methodology 
facilitates the ongoing evolution of the library as a departmental research tool. 
The breakdown of the system at the highest level can be seen in figure 4.1. 






































































Figure 4.1 – High level design of modular RTK library 
 (Parkins, 2007) 
 
The main inputs required depend upon how the user specifies which library functions 
are to be used. This is specified in the settings file that is read at runtime every time 
the program in executed. 
If precise SP3 (Spofford & Remondi, 1991) orbit interpolation is selected, providing 
the files are present in the projects folder, the program will provide satellite positions 
using the IGS SP3 product files.  
 
The library can also use the broadcast ephemeris (BRDC) data transmitted in the 
navigation message to calculate the satellite positions if the higher accuracy SP3 files RTK Software 
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are not available due to latency. This can allow the user to use the library in real time 
if rapid results are required, but this will be at slight detriment to the accuracy. 
Depending on the network layout used, the library is designed to accept multiple 
roving receivers as well as multiple base station receivers. The accepted format for the 
receiver input is the industry standard Receiver Independent Exchange (RINEX) 
format derived by Werner Gurtner (Gurtner, 2006). The RINEX reader has been 
specifically designed to read multiple input files with the primary rover file acting as 
the seeker file, defining the cross-receiver epochs of interest. 
Once the receiver data has been read, validation occurs in order to make sure common 
receiver errors and incorrect values are not passed on to the next processing stage. 
 
The next stage is single epoch point positioning for all the receivers accounting for 
ionospheric, tropospheric, geoid, satellite clock and position offsets. 
The reference station positions are assumed to be known and so the point positioning 
process is used to determine the receiver clock offsets. 
After the reference station clock offsets have been computed, a minimum spanning 
tree is computed so that inter-station ambiguity resolution can take place with a higher 
success rate. 
 
With the addition of antenna model corrections for phase offset and variance, the 
double differenced ambiguities to all common satellites are estimated, providing float 
solutions.  
 
This is achieved in the same way as seen in section 2.3.2 by forming the double 
difference observation equation, shown in equation 4.1 for a baseline between two 





Where   ???
𝑅𝑖 is the double difference float ambiguity 
    ???
𝑅𝑖  is the phase observable 
???












𝑅𝑖  is the double differenced geometric distance between receiver and 
satellite 
    ?? ??
𝑅𝑖 is the tropospheric effect 
    ?𝐼??
𝑅𝑖 is the ionospheric effect 
???
𝑅𝑖  represents residual errors such as multipath and measurement noise 
    f  is the GPS frequency (L1 or  L2) 
    c is the speed of light 
 
The covariance matrix for the least squares float solution is computed and fed into the 
LAMBDA (De Jonge & Tiberius, 1996) method along with the solution.  
The least squares residuals provided by the LAMBDA method are then tested using 
the ratio method so that the chosen results are at least 2 to 3 times better than the next 
best solution (Zinas, 2007). 
Provided this test is passed, the new, fixed ambiguities are used to interpolate for the 
rover so that its ambiguities can also be fixed. 
If multiple epochs are to be processed and no cycle slips have occurred, the associated 
ambiguities can be compared as an additional form of solution validation. 
The library has also been designed to provide as much information as possible to the 
user during operation so that if any faults arise, their origins are known. The program 
log file contains error reports and individual epoch statuses so that the user can easily 
identify any potential problems as well as track progress. 
The processed results are written to multiple files based upon the output type and the 
individual receiver. Observations to all satellites are written to individual files for 
each receiver, stored according to epoch number. These observations have not been 
corrected for cycle slips and are a direct copy of the observations found in the 
corresponding station RINEX file. Among these observations are the MP1 and MP2 
code multipath observables discussed in section 2.6.1. 
Satellite files are also stored, giving the position, elevation angle and azimuth of each 
satellite from each receiver on an epoch by epoch basis. 
For each rover, a file detailing the various position solutions is also produced. It 
contains the point position solution in cartesian earth centred, earth fixed coordinates 
as well as geodetic longitude, latitude and height values.  RTK Software 
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Along with the point position solution, the float ambiguity and, if available, fixed 
ambiguity solutions are stored on an epoch by epoch basis along with fixed ambiguity 
and ambiguity validation flags for the reference stations and rover. 
 
4.3  Testing and validation 
 
Using the RTK library to process single baseline ambiguities, the effects of the 
different available tropospheric and ionospheric models can be computed easily. 
Figure 4.2 shows the single baseline between the London (LOND) and Barking 
(BARK) Ordnance survey base stations used for initial testing. 
The baseline is 15.3Km long with the Barking station using a Trimble 400ssi receiver 
and Trimble antenna and the London station using a Leica SR530 receiver and 
Ashtech antenna. 
 
The 24 hour dataset selected was recorded on the 18
th of October 2007 and features a 
30 second epoch rate. Final version SP3 files were used for orbit determination. 
For the single epoch ambiguity resolution testing LOND was used as a virtual rover 
and BARK as a reference station. Precise coordinates are known for both stations 
through long term averaging by the Ordnance survey, as shown in table 4.1. 
 
Station  X coordinate  Y coordinate  Z coordinate 
LOND  3979606.812  -8329.692  4967677.525 
BARK  3977368.459  6726.346  4969508.937 





Figure 4.2 – Map showing LOND-BARK OS station baseline 
  
By using base station data for the rover and reference and knowing the precise 
coordinates of both, we can check the accuracy of the final single epoch position 
solutions. We can also see the effects of the various options available to the user when 
selecting which tropospheric and ionospheric correction method to use. 
X,Y and Z values were processed in 9 variations of atmospheric model as shown in 
table 4.2. The ionospheric models are either the Klobuchar model or the use of an 
IONEX file (ionosphere mapping exchange format) that is a 2D or 3D TEC map in a 
geographic grid. 
The tropospheric models available are the Saastamoinen model or the ESA developed 
matlab model. 
 
Plotting name  Ionospheric model used  Tropospheric model used 
Saas, None  None  Saastamoinen 
Saas, Klob  Klobuchar  Saastamoinen 
Saas, Ionex  Ionex file  Saastamoinen 
ESA, GMF, None  None  ESA Zenith delay with global 
mapping function 
ESA, GMF, Klob  Klobuchar  ESA Zenith delay with global 
mapping function 
ESA, GMF, Ionex  Ionex file  ESA Zenith delay with global 
mapping function 
None, None  None  None 
None, Klob  Klobuchar  None 
None, Ionex  Ionex file  None 
Table 4.2 – Atmospheric model variations used in initial test 
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Figure 4.3 – Plot of X coordinates for LOND rover using different atmospheric model combinations 
 


















The results are of interest when looking at the effects of the different atmospheric 
models, but to see the accuracy, the difference between the known values (supplied by 
the Ordnance Survey) and those computed. A graph for the X values is shown in 
figure 4.4, but for analytical purposes, table 4.3 shows the averages for the X, Y and Z 
coordinate errors for each of the atmospheric model combinations as well as the 














































success rate (%) 
Saas, None  0.0229  0.0534  0.0011  0.0581  70.7 
Saas, Klob  0.0241  0.0448  -0.0003  0.0508  73.7 
Saas, Ionex  0.0241  0.0500  0.0013  0.0555  68.0 
ESA, GMF, 
None 
-0.0036  0.0519  -0.0309  0.0605  81.0 
ESA, GMF, 
Klob 
-0.0026  0.0433  -0.0324  0.0541  82.7 
ESA, GMF, 
Ionex 
-0.0022  0.0483  0.0305  0.0571  77.8 
None, None  0.0160  0.0273  -0.0143  0.0347  40.5 
None, Klob  0.0170  0.0194  -0.0158  0.0302  36.1 




From table 4.3 it can be seen that the best method does not necessarily provide the 
best accuracy and the best success rate. Use of the ESA tropospheric model and 
 
Figure 4.6 – Plot of X coordinate errors for various atmospheric model combinations 
Table 4.3 – Average coordinate errors and ambiguity success rates  
for different atmospheric model combinations 
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Klobuchar ionospheric model gave the best success rate, but only the 4
th best 
accuracy. The highest accuracy combinations also have the lowest ambiguity success 
rate which is not ideal.  
For our purposes, when seeking to create a high accuracy position solution using the 
RTK library, the ambiguity success rate is the most important factor and so the 
ESA/Klobuchar combination seems the best choice in this case. 
The standard deviation of the vector error when using the ESA and Klobuchar models 
is 0.0240 which shows the results are not heavily spread and thus are more reliable 
than using only the Klobuchar ionospheric model which gives 0.0289. 
The possible reasoning for the increase in accuracy by not using a tropospheric 
correction could be sue to its spatial variance having a longer wavelength and so 
trying to model it over such a short baseline as this could in fact cause an increase in 
the error. The low success rate does negate any possible advantage of not using a 
tropospheric correction and so it is recommended that one is always used for accurate 
positioning. 
If the library was required to work in real time on board a train, the safety case would 
also have to include the operation times for each of the models used as this would be a 
factor in possible time to alert (TTA) in the event of a failure or unsafe position 
reporting. For the LOND-BARK baseline processing in table 4.3, the RTK runtimes 
ranged from 236 seconds when not using any modelling to 292 when using the EAS 
tropospheric and ionex ionospheric models. This can be explained by the use of input 
files by the ionex model adding significant extra processing a memory paging to the 
overall process. For the interests of this thesis, we will not be concerned with 
processing times, but it must be considered when applied to a safety critical process 
where processing times are an important factor. 
 
When checking the data for ambiguity validation, it can be seen that on several 
occasions the ambiguities seem to have been incorrectly fixed, causing position errors 
for individual epochs. This is always possible as the LAMBDA method used is not 
guaranteed to have a 100% success rate due to the stochastic nature of the problem, 
even using the ratio test to check the results can allow incorrect ambiguity fixes to 
propagate to an incorrect final position solution.  RTK Software 
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Smoothing of the data by checking integer ambiguity values for single epoch changes 
could help solve this problem, but this would also require checking of other variables 
for alterations, such as a possible change in the reference satellite used. 
Figure 4.2 also shows the Amersham (AMER) OS base station which is roughly 
37Km from LOND. To show the effect of a longer baseline on ambiguity resolution, 
the LOND-AMER baseline was processed using the RTK library using the ESA 
tropospheric model and the Klobuchar ionospheric model. The results gave an integer 
ambiguity success rate of 53.64% as apposed to 82.7% for the 15Km LOND-BARK 


















The results can be seen to be a little noisier than for the shorter baseline, with the 
average errors in X, Y and Z being 0.0067m, 0.0606m and 0.0321m respectively, 
giving a resultant average position error vector of 0.0689m, with standard deviation of 
0.07668. The number of incorrectly fixed ambiguities is also higher.  
 
The library is constantly being updated to improve accuracies over longer baselines so 
that wide area network operations are possible. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 – Plot of X coordinate errors for AMER-LOND baseline using ESA and Klobuchar 
atmospheric models. RTK Software 
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Despite the focus of this thesis being centred on the effects on code measurements in 
the rail environment, for multipath values to be calculated using geometric range and 
observed range a high precision position for the receiver must be calculated first and 
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5  Data collection exercises 
5.1  Introduction 
 
For the effects of the UK rail environment on GPS signals to be understood, real 
world experimentation must take place as the highly complex nature of the 
surrounding infrastructure would prove very difficult to model in enough detail. 
We are interested in analysing data collected in three of the main types of 
environment found in the UK rail network. These are: 
 
  Highly rural – trees and foliage being the main error sources 
 
  Electrified – overhead cables and supporting infrastructure being the main 
error sources 
 
  Highly urban – buildings and inner city infrastructure being the main error 
sources 
 
For each of these situations, experiments have been designed and locations 
specifically chosen to give the best examples of each. The rural location is based in 
the Severn Valley where access has been granted to the recreational Kidderminster to 
Bridgenorth line. This is also the first, early dataset recorded so that an understanding 
of kinematic train data can be gained in preparation for the later exercise.  
The electrified west coast main line was chosen due to the overhead electrification 
and supporting structures for the electrified environment experiment, this is not 
kinematic but is purely designed to check for possible interference. The urban 
environment chosen is located in the Birmingham new street central depot area and is 
part of a larger project called LOCASYS (Cross, 2007). Details of each site and the 
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5.2  Severn Valley railway 
 
5.2.1  Track location and surrounding area 
The Severn Valley railway is a 26 Km line that runs from Kidderminster to 
Bridgenorth, following the course of the river Severn. 
The line was originally used for commercial transport for 101 years until 1963 when 
the profitability of the line was deemed impractical. The line is now run as a heritage 
railway by the Severn Valley Railway Company which has over 250,000 visitors a 



















The line has several features desirable when looking for examples of a rural rail 
environment. The line runs through both deep and shallow cuttings, through open 
valleys and also over hills and bridges. The line is mostly lined with trees; in some 
cases the trees form a complete canopy over the train line which is ideal for analysing 
their effects on GPS measurements. There is also a short tunnel in the Bewdley 
section of track. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Map showing Severn Valley Railway Data Collection 
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Due to the operations of the line being purely for recreational use, access to the train 
was far more relaxed than that of a commuter train. The cooperation of staff proved to 
be invaluable when collecting data as access was granted not only to mount an 
antenna on the train, but also to set up a local base station in the nearby mechanics 
yard to facilitate the use of localised GPS corrections at the same epoch rate.  
There are no overhead power cables and no other trains operating on the line which is 
4ft 9½ inches wide and begins with two way sections and ends as a single track. 
In the near vicinity to the track there were no high rise buildings with only the station 



























Figure 5.3 – Kidderminster platform and depot   
Figure 5.2– Water refilling tank 
 














The data was collected on the 21
st of December 2004 in dry, cold weather when the 
train was in full use transporting visitors from Kidderminster to Highley and back 
again. This was an ideal opportunity to collect data in a rail environment so that the 
‗quality‘ of the data could be assessed as well as any processing aspects specific to 
this as yet untested environment. 
 
5.2.2  Equipment configuration 
The receivers used were departmentally owned Leica system 500 units with 
manufacturer rated (Leica, 1999) 5cm rms code measurement precision using a 
narrow code correlator spacing. 
The antennas used were Leica AT502 dual frequency units connected via coaxial 
cable. 
 
The train mounting used consisted of a Leica standardised 2m pole attached to non 
heated service pipes with plastic zip-ties as shown in figure 5.6. The coaxial cable was 
then routed down the pole and along the outside of the train to the next carriage where 







Figure 5.5– Container used to mount reference 




























The carriage skin was made of paint and lacquer covered plywood over a structural 
layer of pine slats. The roof is made of thin sheet steel covered in waterproofing 
membrane sealed with tar.  
 
The guards van was chosen as the location for the receiver as it was not in use so 
caused the least amount of disturbance to the normal operation of the service as well 




Figure 5.6 – Antenna mounted to side of train 
 

















The reference receiver was located in the nearby maintenance yard, also owned by the 
Severn Valley Railway company. The Leica receiver and antenna was mounted on top 
of a survey grade tripod (see figure 5.10) which was placed on top of an 8 foot high 
shipping container located in the yard so as to have the best possible, unobstructed 
view of the sky. The layout of the Kidderminster end of the line and depot is shown in 
figure 5.9 below with the reference receiver position marked. The train speed was 
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The reference receiver was set to a 0.5 second epoch rate and left for the day to collect 
data so that any rover data collected would fall inside the operating ‗window‘ of the 
reference receiver. The extra data collected outside the rover operating time can then 
be deleted to avoid unnecessary processing time. 
The rover receiver on the train was also set to operate with a 0.5 second epoch rate but 
without the need for a static initiation so that kinematic initialisation could occur if the 
need arose. 
Dual frequency code and phase data was collected in the receivers own ASCI binary 
format which was then post processed using Leica geo office (formally Ski-Pro) to 
produce RINEX 2.1 files for processing in the RTK library. 
 
5.2.3  Data sets produced 
 
The Rinex files produced are summarised in Table 5.1 below. 
 
Detail  Rover  Reference 
Reference  
(cut down) 
File size  5.5Mb  19.1Mb  5.5Mb 
Start time  12:27:6.5  09:01:50.0  12:27:6.5 
End time  13:38:54.0  14:01:12.0  13:38:54.0 
Total no. epochs  8614  359900  8614 
No. epochs with 4 
or more satellites 
6607  359900  8614 
% ambiguity fix 
when 4 or more 
satellites 
26.5  N/A  N/A 
Table 5.1 - Table showing Rinex file details for Rover and Reference 
 
It can be seen that the beginning and end of the cut down reference station file has 
been removed so that skipping of the epochs is not required by the RTK library when 
trying to process double differences with the rover file. The reference receiver has 
enough satellites in view for at least 4 in every epoch so that a position can be 
calculated. This is not the same for the rover where 2007 epochs have below 4 Data Collection 
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satellites in view, some of which are during the time when the train is inside Bewdley 
tunnel. 
 
Figure 5.11 shows a sky plot for the time when data was collected using Leica 
satellite availability software. A 10° cut off angle has been imposed as stochastically 
speaking satellites below 15° on the horizon tend to have a higher level of multipath 
and signal degradation but we wish to see as many available satellites as possible. 
By plotting the availability of satellites against time, we can see which satellites 
should be in view at any one time, provided they are above the minimum elevation of 


























Figure 5.11– Sky plot for Kidderminster showing satellites visible from 9am to 2pm on the 21
st December 2004. 


















As these plots can be calculated using forward prediction of orbits, they can be used 
to select an ideal time for data collection if particular satellites are of interest, or if 
simply the largest number of satellites is required. 
For this location it can be expected that there are always at least 6 satellites in view, 
with 7 for the most part when using an orbit prediction program for the data collection 
date. 
The epochs when rover data was collected can be seen to have at least 8 satellites, in 
some cases rising to 10 so this was considered an ideal time during the trains 
operation to collect data as a large number of satellites are available. 
5.3  Watford Junction 
 
5.3.1  Platform location and surrounding area 
Watford Junction is located to the north west of central London roughly 10Km inside 
the M25 motorway. 
The main train station has over 4.5 million commuters annually and looks to increase 
with the station being overhauled and upgraded by the year 2009 with the possibility 
of added links to the London Underground. 
 
 











































The station has 12 platforms and is in constant use by the public. Special permission 
was sought through Silverlink trains, Network Rail, C2C Rail and IVECO for access 
to both the platform and the roof of the station building (occupied by the HGV 
company IVECO).  
 
For access to the platform to be granted, a brief safety case for the data collection 
process had to be compiled and formally submitted for scrutiny by the Silverlink 
property manager. Stipulation for the personnel involved to have full and valid 
Personal Track Safety (PTS) cards was also imposed requiring attendance of a two 
day lecture and testing course.  
 
Once all safety procedures were completed access was granted the dates chosen for 
data collection were the 2
nd and 3
rd of November 2006. Two days were chosen so that 
any effects that were noted could be corroborated with the second days data in order 
to remove possible freak events. 
 
Figure 5.13  – Overview of Watford junction rail lines and local area 
West coast main line 
St Albans branch line 
Watford junction station 
Main line to Euston Data Collection 
112 
 
By utilising the exact daily repetition (minus 4 minutes) of the satellite geometry, any 
effects from the stationary surrounding environment should be seen to repeat 
themselves. 
 
Because the station was in constant use, the receiver used on the platform had to be 
constantly guarded as when trains pass through, the vibration of the ground and 
suction caused by the trains speed (some pendolino tilting trains pass through at near 
200Km/h) could cause the tripod to move or even fall over. 
The west coast mainline station platforms are on a rough bearing of 315° and are open 
to the sky with a clear field of view to roughly 15° elevation when close to the main 
entrance, though on the south side the main station building housing IVECO is a large 
block to the sky as it has several storeys. This will need to be accounted for when 
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Figure 5.15– View of platform and receiver facing south Data Collection 
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As can be seen in figure 5.15 to the south there are a large number of possible 
reflectors in the near vicinity to the receiver such as sign boards and a signal post. 
When looking to the north and north west of the receiver, the area is clear from 
obstructions, with only the main station building being a possible source of major 
reflections. 
 
The layout of the surrounding cables and platforms was recorded in a simplified form 
































90°  270° 
   
The northern cable section is also shown in the following figure; note the horizon of 
trees and buildings at roughly 7° elevation angle and supporting infrastructure at 60° 
azimuth. 
 

















When a train is either stopped beside the receiver or passing through the station, the 
rough elevation mask of the train does not exceed 14° within the cabled area of 
interest towards the north of the platform. 
 
5.3.2  Equipment configuration 
The receivers used were the same departmentally owned Leica system 500 units used 
for the Severn Valley data collection exercise. The antennas used were also the same 
Leica AT502 dual frequency units. 
For the required observations to take place, a rover receiver was positioned on the end 
of the platform on a survey grade tripod as shown in figure 5.17 and a reference 
receiver was placed with the approval of IVECO on top of the main train station 























The reference receiver has a full clear view of the sky without any obstructions as the 
building is the highest compared to all other visible buildings on the horizon. 
The relative positions of the rover and reference receivers can be seen in the overhead 
















The baseline between the receivers is roughly 130 meters on the horizontal and so the 
spatially correlated atmospheric errors that can effect network RTK measurements are 
going to be minimal leaving only the effects of the highly localised environment. 
 
Figure 5.18 – Reference receiver on station building roof 
 
Figure 5.19 – Plan view of Watford Junction train station showing 
receiver locations 
Reference receiver 
Rover receiver Data Collection 
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Both the reference and rover receivers were set to log with one second epochs with 
the reference being set up first and shut down last so that the rover fits within the 
‗window‘ of the reference stations operating time. This was repeated on the two 
consecutive days at roughly the same time. 
As before, dual frequency code and phase data was collected in the receivers own 
ASCI binary format which was then post processed using Leica geo office to produce 
RINEX 2.1 files for processing in the RTK library. 
 















File size  8.42Mb  11.0Mb  10.23Mb  11.3Mb 
Start time  11:18:0.0  10:38:14.0  10:45:24.0  10:7:14.0 
End time  15:31:37.0  15:37:23.0  15:51:20.0  16:1:57.0 
Total no. 
epochs  15217  17949  18356  21283 
No. epochs 
with 4 or 
more 
satellites 
15217  17949  15217  21283 
% ambiguity 
fix when 4 or 
more 
satellites 
95.8%  93.5%  N/A  N/A 
Table 5.2 – Table showing details of files produced by receivers on 2
nd and 3
rd of November 2006 
 
The reference station datasets recorded on the roof were cut down to match the 
platform rover receiver files so as to reduce unnecessary processing time. 
When looking at predicted availability, the sky plot (figure 5.20) shows that a large 
























The availability of specific satellites can be seen below, showing the fragmented 
visibility of some satellites with lower elevation. The number of satellites available 
during the data collection period does not drop below 6 and reaches a maximum of 11 
















Figure 5.20 – Sky plot for Watford junction on 2
nd/3
rd November 2006, 10° 

























Figure 5.21 – Satellite availability plot for Watford Junction Data Collection 
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When looking at the availability of satellites, it looks as though the first half would be 
the best to record data, but given that the purpose of the investigation is to ascertain 
the possible effects of EM radiation from overhead power lines, the period of 
investigation that is of most concern is when satellites are in a low enough elevation 
and within a certain azimuthal range that the signal propagation path coincides with 
the relative location of the overhead lines.  
When comparing figure 5.20 with figure 5.16, the ideal candidate satellites are two 
subsets depending on whether the northern set of overhead lines (complete with 
resistors) are of interest, or the southern set of overhead lines are being investigated. 
For investigating the overhead lines and resistors to the north of the platform, 
satellites 2, 4, 10, 17 and 24 are of interest whereas for looking at the southern set of 
cables, satellites 1, 6, 14, 25 and 30 are of interest. 
The sky plot for these specific satellites is shown below with the areas of interest 


















The northern section of interest contains only low elevation satellites, generally below 
a 30° elevation angle. The southern section contains satellites passing through a full 
 
Figure 5.22 – Sky plot showing selected satellites and areas of interest 
highlighted in green Data Collection 
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range of elevations with satellite 25 passing through the centre of the section in a 
descending elevation pattern. 
This diagram will help in determining which satellites will be of interest and at what 
period during their visibility are of concern. 
 
5.4  Birmingham New Street line 
5.4.1  Track location and surrounding area 
Birmingham New Street station is located in the centre of the city of Birmingham and 
lies on the Birmingham loop of the west coast main line. 
The station is a major hub and has over 31 million passengers passing through every 
year. The current station was redeveloped in the 1960‘s when the electrification of the 
west coast main line took place and is due to be redeveloped again under the Gateway 
Plus scheme. 


















It can be seen that all the local lines pass through New Street station, causing the 12 
platforms to be very busy. 
 
Figure 5.23 – Map of the local Birmingham rail network. Data Collection 
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The main lines that data will be collected on will be the green Lichfield to Redditch 
line and the Birmingham New Street to Wolverhampton line. 
 
The lines used have a mix of rural and urban surroundings, with the latter going to the 
extremes of the New Street station area where high rise buildings, office blocks and 
overhead infrastructures such as roads and catenary line supports surround the lines, 














There are also a number of tunnels leading up to New Street to accommodate the 











The routes used run for roughly 16 hours a day with the 1 hour trip being repeated 7 




Entrance to tunnel 
Figure 5.24 – New Street station overhead view 
 
Main station 
Underground tunnel section 
Figure 5.25 – Overhead view of main New Street tunnel section Data Collection 
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the amount of data collected during the 36 month operation period for the larger NSL 
run LOCASYS project (Cross, 2007) of which this work is an introduction. The 
length of the major project is such that changing weather seasons can be documented, 
such as using GPS to check on-board odometers, allowing wheel slip due to leaf fall 
to be quantified. 
 
5.4.2  Equipment configuration 
The data collected is from multiple sensors and receivers mounted on the train, as well 
as corresponding base station data from the local Ordnance Survey active base 
stations. 
The train mounted sensor system was built by Bangor University and designed to 




















The sensor unit contains a dual frequency geodetic quality NovAtel OEM-V3 receiver 
producing raw measurements in a binary format that can be converted to RINEX. 
 
Figure 5.27 – Sensor system built by Bangor University 
 
Figure 5.26 – Sensor system installed on train under 
seating in main passenger compartment Data Collection 
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There is also a combined INS/GPS (single frequency) Microbotics MIDG unit that 
provides combined INS/GPS position solutions as well as raw INS measurements at a 
maximum of 50Hz. 
Due to the Baud rate being maxed out by the raw INS data stream from the combined 
unit, a third single frequency NovAtel GPS receiver is also installed.  
An analogue to digital converter card that allows the unit to receive information from 
the trains onboard systems is interfaced with the ignition system so that the moment 
when the driver turns on the train, the system can begin logging. The trains on-board 
speedometer is also fed into the system so that the unit can be used to check the 















The unit also contains an integrated GSM modem so that status updates can be 
automatically transmitted for easy monitoring of the system as a whole as well as the 
memory status of the integrated memory card adaptor used to store all the recorded 
data. 
The compact flash card used to store the data can run for several weeks before the 
data needs to be downloaded and the card wiped clean. This is ideal as access to the 
unit is only possible when the train is in the depot due to the security and safety 
concerns for the travelling public. 
 
  Antenna 
L1 GPS RX  INS/GPS RX  L1/L2 GPS RX 
Key sensor  Main CPU  Speedometer 
Storage card 
Figure 5.28 – On board sensor and logging system configuration Data Collection 
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The Antenna used for the GPS signals is a low profile Aeroantenna AT2775-41 
aviation grade dual frequency antenna connected by a split feed coaxial cable 











The trains used in the Birmingham area are Hunslet TPL 3 vehicle electric suburban 
trains as shown in figure 5.31 below with a maximum line speed of 75mph. The trains 
are in constant public use and so for safety all items installed must be checked for 




















Figure 5.29 – Picture showing roof mounted low profile GPS antenna 
 













The epoch rate used for the GPS data logging was 1 second with the INS raw data 
collection rate being set at 50Hz and with a maximum line speed of 75mph, this 
allows a position at roughly every 33m when at full speed, but given the more 
common speed of around 20-40mph in urban areas, an average of 13m between 
positions is more common, close to the accuracy levels in the RNP‘s listed in section 
3.5 and so given the positions plotted are so close to the accuracy requirements, along 
track errors nearing 10m will be clearly seen. 
In order to make full use of this 1 second data, the base stations used must also have 1 
second data available if double differenced position solutions are going to be 
calculated. 
The Ordnance Survey OS net GPS network not only provides 30 second epoch rates, 
but on request 1 second data rates are available. There is no base station (surprisingly) 
in Birmingham itself, but there are in the neighbouring towns of Church Lawford 
(CHUH), Droitwich (DROI), Lichfield (LICH) and Shrewsbury (SHRE), all of which 
produce 1 second epoch rate RINEX files. 
The baseline lengths and geographical layout of these stations relative to Birmingham 

























The coordinates of each of the stations can be seen in figure 5.35 below. 
 
Station  X coordinate  Y coordinate  Z coordinate 
CHUH  3902468.454  -90706.003  5027408.638 
DROI  3909833.011  -147097.137  5020322.461 
LICH  3870544.458  -122565.380  5051157.820 
SHRE  3867417.468  -183495.554  5051679.744 
Table 5.3 – Table showing OS net base station ETRS89 cartesian coordinates 
 
All the stations listed use a Leica SR530 receiver and a Leica LEIAT504 antenna 
apart from DROI which uses an Ashtech ASH700936E antenna. 
All antenna offsets are contained in the ANTEC file used in the RTK library and so 
the phase offsets are accounted for when calculating differential positions. 
 
5.4.3  Data sets produced 
The data sets produced by the combined system vary in size depending on the active 
period during each run of the train. The RINEX data produced by the dual frequency 
NovAtel receiver is of prime interest to this thesis and so this will be what is 
discussed. The combined INS/GPS data is also available for analysis as is the single 
frequency receiver data, but the use of this is limited as the need for dual frequency 
GPS observables is required for the formation of the code multipath observables. 
 







Figure 5.32 – Map showing OS net stations and their distances to Birmingham New Street Data Collection 
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The data received from the on board speedometer cannot be used due to the interface 
between the sensor system and the train incorrectly functioning. This situation is to be 
resolved, but due to the time constraints of this thesis the results will not be available 
in time. The data collection exercise will carry on as the LOCASYS project continues 
for over 12 months (to allow for a full range of seasonal variations to be experienced 
by the equipment) 
The initial data sets produced were for the dates and journeys listed below: 
 
02/11/07: Return trips between Birmingham and Wolverhampton plus a trip from  
      Birmingham to the depot. 
 
03/11/07: Return trips between Birmingham and Redditch/Lichfield (or other  
      intermediate stations) plus 1 return trip between the depot and Birmingham 
 
04/11/07: 1 trip from Birmingham to the depot 
 
05/11/07: Mostly between Birmingham and Redditch/Lichfield (or other intermediate 
      stations) with 1 return trip between Birmingham and Wolverhampton and a 
      single journey to Wolverhampton 
 
06/11/07: Mostly between Birmingham and Wolverhampton with a single return  
      journey between Birmingham and Longbridge and a single return journey 
      between Birmingham and Coventry 
 
08/11/07: Return trips between Birmingham and Redditch/Lichfield (or other    
      intermediate stations) plus 2 return trips between the depot and Birmingham 
      and a single trip from Birmingham and the depot. 
 
09/11/07: Return trips between Birmingham and Redditch/Lichfield (or other    
      intermediate stations) plus 1 return trip between the depot and Birmingham 
 
10/11/07: Return trips between Birmingham and Wolverhampton and between    
      Birmingham and Walsall with a single trip from the depot to Birmingham 
 
13/11/07: Return trips between Birmingham and Redditch/Lichfield (or other    
      intermediate stations) 
 
14/11/07: Return trips between Birmingham and Redditch/Lichfield (or other    
      intermediate stations) plus 1 return trip between the depot and Birmingham 
 
15/11/07: Return trips between Birmingham and Redditch/Lichfield (or other    
      intermediate stations) 
 
These RINEX files and the corresponding OS base station files had a total size of 
roughly 3.2Gb with a daily file size being roughly 264Mb. The Train RINEX files Data Collection 
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were on average 60Mb for a full day of operation which lasted roughly from 5.30am 
to midnight the same day.  
This gives an average number of daily epochs as 66,600. 
Because of the continuing nature of the data collection exercise, the data sets will not be 
discussed in detail, with the main discussion being based on the analysis and results 
obtained. 
 
When looking at the number of satellites available to the train during some of the above 
listed runs, the visibility is seen to be very good with observed satellites reaching as many 
as 13 in some cases.  
Obvious breaks can also be seen in the data due to various obstructions and tunnels, but 
these will be further discussed in section 6.4.
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6  Data analysis 
6.1  Introduction 
Dual frequency code and phase data has been recorded for all three rail environments 
so that investigations into their effect on GPS signals can be as thorough as possible. 
Multiple analysis techniques are used to identify individual attributes in the rail 
environment and their specific effects. 
 
By utilising the current abundance of satellite imagery, positioning data can be 
plotted straight onto overhead images of the local area being investigated. This can 
facilitate visual mapping of individual signal errors as the resultant position 
degradation can be seen in deviations from the expected results. 
 
The RTK library allows easy manipulation of complex datasets so that individually 
tailored outputs can be designed for analysis of specific variables. Phase solutions are 
also provided for high accuracy geometric comparisons with observed pseudoranges. 
MP1 and MP2 observables are also readily available so that mapping of abrupt 
changes in multipath values can be analysed in the position domain, linking the 
abstract concept to its physical location. 
 
Commercially available processing tools such as Leica‘s Geo office and Geoquest 
solutions‘ Grid inquest also provide alternative sources of position information and 
independent data analysis.  
 
Multiple datasets were also used as not only an additional solution check, but also as 
an additional level of data analysis, utilising the daily repetition of satellite orbital 
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6.2  Severn Valley data analysis 
 
6.2.1  Introduction 
As shown in figure 5.2.3 there are two main datasets produced from the collection 
exercise at Kidderminster, a rover file and a reference file. When dealing with these 
results, the period when both the rover and reference station are actively collecting 
data will be focused on. 
Initially, the satellite availability will be compared to the predicted availability seen 
in figure 5.13 to assess the reference station and rover environments for obscuration. 
The data will be plotted onto overhead satellite imagery so that position errors and 
outages can be seen in the context of the train‘s surroundings. From this, areas of 
particular interest can be analysed in more detail in order to determine multipath 
levels and sources as well as signal quality and the local environmental effects. 
 
6.2.2  Initial data analysis 
Satellite availability was computed for both the reference station and rover receivers 



































It can be seen that the reference station has a good and constant view of 6 satellites, 
with 7 satellites visible for a subset of the data. This differs to the predicted 
availability of 8 to 10 satellites during this time period. This can be explained when 
looking at the predicted sky plot during the rover data collection period, as shown in 
figure 6.3. 
 
The satellites above a 10° mask angle are numbers, 30, 25, 21, 17, 16 and 6. These 
are the same as the satellites seen by the reference and rover satellite for the duration 
of the collection exercise. Satellites 10 and 15 are seen for a short period due to their 
ascending in the sky towards the end of the time period being considered. Satellite 23 
is also seen for a short section of time as despite it being above the cut off angle, it 





























The breaks in rover data can be clearly seen, unlike the continuous availability bars 


















Figure 6.3 – Sky plot for satellites from 12:20 to 13:30 on 21
st December 2004. 
Dark grey band represents 10° cut off. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Latitude plot for complete rover dataset using pseudorange observations 
Bewdley tunnel Data Analysis 
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Using the RTK library to process the rover pseudorange data, longitude and latitude 
positions were plotted for the full train run from Kidderminster to Highley and back 


















The two way journey can be seen to repeat many of the same breaks on the outbound 
and return path, one of which is Bewdley tunnel, as shown on figure 6.4.  
There are also level sections where the train was stationary whilst waiting at stations 
along the line. By cross-referencing the coordinates, the individual stations could be 
identified and marked on figure 6.5. 
For a complete view of the two dimensional track geometry, a plot of longitude 































Other breaks in the track data suggest areas of high surrounding trees and buildings 
leading to complete obscuration of satellites, or at least less than 4, removing the 
opportunity for a position solution to be computed. 
By utilising the open source Google earth KML script language, positions from 
pseudorange observations can be plotted as a path onto satellite imagery. An example 
of a KML file used is shown in figure 6.7. This specific file plots a three dimensional 
line onto the surface of a map within Google earth, we have used the longitude and 
latitude as horizontal coordinates and initially the height value for position as a 
vertical component. 
 
We can also plot a simple two dimensional line onto a map, which is shown in figure 
5.1 at the start of the previous section. By plotting the code solutions, deviations 
from the expected path can be visually seen as the physical train route can be seen on 








Figure 6.6 – Longitude latitude plot for rover dataset using pseudorange observations 


















The first area of interest is the main break due to the Bewdley tunnel. When looking 
at the data in figure 6.6 the break is seen to not be entirely clear, with position 
solutions seeming to appear in the middle of the tunnel. On further investigation, the 
reasoning behind this is clear. Below are three images (figures 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10) of 
the Bewdley tunnel area aerial photo as standard and with 2D and 3D plots produced 















Figure 6.7 – Example KML file format for plotting 3D path 
 
Figure 6.8 – Aerial image of Bewdley tunnel area 

























When looking at these images, the tunnel section can be clearly seen and is marked 
on figure 6.8.  
When looking at a simple two dimensional plot of the rover code based position 
solutions, due to line fitting, seeing the individual points is very difficult and so 
distinguishing between what may be a very straight line made up of lots of points and 
a long line simply fitted between two points is very difficult. This uncertainty was 
removed by using a three dimensional line plot and including the height value from 
the position solution (long, lat, height). Figure 6.10 clearly shows (in the form of 
vertical lines) each individually plotted position. In further figures, the height 
component from the 3D plot has been replaced by levels to show the number of 
satellites used for the position at each epoch, i.e. (long, lat, sats used). 
 
Figure 6.9 – Aerial image of Bewdley tunnel area with 2D line plot 
 
Figure 6.10 – Aerial image of Bewdley tunnel area with 3D line plot Data Analysis 
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The break in data can be seen to cover not only the tunnel section, but also sections 
before and after as reacquisition of the GPS signals occurs. The data plotted is for 
both the outbound and return journeys. If the data is broken into two sets, the 

























Figure 6.11 shows that on the outbound journey, the data gave position solutions in 
the middle of the major blackout region; this was not the case when the train was 
travelling in the opposite direction an hour later on the return journey. This could be 
due to the reacquisition time required by the receiver to lock onto the GPS satellite 
signals which would delay the first position solution, or due to the satellites seen on 
the outward journey being in a different position on the return journey due to the 
 
Figure 6.11 – Aerial image of Bewdley tunnel area with 3D plot of train out (travelling left) journey 
Direction of train travel 
 
Figure 6.12 – Aerial image of Bewdley tunnel area with 3D plot of train return (travelling right) journey 
Direction of train travel Data Analysis 
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time difference being 1 hour. Any alterations in speed would also affect the distance 
travelled without a position fix, but at this point on the track, the train was travelling 
at roughly 20mph. 





Outward journey  Return journey 
Elevation  Azimuth  Elevation  Azimuth 
6  72  79  46  73 
16  N/A  N/A  58  292 
17  30  52  N/A  N/A 
21  N/A  N/A  54  142 
25  56  239  35  210 
30  31  109  N/A  N/A 
Table 6.1 – Table showing available satellites and corresponding elevation and azimuth angles for 
Bewdley tunnel area during outward and return journeys 
 
The table shows that there are only two satellites in common with the two journeys, 
both of which are descending in elevation. When looking at the layout of the track 
along this section, the direction of travel is either at a bearing of 78.7° or 258.7°.  
 
From the sky plot in figure 6.3 it can be seen that satellites 6 and 25 are also 
travelling close to and parallel with this azimuth.  
Satellite 17 is seen to begin in an ideal position, but it‘s azimuth and elevation 
decrease and so it is not seen on the return journey. Conversely, satellite 16 is too 
low on the horizon and possibly obscured by the trees due to its large azimuth. This 
azimuth then decreases and the elevation increases, bringing the satellite into view on 
the return journey. 
 
If the raw Rinex data is used to determine the number of satellites seen by the 
receiver, rather than the number of satellites with data used for the position solution 
during the outbound journey whilst entering Bewdley tunnel we produce figure 6.13. 



















The number of satellites available during the section of tree covered track can be 
seen to drop to three and so a position solution is not attempted by the RTK library. 
When looking at the Rinex data directly, the L2 signals are lost for some of the 
satellites while the L1 signal is retained. This is assumed to be due to the weaker 
signal strength of the L2 band as well as the additional processing in the receiver on 
the L2 signal. Loss of the L2 frequency removes the possibility for the dual 
frequency ionospheric correction to take place, increasing pseudorange and eventual 
position error. 
Given that the focus of this thesis is code multipath, unless otherwise stated, L1 and 
L2 will be used to refer to the code observation on each frequency as phase multipath 
is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
Further breaks in the train‘s data can be linked to tree canopies, bridges and 










Figure 6.13 – Graph to show number of satellites recorded in Rinex file and number of satellites used 
for position solution in Bewdley tunnel area on outward journey 

































When considering the entire dataset, 83.2% of the epochs have four or more satellites 
available in the Rinex file, however only 76.7% of the total data set provides position 
solutions using four or more satellites. The exclusion of 6.5% of these epochs can be 
due to several factors.  
 
Figure 6.14 – Data breaks due to tree canopy signal obstruction 
 
Figure 6.16 – Data breaks due to overhead bridge 
 
Figure 6.15 – Data breaks due to buildings obscuring signals Data Analysis 
140 
 
The most obvious when using the RTK library is the need for a common subset of 
available satellites between all base stations and rovers. With the data used in this 
instance, given that the reference station is in an ideal position for maximum satellite 
availability, this is not such an issue and so other reasons are more likely, such as the 
previously mentioned loss of the L2 band due to trees. Errors on the signals received 
due to the interaction with the surroundings can cause them to be considered as 
unusable.  
 
Multipath mitigation has not been implemented in the processing used so far and so 
this would not cause discrimination in signal use. Satellite health status flags were all 
set to healthy during the data collection process and so that was also not a 
contributing factor to the reduced number of satellites used. 
 
Figures 6.15 to 6.17 also show additional information in the height of the three 
dimensional line. The KML input file has been altered to accommodate the number 
of satellites used in the pseudorange position solution as a variable.  
This allows the user to verify if a sudden change in an otherwise smooth path is 
caused by the loss of a satellite or by other errors such as multipath or signal 
interference.  
An obvious example of the former is shown below where the plan view shows an 
abrupt change in direction for the rover (figure 6.18) and when the view includes the 
height parameter (the number of satellites used) the error source can be seen as a 





























The abrupt change in direction is due to the number of satellites falling from 5 to 4 
and then back to 5 for a single epoch, then to 4 for 5 epochs before returning to 5 
satellites and the correct path. The satellite that is lost and then re-acquired is number 
25 which has a 51.6° elevation and 227.4° azimuth which is perpendicular to the 
track direction in figure 6.18. This shows how the loss of a satellite can drastically 
shift a train‘s position, especially if the satellite is located perpendicular to the train‘s 
line of travel. This is a possible issue as the along-track direction is considered to 
have the best chance of continuous individual satellite acquisition, i.e. satellites seen 
in the along-track direction will be in view without regular obstruction provided the 
train path is relatively straight. Due to the nature of the rail environment, satellites 
seen to the side (perpendicular to the line) will be more prone to obscuration due to 
the line side infrastructure not necessarily being constant in its blocking effect.  
Inclusion of accelerometers and gyroscope data together with doppler measurements 
to provide a bearing for the direction of train travel could be used to down weight the 
effect of satellites perpendicular to the line of travel so as to reduce this effect. 
Commercial systems use down weighting of newly acquired satellites for this reason. 
 
 
Figure 6.17 – Plan view of abrupt position change 




Figure 6.18 – Side view of abrupt position change 
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Jumps also occur when the number of satellites is constant. This is less common and 
is assumed to be due to signal errors due either to multipath, diffraction or 
interference. 
From the dataset recorded, some of these shifts in position will be investigated to try 




























The jump seen is attributed to the loss of the L2 signal on satellite 6 whilst retaining 
the L1 signal. This means the ionosphere free combination cannot be carried out and 
 
Figure 6.20 – Position jumps with constant number of satellites seen from side 
 
Figure 6.19 – Position jumps with constant number of satellites plan view 
Assumed correct path 
Direction of train travel Data Analysis 
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causes a range error for this satellite. The minor shifts seen within the main section 
are due to the L2 signal for satellites 23 and 25 being regained, thus causing a slight 
shift to the correct position (if averaging was to occur between both ends of the 
shifted section) Then the path is pulled back onto the expected line by regaining the 
L2 signal on satellite 16. This is shown more clearly on the annotated graph of 















From this it is clear that not only does losing/regaining a satellite affect the position 
but losing/regaining a single frequency from a satellite can affects the position in a 
similar manner. 
 
Another example of additional satellite data not necessarily improving the position 
solution is a section of track located north of Bewdley and is the next section along 









L2 sat 6 regained 
L2 sat 23 regained 
L2 sat 25 regained 
L2 sat 16 regained 













The small deviation seen in the plotted line is due to a single epoch where the signals 
of satellite 23 was momentarily observed.  
The section of interest consists of 24 epochs from 12:40:58.0 to 12:41:09.5. 
During this period satellites 6, 16, 21 and 25 were also observed but without any 
cycle slips or data gaps. 
This raises the issue that the position of a train calculated when only L1 signals are 
available is possibly better than when only some have L2 signals available, or if the 
availability of L2 signals is fluctuating. 
When looking through the entire route, most position shifts that were visible in 
Google earth were deduced as being due to either the loss or acquisition of the L2 
signal of one or more satellites. 
 
6.2.3  Dual frequency investigation 
 
When looking at the signal availability for the entire run for each of the satellites 
mentioned in relation to figure 6.22, the ratio of epochs where L2 is observed as well 








Figure 6.22 – Overhead view of section of track surrounded by trees (epoch 12:40:58.0) 






over whole run 
L2 availability 
over whole run 
L2 availability 
when L1 present 
6  81.7%  73.5%  90.0% 
16  81.5%  75.3%  92.2% 
21  81.7%  80.7%  98.7% 
25  81.7%  75.0%  91.8% 
Table 6.2– Table showing availability of L1 and L2 signals during 
 
These results do not follow the expected availability when considering only the 
elevation angles as when averaging for the duration of the journey, satellite 6 has the 
highest elevation angle yet has the lowest L2 visibility (though joint highest L1 
visibility with satellites 21 and 25). The lowest elevation satellite, PRN 21 also has 
the highest L2 availability. None of the elevation angles are however below 40° and 
the differences between the satellites discussed are small (~10°) so the data does not 
cater for the extreme cases very well. 
The breaks in L2 availability consequently cause breaks in the calculation of the MP1 
and MP2 code observables. These breaks mean that when trying to average a long run 
of data in order to extract the actual multipath values, only short runs can be 
averaged and depending on the variance of the multipath, it may not be possible to 
identify actual values. 
 
One section of track that allows a significant stream of data to be logged without 
breaks is located just north of the Bewdley tunnel in a valley passing the local safari 






The averaged MP1 values for the visible satellites in this section of track can be seen 




Figure 6.23 – Valley section of line with few signal breaks 

















Despite this section of track having a comparatively clear view of the sky, there are 


















Figure 6.24 – Averaged MP1 values for valley section of track on outgoing journey 
 
Figure 6.25 – Averaged MP1 values for valley section of track on return journey Data Analysis 
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By looking at the elevation angles of the visible satellites during the outbound and 
return journeys, some of the breaks in data and high MP1 values can be seen to be 
elevation angle dependant. 
 
Satellite PRN 
Outward journey  Return journey 
Elevation  Azimuth  Elevation  Azimuth 
3  N/A  N/A  10.2°  256.0° 
6  70.9°  77.8°  47.8°  73.4° 
16  34.2°  288.8°  57.2°  292.9° 
17  29.54°  51.3°  N/A  N/A 
21  30.9°  160.1°  53.2°  144.7° 
23  12.5°  308.4°  14.6°  320.5° 
25  56.0°  238.0°  37.2°  212.3° 
30  30.6°  110.3°  N/A  N/A 
Table 6.3  – Table showing elevation and azimuth angles for all visible satellites on the outgoing and 
return journeys in the valley section of track seen in figure 6.23 
 
Satellite 23 has the greatest variance in MP1, reaching 1.1m in total during the earlier 
run. This is most probably due to the very low elevation angle of 12° to 13°, 
something that may not normally be possible, but due to the azimuth of the satellite 
relative to the train being along the line of the track, the visibility is improved 
dramatically, especially as this particular section of the valley is relatively straight 
and feeds onto a level area where Bewdley town is situated. 
 
This level of multipath follows on from what was hypothesised in section 2.6 
regarding the along track, low elevation satellite geometry providing the highest risk 
of multipath. 
 
Satellite 3 comes into view at 13:28:48.0 with a high level of rapidly changing 
multipath. The direction of the satellite relative to the train receiver is perpendicular 
to the track direction over the shallow side of the valley. The low elevation angle of 
the satellite and the fact that it is ascending into the sky means the initial signals 
received will be more susceptible to multipath and interference from the ground Data Analysis 
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plane of the valley. Table 6.3 illustrates this in the late acquisition and rapid change 
in MP1 observable for satellite 3. The level of change is then reduced dramatically 
and begins to stabilise to a variance similar to that of the other satellites present. 
 
Analysing the extremes of MP1 and MP2 values seen on all visible satellites for the 
out and return journeys gives a rough estimation of the values expected. The results 
are shown in table 6.4 by calculating the difference between the maximum and 
minimum values for the entire run. 
 
Satellite PRN 
Maximum normalised difference  
MP1 (m)  MP2 (m) 
3  1.162  0.821 
6  0.303  0.960 
10  0.420  0.326 
13  0.781  1.140 
15  0.638  1.538 
16  0.617  1.061 
17  0.464  1.735 
21  0.500  0.704 
23  1.220  1.471 
25  0.685  0.821 
30  0.401  1.438 
Table 6.4  – Table showing maximum variations in MP1 values for satellites in view 
 
From the results, it can be seen that MP2, the code multipath seen on the L2 signal is 

























The reasons for the overall increased, yet not proportionate MP2 values are due to the 
nature of the L2 signal and its reflection and interaction properties being different to 
that of the L1 signal. The different surfaces that interact with the signals also affect 
the regularity of the received signals, increasing the seemingly random ratio of 
MP1/MP2 values calculated. When the ratio of L2 availability was compared to L1 in 
table 6.2 it was also seen that L2 was generally a weaker signal with a consistently 
lower availability. 
 
When analysing static data recorded from some of the satellites in view whilst the 
train was in Kidderminster station, as discussed in chapter 2, the changes in code 
multipath observables are seen to have a far smoother, sinusoidal variation, as in 








































The scale of change on MP2 is over double MP1but with similar frequency, though the 
MP1 values for satellites 6 and 25 are not as clearly sinusoidal as that of satellite 15. 
When comparing the frequency of the multipath, all 3 satellites appear to have a very 
similar frequency of roughly 1 minute. This is due to the multipath on all the satellite 
signals either being from the same surface or from surfaces the same distance from 
the receiving antenna. 
 
Figure 6.27 – Graph showing change in MP1 for static train data 
 
Figure 6.28 – Graph showing change in MP2 for static train data Data Analysis 
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It is possible that the multipath seen in these figures is in fact due to the train roof 
reflecting the incoming signals at a low angle. The difference in values for the L1 
and L2 code multipath can be due to many reasons, some with larger effects than 
others. 
 
One contributing factor is the weaker signal strength on L2 and the tendency for its 
absorption coefficients to be higher than L1 for some surfaces, causing a greater 
circular signal retardation and a greater perceived reflected signal path length. 
 
Due to the internals of the hardware receiver being unknown, it is difficult to say 
with certainty that the L2 signal undergoes more processing and so introduces more 
possible errors (mainly as system noise) than for L1, but it is generally considered as 
another source of degradation on the L2 signal. 
 
When investigating the dual frequency data collected, the major limiting factor for 
obtaining useful and valid results has been the intermittent characteristics of the two 
frequencies in the presence of foliage and buildings. Due to the frequency of breaks 
in the signals, trying to produce MP1 and MP2 results over a sufficient period of time 
in order to reduce them and determine the actual physical multipath values, rather 
than simply the amount they vary by is very difficult.  
By using larger data sets it may be possible to reduce this issue as over the course of 
a day, satellite positions change and so the way in which their signals interact with 
the local environment will also change, possibly providing longer sections of break-
free data. 
If this is not possible, in order for the true value of multipath to be determined, the 
exact position of the receiver and satellites must be calculated and then compared to 
the observed ranges. The initial results from implementing this process are described 




 Data Analysis 
152 
 
6.2.4  Geometric comparisons 
 
Through the use of the RTK library mentioned in section 4, dual frequency data is 
used to provide highly precise double differenced positions for the rover receiver by 
utilising the local base station set up in the nearby depot yard. 
If a highly accurate position is known for the rover receiver as well as the satellites in 
use, the exact geometric (true) range can be calculated, provided the satellite 
positions used are for the time of transmit and not the time of reception by the 
receiver. Clock offsets for both the receiver and satellites are removed during double 
differencing, but these must be calculated and included when calculating satellite 
positions. 
 
Provided the best estimates of the geometric ranges between the satellites and 
receiver have been calculated, the observed pseudoranges can be used to estimate the 
multipath on the received signals. The raw measurements cannot be used without 
alteration though as the ionospheric and tropospheric errors need to be accounted for 
as otherwise, they will show up as an additional unidentified path length that could 
be misunderstood as multipath. 
Once these errors have been removed, some initial results were produced and those 
















Figure 6.29 – Graph showing geometric multipath for satellite 6 Data Analysis 
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From this figure, it seems as though the multipath calculated from differencing 
between the geometric range to the satellite and the observed pseudorange is 
fluctuating by almost 7 meters.  
This is not the case as the errors seen are mainly due to the receiver and satellite 
clock offsets not being modelled or calculated to a high enough accuracy. The 
inaccuracies in clock offsets, although small (nanosecond level), affect the 
pseudorange value by levels similar to those seen in 6.29 due to any timing error 
being multiplied by the speed of light. 
When comparing some of the data with MP1 values for satellite 6, an interesting 





















When investigating this correlation, it is hypothesized that the reason MP1 seems to 
change by the same sign at the same epochs, yet by a different scale could be due to 
the L1/L2 correlator frequencies or offset being affected by the clock offset jumps 




Figure 6.30 – Graphs showing correlation between geometric multipath with clock 
error and MP1 values for satellite 6 Data Analysis 
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not of concern in this thesis, but further investigation of the receiver clock jump 
effects on the L1-L2 correlator offset could be of interest to very high precision 
applications. 
 
In order to remove these unwanted clock effects, double differencing can be used as 
was seen in section 2. The only remaining error factor in the signal measurements 
will be due to multipath from the local environment and the internal receiver noise.  
 
The problem with using the double differencing method is that the multipath values 
calculated will be a combination of those seen by both receivers for both satellites 
and so the combination of MP1 and MP2 values must also be calculated if a physical 
level of the combined multipath is to be derived. 
 
When using the double differencing equation 2.34, the corresponding combination of 





Where   ??12
?? is the double difference combination of code multipath  
    observables for satellite a and b observed using receivers 1 and 2 
    ??1
? is the code multipath observable on satellite a from receiver 1 
    ??2
? is the code multipath observable on satellite a from receiver 2 
    ??1
? is the code multipath observable on satellite b from receiver 1 
    ??2
? is the code multipath observable on satellite b from receiver 2 
 
The double differenced geometric multipath results are shown in figure 6.31 for a 


























From figure 6.31, the multipath calculated using the observed minus computed 
residuals from the double differencing process is seen to vary by roughly 20cm over 
the 1 minute period. This is a combination of the multipath seen at the base station 
and rover sites for signals received from satellites 6 and 25.  
 
The variation in multipath shown in 6.32 can be compared to the MP1 observable for 
the same time period in order to show both the validity of the code multipath 
observables to accurately show the multipath on a signal and to correct for the double 
differenced combined integer ambiguity offset seen as a result of the MP1 














Figure 6.31 – Graph showing double differenced geometric range 
multipath for satellite 25, using satellite 6 as reference. 
 
Figure 6.32 – Graph showing double differenced combination of MP1 




Figure 6.32 shows the same time period as figure 6.31 and the combined integer 
ambiguity offset can be seen to be roughly -23m. When comparing the amount by 
which the geometric multipath varies by, the two figures show the same 20cm 
change as well as a high sinusoidal correlation. Figure 6.33 clearly shows this by 
normalising the MP1 output by adding the average offset of 23.186m and plotting it 














From this correlation, the absolute values for the combined MP1 observables can be 
computed, but the integer offsets at the rover and reference sites are still not known. 
Due to the reference receiver being static and ideally with a clear view of the sky, 
large periods of continuous data are more commonly available and so averaging of 
the data can occur with more certainty. From this averaging, the MP1 integer offsets 
for both the observed and reference satellite can be approximated, along with the 
maximum levels of change in the site specific multipath.  
Despite this extra information allowing the integer offsets for the reference station to 
be calculated, the integer offsets for the rover cannot be calculated as the sign of the 
offset are not known and so the combination of the code multipath observables 
cannot be broken up to solve for the rover observable offsets . 
 
 
Figure 6.33 – Graph showing geometric and normalised double 
differenced MP1 observables for satellite 25 using satellite 6 as reference Data Analysis 
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What this process of double differencing does allow, as shown in figure 6.33 is the 
checking of the MP1 observable and whether or not the values observed (although 
combined) represent the true physical variation of multipath on the satellite signals. 
 
By using the RTK library to calculate the double differenced position for the trains 
receiver, a truth is obtained so that positions calculated purely with code 
pseudoranges can be compared for accuracy and precision as the additional benefits 
of phase solutions may not be cost effective if the pure code solutions are within the 
required limits of positional accuracy required by the rail network. The possibility for 
further research in this area has been provided by the construction of the RTK 
library, but is beyond the scope of this research project. 
 
6.2.5  Conclusions 
The initial purpose of this experiment was to collect data from a rail environment in 
order to gain an understanding of how it may differ from that collected from more 
common sources such as base stations and rover receivers in cities and open spaces.  
The UK rail environment has not been investigated using GPS very much and 
multipath analysis has never been undertaken.  
Because of the relative lack of available information on the area and the complete 
lack of RINEX data from a train based receiver, this initial experiment was an ideal 
chance to record something that would provide data similar to that expected from the 
Birmingham data collection exercise.  
The data characteristics in terms of breaks, kinematic variance and signal errors were 
new and gave an idea of how a GPS receiver would function in kinematic mode 
along a smooth track where repeatability of position is possible within very low 
tolerance due to the outgoing and return journeys of the train. 
The rural nature of the Severn Valley also helped to quantify the possible effects of 
trees and foliage on a kinematic receiver. 
Being the first data set for evaluation, many processing tools were developed using 
the data as the erratic availability of dual frequency data and whole satellites forced a 
single epoch approach to calculating positions. The number of cycle slips was also 
larger than normally expected, adding to the need for single epoch positioning as 
multiple epoch data processing would rarely function. Data Analysis 
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Due to the main Birmingham data set availability being delayed by 2 years, the 
processing system needed to be automated so that when the large data sets were 
available, errors in data did not cause problems. 
Simple errors such as RINEX breaks and receiver glitches were prevalent in the 
Kidderminster data set and this allowed a number of software improvements to be 
undertaken to improve the resilience of the processing library used. 
  
Given the predicted satellite availability from the Leica availability program, the 
actual availability generally agreed favourably with the rover and reference visibility 
however the rover visibility altered significantly depending on the surroundings.  
The major errors seen when trying to produce a track line plot in Google earth were 
produced either by whole satellite availability changes or L2 signal dropouts. It was 
clear when analysing specific instances of these jumps that satellites in the along-
track direction cause less of a position error than when satellites perpendicular to the 
track direction fluctuate in availability. The results are similar when assessing L2 
signal availability, when the L2 drops out, the position jumps can be similar to losing 
a satellite entirely. 
In order to counteract this, a form of smoothing is usually used by commercial 
location devices in order to reduce the instantaneous effects of satellite acquisition. 
This does not however alleviate the sudden jumps seen when a satellite is lost from 
one epoch to the next. For certain satellite geometries, the effects of a satellite being 
removed may have more or less effect, by looking at Geometric Dilution of Precision 
(GDOP), the even spreading of satellites may reduce any shift in position along a 
certain line but as calculation of GDOP simply produces a unit-less number, a full 
3D geometric analysis of each epoch would need to be carried out in order to 
determine possible position effects. 
Given the obvious fact that a train is on a fixed line and that the maximum curvature 
of the line is limited relative to the line speed, this could be used when attempting to 
smooth continuous position data. The use of extra sensors such as tachometers and 
accelerometers could also aid in the reduction of large position jumps due to satellite 
and signal availability, provided an appropriate kalman filter is used. 
 
Another problem due to L2 dropping out is when trying to assess the fluctuations in 
multipath through the computation of the MP1 and MP2 code observables. Due to the Data Analysis 
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unknown offset in the values calculated, averaging must take place. This averaging 
requires a significant period of break-free data in order to confidently determine the 
average value. Due to the constantly varying availability of some L2 signals, the 
process of determining an average and thus trying to determine the physical level of 
multipath as opposed to simply the amount by which it changes is a very difficult 
process given the amount of data that has been recorded is limited. 
 
It is for this reason that future data collection exercises of this kind would ideally 
produce a far larger data set so that averaging is possible due to the increased 
likelihood of longer periods of break-free data. 
 
The tools developed during this initial phase have also paved the way for future 
analysis to be carried out easily by providing a tool set that can be manipulated and 
added to in order to analyse specific scenarios and data sets. 
The use of Google earth also helped by providing visual results that can be quickly 
analysed without the need for complex coordinate mapping and the production of 
multiple graphs for specific areas of interest. 
 
As results, although this initial data set was designed as a test execution methodology 
for the later Birmingham data set, they would be included in a safety case for GPS in 
the railways as it is supporting evidence due to the results obtained but also for the 
development of the analysis techniques used. Given that the integrity level 
requirements rely on analysis of very large data sets (or reliable extrapolation from 
smaller sets) any additional data collected is of use when trying to define any 
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6.3  Watford junction data analysis 
 
6.3.1  Introduction 
The four data sets produced over the two days of observation by a rover and 
reference receiver were processed using the RTK library and the outputs analysed.  
The 4 minute offset between successive day satellite positions provides a truth to 
check for any repeated breaks in the data or anomalies seen. 
General satellite availability is not the focus of this experiment due to the area being 
relatively open to air and the receivers used not being mounted on the train itself but 
on the platform and nearby building roof. 
By focusing on the elevation and azimuth angles where possible sources of EM 
radiation are located, changes in the signals received can be analysed without having 
to perform a detailed analysis of all the data. 
 
6.3.2  Initial data analysis 
The satellite availability for the two days for the rover and reference receivers are 
shown in figures 6.38 and 6.39. The graphs show the link between the roof and 
platform receivers in the satellites available being very similar. The platform results 
for both days follow the roof results very closely, confirming initial thoughts that the 
platform receiver has a very good view of the sky. 
 
The broken availability of satellite 30 is also seen to repeat itself on the second day 
of observation for both the roof and the platform receivers and so the possibility of 















































Figure 6.34 – Graph showing satellite availability for roof and platform Watford Junction 
receivers on 2



























There is generally a good availability of satellites, with there always being at least 4 
and up to as many as 11 on numerous occasions. 
Due to the number of epochs represented in figures 6.34 and 6.35 and the possible 
size of any breaks being very short, it is unlikely that any breaks due to overhead 
cables would be seen in either of these figures. 
The rough satellite positions seen in the skyplot (figure 5.20, section 5.3.2) are valid 




Figure 6.35 – Graph showing satellite availability for roof and platform Watford Junction 
receivers on 3
rd November 2006 Data Analysis 
163 
 
As mentioned in section 5.3.2, the 10 satellites of specific interest are 2,4,10,17 and 
24 for the northern section of sky and 1,6,14,25 and 30 for the southern. 
When looking at these satellites and comparing them to the availability shown by 
figures 6.34 and 6.35, most of the northern satellites of interest are not present, in 
fact only satellite 2 has a significant amount of data at around 2 hours, with satellite 
24 providing under an hour on both days. Given that the satellites are not available to 
either the platform or roof mounted receivers, it is assumed that either the orbital 
prediction program was incorrect, or other factors were involved. For satellite 4 it is 
possible that its availability was premature and so during the time of data collection 
it was missed, satellite 10 seems to be too low on the horizon but the absence of 
satellite 17 is unexplained. 
 
When looking at the south western satellites, the situation is better with none missing 
for both days and both receivers. 
This is ideal for the southern mounted overhead cables, but the northern set of cables 
also have the additional resistors mounted within the region of interest and so any 
possible effects from these may not be observed due to the poor availability of 
satellites with signals passing through that area. 
 
6.3.3  Interference investigation 
The first investigation into possible interference on satellite signals due to EM 
interference from overhead cables and the supporting infrastructure is an overview of 
the MP1 and MP2 multipath observables for the satellites listed in section 6.2.2. 
Due to the platform receiver being static and the sky view being almost ideal, the 
number of breaks in data are minimal, thus the code multipath observables can be 
normalised with confidence. The following set of graphs (figures 6.36 – 6.39) show 
the MP1 and MP2 values for the platform receiver during the two days of observation 






























Figure 6.36 and 6.37 show the MP1 and MP2 values for the northern satellites for the 
two days of data collection. The obvious similarities between the two days have been 
shown in red but given the scale difference the magnitude of the MP1 and MP2 










Figure 6.36 - Graphs showing MP1 variations for northern satellites on the 2
nd and 3

























When viewing these figures, if there is a difference from one day to the next, it is 
assumed to be due to either a person passing the receiver causing an error, or due to 
freight trains that pass through as they are not timetabled and so do not repeat from 
day to day (Though timetabled trains do not tend to run on time anyway). 
This can be seen on the 3
rd of November for satellite 2 in both the MP1 and MP2 
graphs. When looking at satellite 4 on the first day, towards the end, there is a 
significant increase in both MP1 and MP2. This can be attributed to the low elevation 
of the satellite causing reflections from objects. 
 
Satellite 24 is seen to be stable in its multipath fluctuation and follows a similar 
pattern for both days with MP1 and MP2. 
 
 
Figure 6.37 - Graphs showing MP2 variations for northern satellites on the 2
nd and 3
rd of November 2006 Data Analysis 
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From this brief initial analysis of the northern satellite signals, there do not seem to 
be any sections of data that arouse suspicion of signal errors. The data will however 
be analysed further as the possible EM interaction with the overhead cables could 
cause a block of the signal instead of errors in its value. Due to the density of the data 
plotted in figures 6.36 and 6.37 any breaks in the data with duration shorter than 
























Figure 6.38 and 6.39 show the MP1 and MP2 values for the southern satellites for the 





Figure 6.38 – Graphs showing MP1 variations for southern satellites on the 2
nd and 3

























Satellites 1,6,14 and 25 do not seem to have any epochs of particular interest with 
regard to abnormal values, despite satellite 25 beginning with a large variation in MP1 
and MP2, this is most likely due to the low elevation of the satellite as it comes into 
view of the receiver. 
Satellite 30 shows two distinctive peaks in MP1 and MP2 around 14.30. Despite this 
being near the end its period of visibility and thus possibly due to multipath from 
other objects low on the horizon, the initial spike in the code multipath observable is 
less likely to be due to this. On further investigation it was seen that the azimuth 
angle of the satellite towards the end of the data collection exercise was around 120° 
and so the cause of the multipath values and breaks in the signal were most likely the 
platform itself and the infrastructure supporting the overhead cables and signals. 
 
 
Figure 6.39 – Graphs showing MP2 variations for southern satellites on the 2
nd and 3
rd of November 2006 Data Analysis 
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Due to the apparent lack of EM interference from overhead cables altering the 
information on the incoming signals or distorting the code or phase measurements, 
the possible blocking of signals (or assumed rejection by the receiver hardware if 
scrambled) due to EM interference was investigated. 
 
When analysing the full data set for both days manually, there were very few breaks 
inside the specific zones designated as containing EM radiation sources of interest. 
For both the northern and southern sets of satellites, only satellites 2 and 25 had 
breaks on the first day of data and satellites 2, 4, 6 and 25 had breaks on the second. 
Given that the break in signal from satellites 6 and 4 are not repetitions, they have 
been ruled out as being due to EM interference, leaving only satellites 2 and 25 for 
further investigation. 
 
The results for these two satellites are shown in table 6.5. 
 
Day  Satellite PRN  Epoch  Duration  Elevation  Azimuth 
2/11/06 
2  13:24:24  14s  16°  39° 
25  15:17:58  10s  29°  214° 
3/11/06 
2  13:01:18  3s  22°  45° 
2  13:18:57  6s  17°  39° 
25  15:34:41  9s  21°  210° 
Table 6.5 – Table showing signal breaks, elevation and azimuth angles for satellites 2 and 25 
 
The first break that can be removed is for satellite 2 on the 3
rd. This is because it is 
very short and probably due to a passing passenger or freight train. It also has no 
correlated break on the previous day, ruling out a repeating error source. 
When comparing the other break in this satellite, the durations are not the same, and 
the starting epoch is not inside the 4 minute window, but the elevation and azimuth 
angles are almost identical.  
 
The breaks shown in table 6.5 were also cross checked with the reference receiver to 
make sure that there were no chances of satellite malfunction in order to qualify the 




Given that the receivers had to be set up both days in exactly the same position for 
the results to follow theory precisely, it is possible that the positioning of the 
receivers on both days were in fact not exact, and due to the constant rail traffic 
causing large vortices and ground movement, some additional movement of the 
receivers is possible. From this additional assumption and the fact that a minute 
change in the receiver position will only alter the elevation and azimuth a very small 
amount it is assumed to be the same object causing the obscuration.  
 
The change in initial epoch is most likely due to the near-field effect of an obscuring 
object causing a larger effect on the visibility of far objects, thus a small change in 
the receivers position causes a significant change in the timing of satellite visibility. 
The effects seen on the signal from satellite 25 are not as closely correlated, with the 
difference in elevation and azimuth angles between the two days being 8° and 4° 
respectively. The time offset is also far larger than for satellite 2 and is not seen 
earlier the second day, but later so the likelihood of the two days observations being 
for the same obscuration are far lower. 
 
By looking at the elevation and azimuth angles at which the satellites have been 
blocked, the local platform site was then checked to see if either the overhead cable 
EM radiation or local objects were to blame for the breaks. 
 
6.3.4  Mapping errors to local infrastructure 
From the final results of section 6.3.3, only 2 satellites are seen to be blocked or 
affected by the local platform infrastructure. The lines in figure 6.45 show the 
























When checking the receiver locations for the northern side of the platform as seen in 
figure 5.19, the breaks in signal for satellite 2 coincide with the location of the 
northern pair of resistors in both azimuth and elevation. Figure 5.18 also shows the 
resistor pair to the left of the photo. Unfortunately, due to the timeframe of 
observation, there are no other satellites observed passing this point as the prediction 
program shows satellites 4, 10 and 24 passing in very close proximity. 
 
The obscuration of satellite 25 on both days due to a fixed object has already been 
shown to be doubtful and so the next obvious step was investigated, the train times. 
Due to the movement of apparatus when trains enter and leave the station, exact 
timings of train arrivals and departures were not taken as the equipment had to be 
held to the ground. But on checking the timetable, the two times when satellite 25 
was seen to have breaks in signal, at 17 and 35 past the hour, trains were due (± 4 
minutes) and so this is believed to be the reason. The trains using the southern 
section of track were Virgin pendolino trains and so despite the train body not 
obscuring the sky to such a high elevation angle of 29°, the pantograph does in fact 
reach this high as it makes contact with the overhead cables.  
 
We have already seen from analysing all the recorded data that the overhead cables 






Figure 6.40 – Overhead view of Watford Junction platform receiver location, showing 
azimuth of satellites 2 and 25. Data Analysis 
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have been observed through the area containing cables without issue and so the two 
breaks observed are assumed to be due to other factors. 
 
The change in azimuth and elevation for the break points in the signal from satellite 
25 can also be explained as being due to the slightly varying position of the train as it 
stops by the platform. Whereas with satellite 2 the differences were small, the 8° 
elevation and 4° azimuth change in break position for satellite 25 are significant. The 
second day‘s elevation and azimuth increasing by these amounts can be seen to fit 
with the physical situation of the train stopping fractionally further along the 
platform on the second day, thus increasing azimuth, and due to the platform being 
roughly perpendicular to 225° azimuth, the apparent elevation angle to the 
pantograph would also increase. 
There is however the duration of the breaks that make the possibility of the 
pantograph being the cause less possible. Due to the breaks only lasting in the order 
of 10 seconds, this seems too short a timeframe for a train to stop at a platform and 
so the only additional reasoning for this may have something to do with gap 
discharge or the nature of the trains coupling with the overhead cables once the train 
has reached a standstill. Further investigation would be needed to confirm this 
theory. 
 
6.3.5  Conclusions 
Due to an increasingly large proportion of the UK rail network adopting overhead 
electrification as a form of rolling stock propulsion, any possible effects from the 
overhead lines need to be investigated if GNSS is to be used for signalling and 
control purposes. 
The experiment involved using receivers mounted near to the overhead cables on 
Watford Junction platform and on a nearby roof free from obstructions to the sky. 
By calculating the code multipath observable, any possible errors or abnormal values 
in either the code or phase for the L1 and L2 frequencies would be shown when 
plotting a time series. 
Any values of interest were first checked with the reference receiver to see if they 
were in fact due to the localised platform environment or the constellation itself. Data Analysis 
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Further to this, individual investigations were carried out in order to determine the 
possible reasons for the errors. 
This is important when considering the evaluation of continuity and availability 
RNPs due to the breaks in signals possibly causing a loss of performance within the 
required limits or, ultimately a total loss of position integrity and therefore a break in 
system availability. 
 
The results show that the only effects seen by the receiver due to overhead 
infrastructure were obstruction by larger objects, such as the in-line resistors and 
train mounted pantograph. These obstructions may be due to the physical size of the 
obstruction or due to the possibility of corona or gap discharge as the pantograph 
maintains a dynamic coupling with the cable and the resistors have been noted as a 
possible source of electrostatic build-up leading to small discharges, but the limited 
time noted for the breaks require further investigation as the source of signal 
obscuration may not be the physical object of the pantograph itself. 
 
The plots created for the code multipath observables show that there are no apparent 
signal errors or range anomalies due to the cables themselves or the surrounding 
area.  
No cycle slips were observed whilst the GPS signals were passing through the cabled 
area, increasing confidence in the correct operation of GPS in the presence of 
overhead cables. 
When mapping the individual signal breaks to physical objects located in the near 
vicinity, the inaccuracies in receiver position caused a certain level of uncertainty 
and the advantage of repeating observations over the two days was diminished 
slightly.  
Ideally, the local area would have undergone a full survey using either a total station 
and pogo or a laser scanner mounted in exactly the same position as the receiver. 
This would have allowed precision mapping of any signal breaks to individual 
infrastructure details in an automated manner. 
 
The overall levels of multipath experienced by the rover receiver were also a good 
indication of what a train would see in an open air station like Watford Junction. Data Analysis 
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The level of multipath variation on L2 is again seen as being larger than for L1, with 
the average over the two days being ~0.65m for L2 compared with ~0.45m for L1. 
When looking at extreme values for multipath fluctuation, the L2 signal was more 
prone to large differences, reaching a change of 3.5m for satellite 30 on the 3
rd of 
November compared with the maximum L1 variance being 1.5m for satellite 2 on the 
2
nd and satellite 25 on the 3
rd or November. 
These results should be integrated into any HAZOP process evaluating GPS 
interference due to overhead lines as the analysis shows that there are no detectable 
errors and that they should therefore not cause an issue in the operation of GPS in the 
vicinity of quaternary overhead power lines. 
Further work towards a more stringent and quantitative value for the possible 
emission of interfering EM frequencies from overhead lines would require the use of 
specialist equipment to monitor EM fields in an anechoic chamber. The results from 
such an experiment would hopefully determine exact values for a standardised 
overhead power network that could be included in a final safety case for the use of 
GNSS under power lines. 
Due to the effects not being detected in this experiment, the FMEA worksheet would 
not contain EM radiation from power lines as a possible cause of system failure and 
thus would not require any additional features to mitigate its risk.  
Given the levels of confidence required for SIL qualification, the data collected and 
analysed in this report would not be considered sufficient for a level to be 
determined, but through extrapolation and further testing, the possibility of 
undetected errors may be determined, though it is expected to be of a very low 
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6.4  Birmingham data analysis 
 
6.4.1  Introduction 
Following on from the results obtained from the Severn Valley railways data 
collection and analysis, the methods of analysis to be used for the Birmingham 
datasets have been refined and developed. 
 
The use of Google Earth is again ideal for visually representing the position data and 
the local infrastructure effects on satellite visibility and interference. 
 
Due to the high volume of data, statistical testing can be carried out in order to 
determine quantitative statements about the variability of multipath and possibly its 
dependence on the length of break-free observations for each satellite. 
Although inertial sensor data is available to accompany the GPS data recorded, for 
the purposes of this thesis, this data is not included and will not be considered. 
 
6.4.2  Initial data analysis 
Given the large volume of data collected, individual files will not be referenced, but 
the day of collection will be referred to for particular data sets. The two main lines, 
Birmingham – Redditch and Birmingham – Wolverhampton will be dealt with 
separately and any differences in results noted. 
 
The first data sets recorded in November will be broken into the two routes 
according to the day‘s schedule. The data collected varies in length depending on 
how many journeys are carried out and which line the train is operating on. 
The first two days data cover the two lines and will be part of the initial analysis, 
then the days when these routes are repeated will be integrated into the investigation 
in order to statistically improve the results obtained. 
 
The first day of data collected (2
nd November 2007) covers the Birmingham to 
Wolverhampton line several times, as can be seen from the longitude and latitude 
plots in figures 6.41 and 6.42 from code pseudorange measurements processed using 






























The train is seen to repeat the return journey 7 times during the running time of 12:30 
to 22:50 with the final leg showing the train travelling to the depot.  
The large repeated breaks seen in the longitude plot are due to New Street station and 
tunnel and can also be seen as smaller breaks in latitude due to the latitudinal change 
when entering the station being minimal compared to the longitude. 
This can be seen in figure 6.43 when plotting the Birmingham – Wolverhampton 
track coordinates. 
 
Figure 6.41 – Graph of trains longitude against time for 2/11/07 
 

















The large break in data is mainly due to the tunnel at the western entrance to New 
Street station and is made longer by the lack of re-acquisition of satellites signals 
after the tunnel due to the roads and bridges located above the tracks in and around 
the main station area. Once the train has entered the platform area for a while and is 
able to re-acquire enough satellites for a position, the errors are large due to the 
surrounding buildings and infrastructure.  
 
The second day of data collected (3
rd November 2007) covers the Redditch to 
Lichfield line which also passes through Birmingham New Street station. The 
number of repeated runs can be seen from the longitude and latitude plots in figures 











Figure 6.43 – Plot of Longitude against Latitude for Birmingham – Wolverhampton line 
New Street station tunnel break 






























The main route that is split into two sections by New Street station can be seen to 
repeat 4 times during the day. The longitude plot also shows Birmingham New Street 





Figure 6.45 - Graph of trains latitude against time for 3/11/07 
 
Figure 6.44 - Graph of trains longitude against time for 3/11/07 
New Street station area Data Analysis 
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Figure 5.45 shows the route in its entirety, with New Street station in the centre 















As with figure 6.43, several position errors are visible, even at this scale. These are 
mostly due to loss of satellites and poor satellite geometry and will be briefly 
investigated in the next section as the reasons are similar to those previously seen in 

















New Street station area 



















By using Google earth, the positions calculated using code pseudoranges can again 
be used to visually show the effects of the local infrastructure. The effects of the 
New Street station infrastructure are shown in figure 6.47. 
The position errors due to multipath will be discussed in section 6.4.3 but the errors 
due to satellite availability will be discussed next. 
 
When looking at satellite availability for the entire data set for 2/11/07, figure 6.48 












Figure 6.47 – Picture showing Birmingham New Street station train position errors for data on 2/11/07 caused by 




























The time based plot shows a visible cyclic pattern that repeats 7 times during the day. 
The minimum number of satellites shown is 4 and if fewer are visible then a break in 
data is produced.  
This output has been chosen as the focus of this research is to assess the errors on 
signal and position when one is obtained and not on implementing alternative 
positioning algorithms to obtain a solution with fewer than 4 satellites, and so epochs 
where there are fewer than 4 satellites will be seen as blank. 
 
 
Figure 6.48 – Plots of satellite availability against time and longitude for all data recorded on 2/11/07 Data Analysis 
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The graphs in figure 6.48 show that throughout the entire journey, then number of 
satellites in view change rapidly and does not stay constant for very long. It can be 
seen that towards the end of the day, the maximum number of visible satellites 
reduces from 14 to 12, with the period of 18:00 to 22:00 only having a maximum of 
10. The average number of satellites for each 1 minute period has also be plotted as a 
black line on the time varying graph in order to remove some of the difficulty 
encountered when dealing with such a high volume of data. 
The black line on the longitude graph has been broken into 0.01° averaged sections 
and shows that the average number of available satellites near the station reduces to 
below 5 per epoch. 
 
When looking at the repeated pattern during the day, the number of satellites visible 
when the train is in New Street station is also reduced, with this being more obvious 
later in the day. This can again be attributed to the large number of high rise 
buildings in and around the station blocking incoming signals. 
The small section of data from 22:50 onwards shows availability of satellites when 
the train is in transit from New Street station to the local depot at the end of its daily 
service. 
 
As the aim for this research is to aid in the construction of a safety case, the worst 
possible operating conditions must be considered when analysing data. Despite the 
average number of satellites not falling below the minimum 4, there are a large 
number of breaks in the data and certain sections of track contain obstructions that 
hinder the performance of GPS.  
One such area is along from the Smethwick Rolfe Street section of track where 






















The figure shows all the runs from 2/11/07. The times when the train passes through 
the area pictured are shown in table 6.6, the timetable can be seen to repeat itself at 
roughly 10 and 40 minutes past the hour. 
 
Train enters section  Train leaves section 
12:41:31  12:43:23 
13:37:31  13:39:07 
14:13:37  14:15:15 
15:10:32  15:12:37 
15:44:01  15:46:03 
16:39:20  16:42:05 
17:13:49  17:16:01 
18:11:42  18:13:25 
18:42:25  18:44:12 
19:43:07  19:44:13 
20:11:55  20:13:56 
21:09:37  21:11:18 
21:41:26  21:43:26 
22:49:49  22:51:30 
Table 6.6 – Table showing times when train enters and leaves the overhead bridge section near the 
Smethwick Rolfe Street section of track 
 
Figure 6.49 – Plot of train positions in Google Earth near the Smethwick Rolfe Street area. 
Overhead bridges Data Analysis 
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Due to figure 6.48 representing a full day of data, the resolution for the section of 
track being investigated is poor, because of this figure 6.50 is plotted in order to 

















The average number of satellites for sections of 0.0005° (roughly 46m long) is also 
plotted on the graph as a black line due to the rapidly changing values making 
determining the most common number of satellites at each point difficult. 
The gaps in data are also clear as when the train passes under the bridges, sometimes 
complete satellite obscuration occurs. Smethwick Rolfe Street station is located at 
1.970° longitude and can be seen on the graph as having a greater density of data 
collected and with an average number of around 7 visible satellites. 
The run that produced the highest position deviation from the track was investigated 








Figure 6.50 – Graph showing number of satellites and average number against longitude in Smethwick Rolfe Street 























The graphs show that due to a loss of 2 satellites a large position jump occurs, there 
are also a large number of gaps in the data where the number of satellites has fallen 
below 4. 
When investigating the specific satellites that come into and go out of view, two 
satellites have very low elevation angles as well as azimuth angles that are 
perpendicular to the direction of travel. The general fluctuation in the number of 
visible satellites can be attributed to these factors, with the loss of more satellites 
most likely being due to the overhead infrastructure present in the area. 
This pattern is also seen in figure 6.48 where the average number of visible satellites 
is greater earlier in the day when more satellites had a higher elevation angle than 
later in the day. The number of satellites visible still fluctuates, but towards the end 




Figure 6.51 – Graphs showing latitude and number of visible satellites for 
Smethwick section of track for highest position error run. Data Analysis 
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These results mirror those seen for the Severn Valley Railway data analysed in 
section 6.2 whereby when there are a limited number of satellites available and one 
satellite is lost, the computed position can change significantly. Because of the 
earlier conclusions, the data collected from Birmingham will not be fully analysed 
for satellite availability issues causing position shifts.  
For this reason, the next section will involve the dual frequency investigation of the 
data utilising the code multipath observables MP1 and MP2. 
 
6.4.3  Dual frequency investigation 
An initial assessment of the level of change in MP1 and MP2 for all the satellites in 
view was carried out for the first two days of operation as both of the major lines 
under investigation are covered during this time. 






















Figure 6.52 – Graph showing MP1 values for all visible satellites (colours represent different satellites) on 2/11/07 






































Figure 6.53 - Graph showing MP2 values for all visible satellites (colours represent different satellites) on 2/11/07 
(Birmingham – Wolverhampton line) 
 
Figure 6.54 – Graph showing MP1 values for all visible satellites (colours represent different satellites) during first half of 




















As can be seen from the figures, the average change in MP1 and MP2 for both lines 
rarely exceeds 4m. The extreme cases are assumed to be due to specific local 
infrastructure such as overhead bridges and high buildings or due to long periods of 
break free data at stationary points providing significant variation. 
 
The MP1 values seen for the 2
nd of November generally vary by around the same 
amount as the MP2 values for the same day but extreme cases where high levels of 
multipath are observed for shorter periods of time are more common and larger on 
MP1 than on MP2. This is contrary to the usual expectation that due to the L2 signal 
being slightly weaker and more prone to interference, a higher multipath value than 
that for L1 is normally seen.  
This specific section of data will be investigated, but when comparing it to figure 
6.44 and 6.45 it can be seen that the train is inside New Street station where high 





Figure 6.55 - Graph showing MP2 values for all visible satellites (colours represent different satellites) during first half of 
3/11/07 (Redditch - Lichfield line) 
 Data Analysis 
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The values of the multipath recorded on both L1 and L2 frequencies were also 
checked for a possible bias in terms of the distribution.  
Given that the graphs in figures 6.52 to 6.55 contain so much information, each value 
has been placed in integer sets to show the distribution of multipath values. A 































Figure 6.56 – Graphs showing distribution of normalised MP1 and MP2 values for 2
























The results in figures 6.56 and 6.57 show the distribution properties for the multipath 
values centred around 0 with a very narrow distribution. 
The distributions do not look ‗normal‘ due to the very narrow distribution of values 
so although there are values distributed over a large range of MP1 and MP2 values, the 
centrally located values are so highly populated that the multipath values over 4m are 
relatively invisible. 
This gives a clear indication that the expected level of change in multipath for the 
two main tracks is within 4 meters or so.  
When discussing safety critical systems, ζ values are normally used to describe the 
distribution of possible outcomes (1ζ contains 84% of the data, 2ζ contains 97% 
etc.) if the data fits a normal distribution.  
 
Figure 6.57 - Graphs showing distribution of normalised MP1 and MP2 values for 3
rd November data 
 Data Analysis 
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If ζ values are to be used to quantify the expected values of multipath in the rail 
environment, the results seen in figures 6.56 and 6.57 have to be normally 
distributed. 
The results obtained were checked using the χ
2
 test. This was done by first 
calculating the expected normal distribution using the standard deviation and mean 
of the collected data and then compared against the actual results as seen in 6.56 and 
6.57. 
The χ
2 test determines if the results obtained follow the expected normal distribution 





Where   n is the frequency of each category 
    Oi is the observed value 
    Ei is the expected value 
 
Once the χ
2 value is calculated it is compared with tabulated values corresponding to 
the same number of degrees of freedom (categories present) and depending on the 
value being below or above the table value, the distribution is considered as being 
normal or not. 
 
The results shown in 6.56 for the Wolverhampton line were analysed and found to be 
vastly differing from the expected normal distribution. Initially the full set of data 
where categories have 5 or more values present were graphed and compared, as seen 
in figure 6.58 for MP1 and MP2 values. Given that such a wide distribution was used 
to calculate the mean and ζ values, a smaller, centrally located subset was then used 
(from -6m to +6m) to see if that changed the resulting distribution function. The 







































From 6.59 it can be seen that despite reducing the spread of data used, the observed 
values still do not follow a normal distribution. 
The next check to see if a normal distribution was possible involved reducing the 
size of the bins in which the multipath values were stored. By reducing the size from 






Figure 6.58 – Graphs to show observed distribution and expected normal distribution for MP1 and MP2 
values 2/11/07 




























Once again the distribution was seen not to be normal with a much narrower 
distribution than is normally described using the datasets mean and standard 
deviation. 
The same process used to produce figures 6.58 to 6.60 was also carried out on the 
data collected on the 3
rd of November and the results were similar. The graphed 





Figure 6.59 – Graphs showing narrow subset of observed distribution and expected normal 






































Figure 6.60 - Graphs showing narrow subset of observed distribution and expected normal distribution for MP1 



























Given these results, it is concluded that statistical terms used to describe a normal 
distribution cannot be applied to multipath levels in the rail environment as the 
expected function has a larger spread of data and a lower central frequency when 
using the mean and ζ calculated from the observed data. 
This is significant as the rail community normally use ζ values to describe safety 
critical systems and the expected hazard rates and error margins. Due to the results 
not adhering to a normal distribution, these statistical descriptions cannot be used 
with confidence and so a qualitative approach and tailored statistical terms must be 
used. 
 
Figure 6.61 – Graphs showing observed distributions and expected normal distributions for MP1 and MP2 values for 
the full data set, narrow data set and 0.5m bins data set on 3/11/07 Data Analysis 
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In order to devise a statistical term for the data recorded and analysed, the nature of 
the values recorded must be fully understood. 
 
Due to the length of break-free data being a major factor in the level of MP1 and MP2 
change calculated, the length of data without breaks collected was also analysed. As 
expected, the number of short duration break-free data sets is far greater than the 
longer sets. 
This can be seen for both the 2
nd and 3

























As there is a large difference between the number of shorter and longer periods of 
data, the equivalent natural log values have also been plotted in the figures.  
 
Figure 6.62 – Charts showing the number of break-free data sets for discretely grouped durations for 2/11/07 and the 
equivalent natural log values 
 
Figure 6.63 – Charts showing the number of break-free data sets for discretely grouped durations for 2/11/07 and the 
equivalent natural log values Data Analysis 
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The values for break-free data periods of 1 minute or less have not been plotted, but 
for reference there were 8,905 and 12,396 for the 2
nd and 3
rd of November 
respectively, far higher than any other duration, indicating the extent to which the 
data is broken up. 
 
The reasons for data breaks vary; the most common being the local infrastructure 
causing a momentary loss of signal. Other reasons include the loss of satellite due to 
low elevation or an azimuth change relative to the direction of train travel such that 
the satellite is no longer parallel to the line of travel.  
 
Breaks due to receiver failure are not considered here as none were known to have 
occurred and are assumed to be infrequent enough not to have an impact on the 
results of this experiment. Receiver failure should however be a major part of the 
final safety case for GNSS in the railways and the various reasons for receiver failure 
must be addressed if system integrity is to be determined. 
 
The average calculated change in MP1 and MP2 over the duration of each break-free 
section of data was also added as an output option for the RTK library so that any 
correlation between the duration of break-free sections of data and the corresponding 
maximum change in MP1 and MP2 can be analysed. This resulted in data that was of 
interest when trying to describe the expected value of MP1 and MP2 for a given length 
of break free data, but the main interest when discussing safety critical systems is the 
maximum possible (worst case) values that can appear. Because of this, the 
maximum recorded MP1 and MP2 value was also added as an output, the results of 
which for the 2
nd and 3


































Given the extreme values of MP1 and MP2 seen in figure 6.64, the two largest values 
for each graph (labelled A-D) were individually investigated. 
 
 
The first (A) MP1 value was due to satellite 18 between 14:37:16 and 14:38:18, 
producing a calculated code multipath of 24.293m 
The train was located at Wolverhampton station and the position errors can be seen 
in figure 6.70. 
 
 
   
N 
N 
Figure 6.65 – Overhead and side view of position error due to signals seen at Wolverhampton station 
2/11/07 (mark A) 
Sat signal 
 
A  B 
D  C 
Figure 6.64 – Charts showing the average and maximum change in MP1and MP2 for discrete durations of break-free data for 2/11/07 Data Analysis 
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From figure 6.65, an almost linear position error is visible, possibly due to the station 
housing or platform. Satellite 18 has an azimuth of 129º and is shown in the picture, 
indicating that the satellite should be visible directly, but reflection due to the station 
house is still possible. The MP2 value on satellite 18 at this time was 3.2128m. 
 
Mark B was due to satellite 19 when the train was stationary in New Street station 
between 15:28:56 and 15:38 43 reaching am MP1 value of 23.423m. The position 
















Given the large amount of surrounding infrastructure, as seen before, the level of 
multipath seen in Birmingham New Street station is very high, with signal 
obscuration and reflection being the more likely causes of the extreme position errors 
seen in 6.66 as several are above the error likely to be caused by an MP1 value of 
23m. The corresponding MP2 value for this satellite during these epochs was also too 
low at 15.679m which again is lower than MP1 for the same satellite, negating the 











Figure 6.66 – Overhead and side view of position error due to signals seen at New St station 2/11/07 (mark B) Data Analysis 
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The position jumps produced during point C are shown in figure 6.67 and relate to 












The train is again located in New Street station, but the duration of data is shorter and 
the position errors are smaller. The direction of satellite 25 relative to the receiver is 
directly in line with the overhead roadway, which may be the major source of 
multipath, especially as the satellite is at a low elevation of just 15º. 
 
Mark D relates to satellite 3 from 13:52:45 to 14:08:43 where an MP2 value of 
20.515m was observed, again in New Street station. The corresponding MP1 value 




















Figure 6.68 - Overhead and side view of position error due to signals seen at New St station 2/11/07 (mark D) 
N 
N 
Sat signal Data Analysis 
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The signal from satellite 3 comes in at a very low elevation of 9º over the overhead 
roadway and so the level of interference and multipath from the surrounding 
infrastructure is significant. The position errors are again very large and show that 
areas of main concern when considering the integrity of a position solution are in 
highly built up areas, especially where there are overhead structures and high rise 


























The two extreme cases labelled A and B in 6.69 are both related to the same epochs. 






Figure 6.69 – Charts showing the average and maximum change in MP1and MP2  
for discrete durations of break-free data for 3/11/07 Data Analysis 
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from 8:02:40 until 8:06:31 and can be seen in figure 6.70. The azimuth angles of the 
















The position errors seen are when the train was stationary in the station surrounded 
by trees and foliage. The equivalent MP2 error for satellite 5 was 3.13m and 2.39m 
for satellite 30, both considerably less than the corresponding MP1 values of 12.49m 
and 17.16m.  
 
This may be due to the weaker L2 signal having its power reduced even further by 
the surrounding foliage not having enough power to reflect on the surroundings and 
still register with the receiver whilst the stronger L1 signal has enough power to form 












Sat 5 & 30 
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Figure 6.71 shows the position error when the train was stationary in Winson Green 
sidings (mark C). It is not known if there was another train along side during the data 
collection period and so only the overhead infrastructure and nearby bushes are 
known to be possible causes of multipath (as well as the trains own roof). The MP2 
value for satellite 5 changed by 11.61m with corresponding MP1 change of 1.48m.  
 
The satellite was positioned very low on the horizon and so the level of multipath, 
despite there being few surrounding high objects, is likely to be big. The change in 
multipath may be due to the satellite geometry changing or due to a train moving 
nearby; it is unknown without a detailed geometric evaluation of the situation which 































Figure 6.72 shows the epochs for mark D where MP2 on satellite 9 reached 9.31m 
between 5:12:30 and 5:14:44. The MP1 value changed by 4.36m over the same 
timescale with most likely source of multipath being the two large warehouses 
located on either side of the tracks. Overhead infrastructure is also visible in the area 
and so this could also be a contributing factor.  
The satellites low elevation of 11.8º would have also caused a higher level of 
multipath from the surroundings with the loss of satellite 9 most likely due to its 
decreasing elevation causing obscuration by one of the industrial buildings. 
 
The results shown in figures 6.64 and 6.69 follow two patterns for the average 
results. 
The initial expectation is that the longer a data set is without breaks, the greater the 
observed change in MP1 will be, purely as there is the possibility for a greater data 
spread to be normalised. This is shown in the figures for both days of data as the 
longer streams of break-free data have an average MP1 variation of around 6 to 10 
meters.  
 
The other noticeable result for the average values is that some of the shorter sections 
of break-free data can also contain larger variations in MP1.  
This is best explained by considering that the most hostile signal environment will 
usually cause the highest level of multipath. This hostile environment will also be 
 
Figure 6.72 - Overhead and side view of position error due to signals seen at Smethwick 3/11/07 (mark D) 
N  N 
Sat signal Data Analysis 
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most likely to cause signal breaks due to obscuration of satellites, so despite the 
comparatively short duration of these data sets, the changes seen in MP1 can in fact 
be much larger than for the longer break-free data sets, as seen in 6.64 for the 2
nd of 
November, though this is mainly due to there only being two 9 minute break free 
data sections, one of which providing 23.4m the other 18.2m when the train was at 
New Street station between 15:17:25 and 15:38:43, showing the high levels of 
multipath experienced when inside such a heavily built environment. The average 
value for MP1 for the 2
nd was 4.18m for the averaged values and 8.40m for the 
maximum values. For MP2 it was 4.43m and 8.59m for average and maximum 
averages respectively. This result agrees with the earlier conclusion that the weaker 
L2 signal is more prone to multipath than L1. 
 
The results for the 3
rd do not have the same level of difference for the shorter periods 
recorded, but as with the first day of data, there is no clear linear relationship 
between the duration of break-free data and the level of change in MP1. The averaged 
values for MP1 are 2.75m and 6.66m for the average and maximum changes and 
2.90m and 6.11m for MP2 which again shows the average being larger for MP2, but 
the average of the maximum values if smaller which is more due to the random 
nature of the possible maximum values than the general trend of the data. 
 
The values for maximum MP1 and MP2 change follow a slightly more random pattern 
(as expected), but with a much higher level of multipath for shorter data sets. This 
fits with the theory that the high multipath areas (such as New Street station) will 
also cause more breaks in the data due to obstruction of the signals. 
The results also show the difference between an averaged multipath value and the 
maximum for the same set which seems far less for the longer data sets, but this is in 
fact mainly due to there being fewer long data sets and hence the average is 
sometimes for only 2 results. The differences seen for the shorter data sets clearly 
show how the average is not indicative of the possible changes in high multipath 
environments, which is a fundamental characteristic of the seemingly random, white 
noise nature of multipath. 
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Given the results show general characteristics of the collected data and that any 
conclusions should be based on the widest available set of data, the processing of 
results was extended to include all the other data from the set provided from 2/11/07 
to 15/11/07. 
The data was again split into the days when the train was either travelling on the 
Redditch/Lichfield line or the Wolverhampton line. The results were collated and 
analysed so as to give a more ‗statistically sound‘ evaluation of the multipath values 
expected in the rail environment. 
 
The first collated data set will be for the Birmingham – Wolverhampton line and will 
be made up of data collected on the 2
nd, 6
th and 10
th of November 2007. 
 
The second collated data set will be for the Redditch – Lichfield line and will be 







th of November 
2007. 
 
There is an obvious bias in the amount of data for the second data set, but this is 
unavoidable as the train timetable does not provide an even split of train time on both 














































Mark A references a very high level of multipath on satellite 19 between 15:21:04 
and 15:22:25 on the 6
th of November that should be filtered out by modern receivers 
as the second (reflected) signal received would have a very large delay that a 




Figure 6.73 – Graphs showing the average and maximum change in MP1 and MP2 for discrete 




C Data Analysis 
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Given the azimuth of the satellite (shown in figure 6.74, ~270º) and the elevation of 
22º, high levels of multipath are expected, especially as the train is once again 
located in New Street station. The MP2 value for satellite 19 during the same epochs 














Figures 6.76 and 6.77 represent marks C and D and are both also from satellite 19 on 
the 6
th but from 15:23:36 to 15:27:04 and 15:27:25 to 15:36:19 respectively. The 
azimuth of the satellite only changes by 1º with the elevation decreasing to 20º. 
 
The MP2 changes for satellite 19 are 32.20m and 29.34m with the corresponding MP1 
changes being 19.24m and 25.89m for C and D. These values are very high and 
suggest that given the satellites position at that moment, there is a very strong source 











Figure 6.74 – Overhead and Side view of position errors due to signal errors in New Street Station 6/11/07 (Mark A) 
N 
N 
















Figure 6.75 relates to satellite 1 on the 10
th of November between 11:28:04 and 
11:36:22. The MP1 value changed by 27.49m and MP2 by 6.32m with very large 
position errors being visible, again in the New Street station area.  
 
Due to the size of the main station building, satellites from the eastern section of sky 
are obscured and so this may be a major contributing factor to the greatly decreased 
















Figure 6.76 - Overhead and Side view of position errors due to signal errors in New Street Station 6/11/07 (Mark C) 






















The graphs in figure 6.78 follow a similar pattern to the MP1 and MP2 graphs in figure 
6.73 with the average value tending to be below 6m with a rough peak in the 12 to 15 
minute length sections of data. 
There is also a lack of data sets that are 30-33 minutes long; the reason for this is 
unknown, but when looking at figure 6.44 breaks are seen in the position around 
every 30 minutes, this is likely due to overhead infrastructure along the line and 
when entering New Street station, which would match the return journey time being 
roughly 30 minutes. 
 
The maximum values are as expected, larger in most cases as there is a larger volume 
of data that is more likely to have the possibility of extreme values, despite this, the 
maximum errors do not exceed 38m on L1 and 33m on L2 with them rarely 
exceeding 20 to 25 meters, which when translated to a position error, in the worst 
case scenario would be unlikely to produce and along-track error above 38m which is 
assumed to be within the operating limits of the railway if compared to the traditional 







Figure 6.77 - Overhead and Side view of position errors due to signal errors in New Street Station 6/11/07 (Mark D) 
N 
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Marks A, B and C were investigated due to their high values compared with the other 
data lengths collected. The resulting position errors and incoming signal azimuth 





Figure 6.78 - Graphs showing the average and maximum change in MP1 and MP2 for discrete break 
free data sets for all available Redditch line data 2-15/11/07 
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Mark A was produced by satellite 17 between 22:32:28 and 22:34:22 on the 5
th of 
November with an incoming azimuth of 237º and an elevation of 39º. The resulting 
MP1 change was recorded as being 27.80m with the corresponding MP2 value being 
2.23m. The position errors seen in 6.84 show a steady walk from the southernmost 













Mark B also coincides with mark F as the same satellite (no. 2) during the same 
epochs (23:47:37 to 23:54:29) had both an MP1 change of 27.92m and an MP2 change 
of 15.36m. The satellite was at an azimuth of 295º with elevation 44º causing the 


























Figure 8.81 refers to mark C, again when the train is located in New Street station, 
causing an MP1 change of 27.04m and a corresponding MP2 change of 14.82m on 














Figures 6.85 and 6.86 show position errors at Longbridge station caused by satellites 
10 and 4 respectively. Mark D was cause by satellite 10 on the 14
th of November 
when at 58º azimuth and 11º elevation. This low elevation is likely to be the major 
contributing factor to the high level of multipath observed between 12:25:56 and 






Figure 6.82 - Overhead and Side view of position errors due to signal errors in Longbridge station 14/11/07 (Mark D) 
 
Figure 6.81 - Overhead and Side view of position errors due to signal errors in New Street Station 5/11/07 (Mark C) 
N 
N 















Mark E was caused by satellite 4 on the 5
th of November between 10:00:49 and 
10:03:18 when at an azimuth of 55º and elevation of 17º. The MP2 change observed 
was 20.09m and the MP1 change was 8.54m. 
The overhead infrastructure surrounding Longbridge station combined with the train 
being stationary for an extended period of time allow for high levels of multipath 
change to be observed. Given the low elevations of satellites 10 and 4, the possibility 
of higher multipath is further increased. 
 
The trends for the average change in MP1 and MP2 for Redditch are the same as for 
the data from the 3
rd of November with peaks at around 10 and 20 minute lengths of 
data. There is more data available for the Redditch line and so longer break free data 
sets have increased the spread of results, again there are no data sets between 30 and 
34 minutes in length for MP1 MP2. 
 
The Averaged values for MP1 are 2.46m for the average values and 11.22m for the 
maximum values, for MP2 the averages are 2.44m and 9.00m which is the opposite to 
the expected result and what has been shown previously. 
The reason the average maximum value for the two frequencies exhibit this non 
typical result due to the maximum multipath values being random and so a ‗typical‘ 






Figure 6.83 - Overhead and Side view of position errors due to signal errors in Longbridge station 5/11/07 (Mark E) Data Analysis 
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The results for the averaged mean would normally be greater for L2 than L1 as seen 
previously but this is not the case. 
This may be due to the fact that the Redditch line is more rural compared to 
Wolverhampton and so the L2 signal could be blocked by trees (which allow the L1 
signal to pass through), causing no L2 measurements but possibly high multipath L1 
signals but this would produce a break in both MP1 and MP2 data due to the linear 
combinations shown in equations 2.50 and 2.51 requiring both frequencies to be 
present for the calculation. Because of this the reason for greater MP1 values than 
MP2 would most likely be due to the reflecting material interacting in a different way 
for both of the signals. 
 
The Wolverhampton line is considerably more urbanised and so signals from both L1 
and L2 will mainly effected by building reflections and L2 would normally receive a 
greater multipath error due to the signal strength and correlation function 
discrepancies in the receiver.  
 
In order to identify the specific areas of high multipath, the values of MP1 and MP2 
were plotted against Longitude and Latitude and the specific areas of interest 
investigated. 
The data for the 2
nd of November is shown in figures 6.84 and 6.85. 
 
The multipath levels at both Wolverhampton and New Street stations can be clearly 
seen as much larger than elsewhere along the line. 
Wolverhampton station is not heavily urban and is not surrounded by high buildings, 
but due to the train being stationary for an extended period of time, the observed 
change in MP1 and MP2 can become very large. There is also a larger volume of data 
for the trains stationary position in the station which also increases the probability of 











































Figure 6.84 - Graphs of MP1 and MP2 against Latitude for Wolverhampton line 2/11/07 
(colours represent different satellites) 
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When analysing the MP1 and MP2 values for Wolverhampton station, despite them 
being high, the average is still below 5m whereas for New Street, a comparatively 
more urban environment, the average multipath level is expectedly higher at 9m. 
 
The position error for the train when stationary inside New Street station (after the 
tunnel section and overhead roads) was calculated using an averaged values for the 
first stationary period of the day and plotted against time, this is shown in figure 6.86 
along with the MP1 and MP2 values for all visible satellites in figures 6.87 and 6.88. 
 
Figure 6.85 - Graphs of MP1 and MP2 against Longitude for Wolverhampton line 2/11/07 
(colours represent different satellites) 
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Given the high levels of multipath shown in figure 6.84 for New Street when plotted 
against position, the values against time shown in figures 6.87 and 6.88 are similar to 
the average levels seen along the rest of the track with only a few satellites reaching 






Figure 6.86 - Graph showing Easting and Northing position error for train stationary in 
New Street station 2/11/07 
 
Figure 6.87 - Graph showing change in MP1 for all satellites when train located in New 
















This is due to the continuously visible satellites having to be of a high elevation 
angle due to the obstructions and so they produce a lower multipath compared to the 
lower elevation satellites, but these lower satellites have very broken data sets and so 
the normalisation for each stream of data produces smaller values for MP1 and MP2, 
skewing the data.  
The elevation angles for the satellites are shown in figure 6.89, the breaks in data for 
the lower elevation satellites can be clearly seen, compared to the continuous data 















Figure 6.88 - Graph showing change in MP2 for all satellites when train located in New 
Street station 2/11/07 
 
Figure 6.89 - Graph showing Satellite elevation angles for New Street station 2/11/07 Data Analysis 
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The position errors from figure 6.86 seem to be more closely linked to the MP2 
values seen in figure 6.88 than the corresponding MP1 values in 6.87. This is due to 
the extreme MP2 values being much larger (~6m) than those for MP1 (~2m) causing 
the effect on position error to be greater. 
 
The error in Northing is also much larger than the error in Easting due to the nature 
of the station layout having exposure to the sky being east-west in nature and having 


























Figure 6.90 - Graphs of MP1 and MP2 against Latitude for Redditch line 3/11/07 
(colours represent different satellites) 
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Figures 6.90 and 6.91 show the MP1 and MP2 values for the Redditch section of track 
for the 3
rd of November to have a similar level of multipath to the Wolverhampton 

























The individual spikes in multipath can be attributed to the various stations along the 
line where the train was stationary for an extended period of time and so highlight 
the importance of a long break-free section of data in order to record enough of a 
change in either MP1 or MP2 so that an accurate value can be determined by 
normalising the data.  
In order to compare the MP1 and MP2 values more closely, the values for satellite 8 
have been plotted against latitude in figure 6.92, showing the way in which the MP2 
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Figure 6.91 - Graphs of MP1 and MP2 against Longitude for Redditch line 3/11/07 
(colours represent different satellites) Data Analysis 
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values vary compared to MP1, especially how the larger MP2 values for Longbridge 















Figure 6.93 shows the overhead Google earth plot of the positions for Longbridge 
station. The station has an overhead footbridge as well as a main road overhead that 
obscures the train‘s view of the sky and causes significant multipath. On one side of 
the tracks there are houses and trees and on the other side, behind the main station 
















Figure 6.92 - MP1 and MP2 values for satellite 8 for 3/11/07 
 
Figure 6.93 - Overhead view of position plots for Longbridge station 3/11/07 Data Analysis 
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Both sides therefore also contribute to the urban nature of the surroundings at 
Longbridge station and thus to the high levels of multipath experienced by the 
receiver when stationary in the station. 
 
Another station that has high levels of multipath is at Barnt Green, though the area is 
mainly rural and without high rise buildings, the trees surrounding the platform area 














The resulting multipath levels seen are not only due to the train being stationary for a 
long period of time but also due to the surrounding trees causing interference, as was 
previously shown in the Severn Valley data. 
 
The average values of multipath change seem to be below 4m until the train enters a 
built up urban area where they average to around 9m which could cause a problem if 
a train was trying to distinguish between two parallel tracks (due to the distances 
between them being roughly 2m) but if the train knows which track it is on, the along 





Figure 6.94 - Overhead view of position plots for Barnt Green station 3/11/07 Data Analysis 
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6.4.4  Conclusions 
 
The volume of data created by the Birmingham exercise provides a better statistical 
grounding for analysis of multipath in the rail environment than the limited amount 
of data collected from the Severn Valley.  
The data also gives a better idea of the levels of multipath expected from an urban 
area as seen when comparing the results from New Street against other stations along 
the route that were in more rural areas, though the effects from foliage and trees is 
still substantial. 
 
The data analysis shows that when trying to model an expected level of multipath, 
the assumption of normally distributed data is not sufficient and qualitative 
generalisations must be included if the expectation of a large error is to be 
extrapolated. 
The data shows that despite maximum levels of multipath change reaching 35m, the 
average value expected, even for areas surrounded by large buildings is around 4m 
and the position errors seen for New Street station are primarily in the across track 
direction due to the along track urban canyon effect. Using GDOP as a measure of 
possible position shift is not ideal and a full geometric analysis would need to be 
carried out if trying to predict a position shift. 
These worse case scenarios would need to be included in the safety case log as 
examples of possible hazards and situations where additional sensors and techniques 
may be required to produce results within the required safety margins.  
The possible faults due to these extreme cases would also need to be documented, 
such as the reduced position accuracy and integrity as well as any possible safety 
monitoring system alarms that may occur.  
Mitigation of the risks associated with these faults would also need to be detailed so 
that a solution complying with the ALARP principal can be designed. 
 
When collating all available data the results were very similar to those from 
individual days and so assumptions and models of data from limited sets could 
produce results comparable to those extracted from far larger sets, provided they are 
for the same line, as the difference in results for the Wolverhampton and Redditch Data Analysis 
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line can be seen for individual stations, though the average level of multipath change 
is around 4m for both. 
 
One of the main issues arising from the data and the analysis undertaken is the lack 
of availability of long break free data streams for both low and high elevation 
satellites along the length of the track. Because of this, the levels of multipath change 
calculated may not be entirely correct.  
Despite this, when multipath is observed and position errors result, it is possible that 
track database integration into the position solution could reduce the level of position 
error as well as improve the level of receiver autonomous integrity monitoring by 
reducing the number of satellites required for a position fix, thus increasing the 
possibilities of detecting measurement errors on redundant satellites, something that 
would also be possible with additional satellites provided by Galileo. 
 
7  Summary and Conclusions 
7.1  Summary of results obtained 
 
 
This thesis provides a qualitative and quantitative view of multipath experienced in 
various environments in the UK network, along with an explanation of the different 
safety analysis techniques that can be applied in order to assess the danger multipath 
poses to the safety of life aspect.  
 
The multipath investigations were carried out on the Severn Valley and Birmingham 
New Street area lines. 
The Severn Valley railway was used for an initial experimentation exercise utilising 
the rurally located 26 Km line to collect moving data from a train in order to gain an 
understanding of how a geodetic grade receiver would work in kinematic mode in 
such an environment. One of the main issues encountered was that for the 6607 
epochs of data collected (over a 1 hour journey); only 26.5% allowed a phase 
ambiguity fix when 4 or more satellites were in view and so high precision phase 
based position solutions were difficult to compute. Summary and Conclusions 
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Despite dual frequency code and phase data being collected, code based positions 
were calculated using the RTK Library and Google maps allowed the trains position 
to be plotted. Breaks and jumps were seen due to tunnels and the loss of the L2 signal 
due to tree canopies and other line side infrastructure. The change in the calculated 
code multipath observable on both the L1 and L2 frequency was within 1.8m for all 
the observed satellites, but due to the limited data set, this was not considered a full 
investigation, merely a useful exercise to prepare for the later Birmingham data where 
a higher volume of data can provide better statistical certainties for possible signal 
errors that may contribute to a system error that would need to be added to a HAZOP. 
The speed of the train was roughly 30mph but when entering stations, this was 
obviously reduced, as can be seen by the closer spacing of each epoch position.  
This provided a higher resolution to possible position errors and caused no 
detrimental effects to the overall data. 
 
The Birmingham New Street data was collected from two main lines, one from 
Lichfield to Redditch and the other between New Street and Wolverhampton, both of 
which have dense urban (around New Street station) and rural surrounding 
infrastructure. 
A geodetic quality receiver collecting dual frequency code and phase data was used 
and the code multipath observable calculated. As this method is normally used for the 
assessment of a static base stations local environment, the breaks in both L1 and L2 
signals again caused issues as the resulting jumps in phase counter measurements 
meant the normalisation applied to the changing multipath had to be restarted.  
The resulting data was limited in its use as signal breaks were common, especially in 
highly urbanised or overgrown areas of track. Geometric analysis of the data was 
found to be non ideal due to receiver clock jumps causing errors in the results and so 
the novel application of code multipath observable formation was used for larger sets 
of data in order to compensate.  
The data used was collected over 11 days and is a subset from a larger exercise lasting 
12 months. This larger data set allowed for averaging to take place and the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of a much greater range of break free data sets. In 
doing this, the results obtained are expected to be closer to the true values, but are still 
believed to be a lower estimate of the average value as the breaks still present in much 
of the data are likely to reduce the normalised change in MP1 and MP2. Summary and Conclusions 
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Using Google earth, position errors were also plotted so that jumps due to specific 
buildings, such as rural stations and the main New Street station could also be seen. 
Signal reflections and obscuration were also seen due to overhead walkways and 
roads for limited periods, highlighting the need for additional positioning inputs for 
short periods of GNSS outage. 
This outage issue would be reduced when future systems such as Galileo and the 
updated Russian GLONASS system are used as the number of satellites available 
would be nearer 90. This would increase availability for more enclosed areas, but 
tunnels and bridges would still need to be accounted for. 
 
The results show that the average level of multipath did not tend to exceed 4m with 
roughly 60% of the break free data sets lasting between 1 and 2 minutes. When 
analysing the numbers of each change in multipath, the underlying distribution cannot 
be described as normal (shown by  ?2 tests), with a very high probability of smaller 
multipath values expected. 
 
The extreme levels of multipath can exceed 35m, but the occurrence of these extremes 
are limited and generally located in stations either allowing long break free data sets 
in comparatively high multipath environments, or short data sets in very high 
multipath environments like New Street station, but due to the nature of the receivers 
internal correlator, the likelihood of multipath of this level is unlikely and thus it is 
more likely that these extreme values are due to reflected only signals not being 
rejected. 
These extremes, although uncommon, would need to be included in any evaluation of 
multipath in a safety case with the effects being categorised for FMECA analysis. 
This would be accounted for in an FMECA table as the failure being a position error 
value higher than a level considered safe with the effect being logged as possible 
position error outside the desired RNP and cause being a high level of multipath.  
 
For a better evaluation of these areas, traditional static survey techniques could be 
carried out in order to collect sufficient exposure to individual satellites for a full 
multipath examination to be carried out. Together with computer modelling of the 
surrounding infrastructure, expected direct, reflected and multipath signals could be 
calculated. Summary and Conclusions 
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Recommended actions could either be the mitigation of multipath through advanced 
receiver design or the addition of external sensors such as three axis inertial units to 
reduce the overall positional error provided it conforms to ALARP principals and that 
system redundancy is not an issue. 
 
The investigation into possible EM interference from overhead cables was done using 
data recorded from a dual frequency geodetic grade receiver placed on the station 
platform near the electrified overhead lines at Watford Junction station. Another dual 
frequency receiver was placed on top of a nearby building as a reference. 
By looking for abrupt changes in the code multipath observable as the satellite line of 
sight passes through the overhead cables, any apparent EM effects were investigated. 
The results show that any anomalies were not detected and thus it is assumed the 
possibility of errors caused by electric fields from quaternary lines is unlikely.  
Due to large sections of the UK railways being converted to overhead electric power, 
these findings should provide significant support for the use of GNSS in these areas 
without worrying about signal interference. 
 
It is hoped that the results and conclusions of this research will provide a solid 
scientific grounding when attempting to create a safety case for the use of GNSS in 
the railways. As exact multipath values cannot be determined due to the variation and 
volume of available data, the safety analysis techniques used would have to cater for 
the qualitative aspects of the conclusions as well as the results defined from the 
statistical analysis of the collected data in order to come to an informed conclusion. 
 
The results obtained outline the main issue for the use of GNSS in the UK railways as 
being satellite availability rather than multipath. As discussed, the code multipath 
mitigation techniques used by modern receivers are designed to produce results well 
within the expected requirements for along track position accuracy.  
If across-track position is not required for track selection purposes during service, or 
for train awakening, GNSS is a viable option as a location technology, provided it is 
augmented with systems to facilitate position determination during periods of satellite 
outage. 
 Summary and Conclusions 
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Given the volume and variance of data collected and analysed in this thesis, the 
characterisation of multipath in the rail environment provided here is unlikely to be 
sufficient evidence for a full safety case to be produced.  
It is difficult to precisely predict the level of multipath experienced by a train mounted 
receiver in the UK railways and so further analysis would be required in order to 
increase the level of confidence in the findings, especially when trying to quantitavely 
justify compliance with SILs and RNPs. 
 
7.2  Contributions to a safety case
 
Past European projects to determine the viability of GNSS as a positioning system for 
railways have been based upon new ideas and possible proof of concept and so there 
are no ‗Good Practice‘ references and no historical data for implementing GNSS as a 
safety of life application in the rail domain. Because of this, any attempt to introduce 
GNSS  in  this  capacity  requires  a  ‗Value  Based‘  approach  using  qualitative  and 
quantitative analysis with conservative approximates of the possible hazards that may 
occur as the system would be required to meet SIL4 if used for passenger trains. 
 
Through this thesis, the possibilities of these hazards due to EM interference from 
overhead cables and multipath have been investigated.  
The  results  obtained  have  removed  EM  radiation  as  a  hazard  (though  further 
conclusive  testing  is  advisable)  and  have  defined  the  levels  of  multipath  to  be 
expected in various types of surroundings found in the UK rail network. 
For  a  safety  case  to  be  complete,  all  possible  outcomes  from  multipath  (within 
reasonable limits) need to be recorded, no matter how unlikely they are to occur so 
that  not  only  the  random  events  (such  as  the  35m  levels  recorded  in  New  Street 
station) are detailed so that stringent mathematical analysis can take place, but the 
systematic errors (such as the average 4m of multipath seen) are also recorded so that 
SIL categorisation can take place. 
 
Availability of satellites was a known issue from the beginning and has been detailed 
in previous UK reports (RSSB, 2007) concluding that roughly 10.5% of the British 
rail network at route level receive no or poor GPS coverage for distances of 150m, Summary and Conclusions 
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this equates to 1885km of track where GPS availability is below standards required 
for even the most basic RNPs. This could be improved by including track databases in 
the positioning algorithm, reducing the number of satellites required, increasing the 
overall  coverage  but  the  issue  of  tunnels  and  overhead  infrastructure  is  still 
unavoidable, thus the inclusion of additional sensors is mandatory for any positioning 
system required to operate continuously. 
 
Causal  analysis  of  multipath  would  attribute  the  surrounding  infrastructure  as  the 
major reason with satellite position as an enhancement or reduction of its value. By 
implementing advanced receiver architectures, the reduction of multipath and increase 
in integrity can be obtained with current Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) equipment 
and so when undertaking consequence analysis the potential for hazardous levels of 
position error and low integrity are reduced. 
The potential for false trust in the systems output due to multipath is possible but 
given the levels of multipath observed on a general level, it is believed that the errors 
in position would be within the required levels and that any additional sensors or track 
database integration should improve errors and facilitate higher RAIM availability so 
that the system could be trusted. 
If  the  seven  stage  process  detailed  in  the  Engineering  Safety  Management  book 
(Railtrack, 2000) were to be carried out, the analysis would take the form similar to 
figure  7.1  using  the  data  and  conclusions  from  this  thesis  as  well  as  from  other 




































7.3  Further work 
 
The work carried out in this thesis has given a solid grounding into the effects of 
multipath in the UK rail environment. The results are from three specific lines in the 
UK and so will not necessarily represent the entire of the UK or Europe in terms of 
the possible variation in multipath.  
 
Larger data sets from other tracks throughout the UK would help to strengthen the 
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Figure 7.1 - Example of safety case structure for Multipath risk assessment stages Summary and Conclusions 
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including the possibility of any geographical variance in satellite observations either 
due to the track heading or any orbital anomaly (though this is highly unlikely). 
The tracks under investigation have had little if any sections located in deep cuttings 
and so the possible effects of these is not well represented, this would also be another 
factor to consider when locating any possible further data collection sites. 
 
Using complex clock modelling techniques would provide an accuracy increase to 
allow highly precise point positioning to occur in order for the geometric multipath 
value to be calculated on a single epoch basis, rather than having to rely on a 
continuous stream of data for normalisation. 
 
Further investigation into possible EM effects from overhead cables may need to be 
carried out in order to provide a definite conclusion, as the experiment carried out 
could have been improved on in order to be more rigorous, with a full site survey of 
the train station being carried out and precise cable positions mapped. Given the 
location of the receiver used in Watford Junction, any direct interference from the 
overhead cables with the antenna itself will be limited due to the distances being 
roughly over 3m. There may be possible effects when placing the antenna on top of a 
train as any EM field created by the overhead cables will be far stronger in close 
proximity due to the inverse square law. This should also be investigated further but 
the results from the Birmingham data did not show any errors when passing under 
electrified sections of track. 
In addition to this, testing of a receiver in an anechoic chamber using high sensitivity 
detectors and clearly defined signal transmission paths would be ideal so that all 
possible background and infrastructure related interference is removed and thus any 
interference experienced can be definitively apportioned to any test EM source 
present. 
 
Given the use of GNSS in the railways as a future possibility for control and 
signalling, augmentation would almost certainly be required due to the obvious 
satellite availability issues encountered throughout the data. The various types of 
augmentation with other devices (dead reckoning) have different positive and 
negative selection criteria and depending on the RNP limits set and the cost of the Summary and Conclusions 
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alternatives an ALARP combined system could be produced, though if this would be 
available as a commercial, off the shelf solution is unknown. 
 
One of the major concerns with devices such as accelerometers and gyroscopes is the 
amount and speed by which they drift from the true value. Cost – benefit analysis 
must be carried out when selecting as normally low cost inertial sensor almost always 
mean a high drift rate and therefore a short time for inaccuracies to build up in the 
position solution. This could be directly linked to conditions such as tunnel length and 
overhead bridge frequency combined with the receivers time to re-acquisition of 
satellites in order to determine the maximum likely period without satellite coverage. 
 
The Figure below shows the possible change in position error for a train travelling at 
30 km/h if a GPS outage was to occur, i.e. if a train enters a tunnel, how the predicted 















The graph shows that despite a track database being integrated with the GPS in order 
to obtain a better initial position, as there is no GPS for the duration of the plot, the 
position error on the train is purely down to the speed of the train being an unknown 
(assuming the train is breaking/accelerating within a 30 km/h bound) and the 
assumption that it is still travelling at 30 km/h. 
 
Figure 7.2 - Graph showing along track position error drift rates after a GPS outage Summary and Conclusions 
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The INS drift rate used is that of the system installed on board the Birmingham train 
and is the manufacturer stated 0.2m/s
2. The use of a tachometer is assumed to be 
without any noticeable drift within the 5 second time frame. 
 
This graph should be considered when designing an integrated system as despite 
tachometry having a significant drift rate over long distances, this can be re-set when 
GPS signals are available so that when a tunnel or overhead obstruction causes a GPS 
outage, the tachometer can take over the along-track position determination for a 
limited time until GPS is re-acquired. This solution, although making use of pre-
existing sensors on the train may not be the cheapest option as tapping into the 
tachometer output may be more complicated and thus more expensive (and potentially 
less reliable) than to simply add INS to the installed GPS package. 
 
Additional augmentation systems can be considered to remove the possibility of 
position error, specifically, the errors encountered due to the loss of satellites or 
signals. When the number of satellites drops to 4, the position error can increase 
significantly (as seen throughout the results in this thesis). This is due to the 
possibility of a satellite signal error being detected being very low as there are no 
‗spare‘ satellites to compare with.  
This is the basis of RAIM, mentioned in section 4.1 and can be improved using a 
known track database to reduce the three dimensional position problem normally used 
to a one dimensional problem (along track) (Zeng & Cross, 2008). Rather than 
requiring 4 satellites to get a position, only 2 are needed, thus giving the user 2 ‗spare‘ 
satellites to provide a higher level of RAIM availability. 
 
The level of modern hardware sophistication available for multipath mitigation should 
reduce the errors seen in this thesis even further, strengthening the conclusion that for 
the UK rail environment, multipath should not be a major concern when considering 
along track position determination provided adequate additional sensors are used to 
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A. Appendix A - The Safety Case 
7.4  Safety case example – Watford Junction experiment 
Below is the safety case used for the Watford Junction data collection exercise. It was 
submitted to the station manager and approved. 
 
 





We wish to record GPS signals on the platform at Watford Junction station using a 
Leica GPS500 receiver system which consists of a tripod mounted antenna, receiver 
pack and self contained battery. The tripod is a standard issue heavyweight surveying 
tripod (that is commonly seen on building sites) and the antenna increases its height 
by roughly 30 centimetres. The receiver unit and battery attach to the side of the 
tripod and are boxes the size of an A4 file and a standard video camera battery. 
We also wish to use a tripod mounted theodolite to measure the vertical angle of the 
over head lines, this involves looking through an eyepiece of a telescope until it is 
aligned with the item being surveyed and is purely a remote sensing device. 
A picture of the equipment is shown below;  
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GPS equipment on tripod         Theodolite on tripod 
 
The positioning of the GPS receiver and the total station would be above the same 
ground mark and so only one tripod will be used, with the different measurement 
devices being interchanged accordingly. The position of the ground mark would be in 
the south east end of the main central platform, next to one of the main supporting 
pylons as this is away from the main flow of passengers and gives the best position for 
data collection., as shown on the map below; 





Map of Watford junction station showing preferred location of equipment 
 
The equipment will be positioned in the centre of the platform at least 2500mm from 
the platform edge and over 3000mm from the overhead lines, and will be 
accompanied by someone at all times who will also adhere to these distances and 




The persons carrying out the experiment will register themselves before starting work, 
by „signing-in‟ in the station visitors book, and receiving a Silverlink safety briefing, 
or as directed by the Silverlink Group station manager or their nominated 
representative. A record of the Silverlink safety briefing is to be retained by Silverlink 
for audit purposes. The persons will also „sign-out‟ of the Station visitor book, at the 
end of any working period, or when obliged to quit site, or as directed by the 




All persons associated with the experiments will have in their possession at all times, 
current and valid personal photo ID. 
Silverlink is to be fully indemnified against any claims which may arise as 
consequence of, or attributable to, the experiments. 
In the event of an incident, the procedures detailed in the Silverlink safety briefing 
will be complied with. 
The persons will wear at all times, Hi Visibility vest / jacket, to an approved colour 
and specification, issued by Silverlink. 
All vehicles will be parked in designated areas as agreed with the Silverlink Group 
station manager or their nominated representative, and Silverlink recompensed 
accordingly. 
Access to station facilities (e.g. toilets) will not be required and local public services 
will be used if required. 
Access to any secure station areas is not required. 
Access to station electrical supplies is not required. 
Access to electrical intake areas is not required. 
All cabinets, compounds, storage areas etc. are to remain secure at all times. 
Access to station services (e.g. water) is not required. 
Sufficient protection will be provided to mitigate injury or loss to any persons from 
the equipment during unloading / loading, transfer to / from site, or positioning on 
site. 
Means of protecting surfaces including but not limited to, car park, platforms, stairs, 
and subway, will be provided to mitigate damage from the equipment during 
unloading / loading, transfer to / from site, or positioning on site. 
All damage caused to the station fabric and its facilities, is to be made good to the 
written satisfaction of the Silverlink Group station manager or their nominated 
representative, and route property manager. 
The experiment site and access routes within the station are to be kept clear and free 
from litter, obstructions or other hazards. These areas are to be examined with the 
Silverlink Group station manager or their nominated representative, to ensure the 
area is safe for use. 
No means of gaining height is to be used in association with these experiments. Appendix A 
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Cleaning regimes are to be invoked to ensure that all waste and residue caused by the 
experiment (including litter), is cleared from the station fabric and its facilities. These 
areas are to be examined at the end of each period with the Silverlink Group station 
manager or their nominated representative, to ensure the area is acceptable to 
Silverlink. 
 
Date of work: 
 
The date and time when the experiment will be carried out is to be agreed between the 
station manager and the Department of Geomatic Engineering but is expected to be 




Although this was approved as a valid safety case, the layout normally used in the UK 
railways contain more detail and supporting evidence for the risks. 





B. Appendix B – UCL RTK Library 
7.5  Settings File 
 
Example RTK library settings file: 
7.6   
Figure B.1 - Example Settings file for UCL RTK library software suite 
 
 